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Abstract 
 
The objective of the thesis is to investigate Malaysia’s pay determinants from three 
different perspectives, namely: employees’ perspective, employers’ perspective, and 
both employees-employers’ perspectives. As a matter of fact, previous studies have 
not been able to document the potential impact of employers and firms on pay 
determinants within the Malaysian economy, owing to a lack of appropriate data. 
Therefore, with the availability of new datasets – worker-level dataset (WLD) and 
firm-level dataset (FLD) obtained from the Second Malaysian Productivity Investment 
Climate Survey (PICS-2), we have developed a matched-worker-firm dataset 
(MWFD), so that by employing such dataset it will add a new dimension to pay 
analysis in Malaysia as well as allowing for a comprehensive understanding and 
clearer picture of Malaysia’s pay system. 
 
From the employees’ prospective, the findings of this thesis indicate that a worker with 
a higher education level, skills and training generally gets a higher pay compared to 
those without. In addition, a worker who undergoes training from his/her current 
employer gets a higher pay compared to those who had training from a previous 
employer or only off-the-job training. At the same time, workers with complex 
computer skills, as well as those who are in professional employment and 
management, also receive a considerably higher pay. From the employers’ 
prospective, however, the findings indicate that firm size, human capital stock in the 
firm, worker performance, capital stock, and firm performance are important factors 
that affect the Malaysian average monthly pay. Besides, the elasticity of pay with 
xiii 
  
 
 
respect to employer size is two percent, and this figure supports the notion that the 
Malaysian labour market can be characterised as imperfect competition. From both 
employers-employees’ prospective, it is obvious that both observable worker 
characteristics and unobserved firm-effects are key elements of pay determinants. 
Nevertheless, firm effects seem to explain the variability in pay determinants more 
than observable worker characteristics. In addition, the relationship between pay 
component and firm performance exhibits a positive tendency. This implies that 
workers get a higher pay either because of worker characteristics or that firm-effects 
are being employed in firms that are more productive and profitability.
1 
  
 
 
 : INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
 
1.1 Preliminary 
 
This chapter introduces the research background and motivation of the study, before 
setting out the aims and research questions. The chapter then discusses the 
contributions of the thesis, followed by a look at the research design. Finally, the 
structure of the thesis is outlined. 
 
1.2 Research background 
 
In the labour market, pay or wage rate is by far the most important and contentious 
issue that concerns government, employers, and workers. For the government, pay is 
important because generally it affects the stability of national macroeconomic 
indicators such as inflation, employment, purchasing power and socio-economic 
development. For the employers, however, pay is deemed important as it represents a 
significant part of their costs, a factor that has become increasingly important to their 
workers’ performance and competitiveness in general. In this manner, pay affects the 
employers’ ability to retain and recruit a labour force of quality. Meanwhile, for 
workers, pay is the most important issue as it measures the value of their services, 
becoming consequently a fundamental indicator of the workers’ standard of living.  
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In recent decades, rapid economic growth in Malaysia has been deemed over time as 
fundamental towards improvement in the standard of living. This is because the more 
prosperous a country is, the better off are its citizens in terms of wealth and health. But 
did Malaysia’s economic growth lead to an improvement in its standard of living? In 
general, we reckon that a higher economic growth, achieved through more productive 
use of all available resources, should result in a higher per capita income, and hence 
improvement in people’s average standard of living (measured in terms of the average 
wage). The average wage represents the general wage level in the country. Figure 1.1 
illustrates the average monthly real wages (defined as the mean of the monthly gross 
nominal wages of employees in the Malaysian manufacturing sector, deflated by CPI 
[2005=100]) and annual growth rates from 1996 to 2010.  
 
Figure 1.1: Average Monthly Real Wages and Annual Growth Rate in Malaysia  
(Manufacturing), 1996-2010 
 
Notes: Total monthly wages are divided by total employment. Real monthly average wage 
is calculated in constant 2005 Ringgit Malaysia. 
  Sources: Monthly Manufacturing Survey, Department of Statistics of Malaysia (Nominal 
monthly average wage); International Monetary Fund (Consumer Price Index).  
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Based on Figure 1.1, the average monthly real wages for Malaysian manufacturing 
increased only at about 36 percent in fifteen years. In 1996, the average worker earned 
RM 1,419 per month in real terms, while it was RM 1,929 per month in 2010. High 
inflation in 1998 and 2008 nullified some of the gains and caused the real average 
wage to fall for those two years by 2.5 and 3.2 percent, respectively. In 2001 to 2004, 
real wages rose more sedately. Real wage growth picked up pace in 2005, but 
continuously grew at a decelerating path from 2006 to 2008. In 2008, given the 
economic recession and the ensuing inflationary pressures, real growth in average 
monthly wages turned out to be negative. With the gradual recovery of the economy 
from the global financial crisis, wage growth started to grow by 4 percent in 2010.   
 
But who actually benefits from such economic growth? The government has long 
acknowledged that growth does not automatically benefit all members of society 
during economic expansion due to its strategies of providing support to the most 
vulnerable and reducing poverty (Bailey et al., 2011). Nonetheless, we expect that 
people at work can directly enjoy the positive impact of such monthly growth through 
their pay. Figure 1.2 shows the link between pay (measured in terms of average 
monthly real wages) and economic growth (measured in terms of real labour 
productivity) in the Malaysian manufacturing sector between 1996 and 2010. Real 
labour productivity is defined as real GDP per employed person in constant 2005 
Ringgit Malaysia. 
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Figure 1.2: Real Average Wage Growth vs. Real Labour Productivity Growth in 
Malaysian Manufacturing, 1996-2010 
 
Notes: Real labour productivity is calculated as real GDP in constant 2005 Ringgit Malaysia, 
divided by the total employment. Average monthly real wages are in constant 2005 Ringgit 
Malaysia. Wage data only cover the manufacturing sector. 
 
Sources: Department of Statistics of Malaysia, Monthly Survey of Manufacturing (nominal 
monthly average wage); National Accounts (GDP and total employment); International 
Monetary Fund (Consumer Price Index).  
 
 
As shown in Figure 1.2, in just about every year, wage growth moved in the same 
direction as labour productivity growth, as predicted by the positive labour 
productivity-wage growth hypothesis. In other words, when the growth rate of labour 
productivity increased, wage growth accelerated; and when the growth rate of labour 
productivity decreased, wage growth decelerated. However, in the years 2001, 2008, 
and 2009, the relationship between the two becomes negative. For the years 2001 and 
2009, the real wage growth increased despite declining real labour productivity growth 
due to inflation being lower than the nominal wage growth. Meanwhile, in 2008, a 
higher inflation (5.4%) relative to the nominal wage growth (2.0%) caused the real 
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and real labour productivity tend to move together, the growth in real wage has mostly 
been falling behind improvements in real labour productivity (2002-2007). In addition, 
real wage growth is much less volatile than real labour productivity growth (1996 – 
2010).  
 
Productivity growth is an important factor for understanding the impact of the wage 
trends in Malaysia (Abdul-Ghani et al., 2001). As reported in the Eighth Malaysia 
Plan, an increase in labour productivity based on sales is greater than an increase in 
wages, i.e. an average 10.4 per cent and 6.8 per cent per annum respectively from 1995 
to 2000. Hence, per unit labour cost decreased by 3.2 per cent on average (EPU, 2001). 
To sum up, Malaysia’s economic growth, as represented by real labour productivity, 
was generally higher than the growth in Malaysian society’s standard of living, as 
measured by the average monthly real wages. This situation provides a rough idea of 
the positive and weak relationship between pay and productivity. A higher 
contribution by workers to manufacturing output justifies higher wages. But what 
exactly is the rationale behind this? And how can we ensure that the proceeds from 
growth can benefit workers through the wages they receive each month? In order to 
better understand these issues, it is important to understand first how wages are 
actually determined.   
 
1.3 Motivation for the study 
 
In any economy, the process of pay determination is a complicated one. The pay is not 
solely determined by the market forces of supply and demand. Pay determination is 
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also influenced by the relevant government policies and national legislation for 
industrial relations. Collective bargaining is regulated through legislation on industrial 
relations. Apart from the law, the government also sets up policies on guaranteed 
minimum wages and minimum statutory benefits to protect workers. Pay formation, 
therefore, is the outcome of interactions between government, employers, and 
workers. 
 
The pay formation system is of utmost importance to economic development. Almost 
all employees in developed countries have higher wages due to a remuneration system 
that rewards productivity. In Malaysia, pay remains stagnant and lower than in other 
regional economies, and may not accurately reflect employee and/or firm performance 
(EPU, 2010). Currently, issues related to pay and the labour market in Malaysia are 
being hotly debated. The Malaysian labour market is facing a significant challenge as 
it seeks to achieve the 2020 goal of being among the elite club of developed and high-
income economies. Various issues are closely related to Malaysia’s human capital and 
pay structure.  
 
According to the Malaysian Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak, Malaysia’s 
pay structure needs to be reviewed. He also stated that the government will put in place 
measures to ensure that the pay structure is commensurate with the country’s pool of 
talents. He argued that human talent in Malaysia has somewhat been undervalued. So 
the government needs to find a mechanism that can raise the country’s pay levels 
(Bernama, 2010). According to the Eighth Malaysia Plan (EPU, 2001), and in view of 
intense competition due to globalization, the government of Malaysia, in collaboration 
7 
  
 
 
with the private sector, has placed a lot of emphasis on the importance of the 
relationship between pay and productivity.  
 
Studies on pay formation and pay structure are crucial to understanding and explaining 
how pay is determined and structured in any economy including developing ones such 
as Malaysia’s. Pay formation is a key element in economic growth and economic 
transformation because from the perspectives of efficiency and equity, pay plays an 
important role in the economy. In order to provide a better understanding of important 
economic issues such as income distribution, poverty, consumer spending, and the 
perpetuation of inflation, we first need to understand the pay determination process 
(Groshen, 1990). A study of pay formation and pay structure can provide a better 
understanding of how the Malaysian wage model works. The Malaysian government 
has admitted that in order to improve the standard of living and reduce poverty, 
employees’ pay ought to be increased. The increase in pay should nonetheless be 
followed by an increase in productivity. Otherwise, it would lead to problems such as 
aggravated inflationary pressures, weakening the country’s international 
competitiveness, and reducing its attractiveness as a profitable centre for foreign direct 
investment. In general, the study of pay formation is important for answering questions 
such as the following: (1) what are the important factors that determine the level of 
pay for individuals, firms, sectors, industries, and nations? (2) what are the effects of 
workers’ characteristics, firm’s characteristics, and government policies on pay? 
  
In neoclassical economics, wage rate is the labour market outcomes driven by the 
interactions between two parties, i.e. employers and employees. It is crucial and timely 
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to understand these interactions in light of the dramatic changes in the international 
economy over the past several decades (Haltiwanger et al., 2007). For example, if there 
are changes in technology or job restructuring at the firm level, these changes also 
affect employees in those firms. Consequently, all policies are driven by a certain 
understanding of these effects. Theoretically, the determination of wage rates by 
employers is based on the supply-side (i.e. employees’ characteristics) and demand-
side (i.e. employers’ characteristics) factors in the labour market. Empirically, the 
strength of each factor can only be assessed if the observed characteristics of 
employers and employees are simultaneously captured, as well as allowing for the 
unobserved personal and firm effects within the regression equation that explain the 
determination of wage rates. 
 
Until recently, most econometric analyses of individual pay in Malaysia were based 
on datasets that had only worker-level data (i.e. based on individual or household 
surveys). For example, studies by Lee and Nagaraj (1995), Ismail and Mohd Noor 
(2005), Milanovic (2006), and Ismail (2011) used worker-level data based on surveys 
of individual workers in the Malaysian manufacturing and services sectors. 
Meanwhile, studies by Ismail and Jajri (2012) used worker-level data based on 
households surveyed in 2007/2008 for all sectors in Malaysia. Therefore, the 
understanding of the interactions between workers and employers in determining 
individual pay rates in Malaysia has been limited, as these data sources contain 
information from only one side of the market, and are therefore incapable of analysing 
models that incorporate both labour supply and demand factors. 
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 In recent years, data that combine employees’ characteristics and specifications of the 
firms in which they work – i.e. matched employer-employee datasets (hereafter 
MEED) – have become increasingly available. These datasets therefore combine the 
observations on typical firm-level variables (e.g. value added, factor employment.) 
with socio-demographic data (e.g. employees’ age, job tenure, ethnic origin, gender, 
experience, skill, pay.). MEED has led to an explosion of interest in research on the 
outcomes of labour market interactions between firms and workers. And despite the 
proliferation of studies on individual wage rates using MEED, studies that use this type 
of data for developing countries are rather limited.  
 
However, the Second Productivity Investment Climate Survey (hereafter PICS-2), 
which contains both information on employers and employees, has become available 
in the case of Malaysia since 2008. This survey contains two different levels of 
datasets, i.e. the worker-level dataset (hereafter WLD) and the firm-level dataset 
(hereafter FLD)1. Both datasets are then merged to develop the matched worker-firm 
dataset (hereafter MWFD) for Malaysia. This is the starting point of this thesis, which 
draws on this newly available representative dataset to examine the determination of 
pay in the Malaysian economy by taking greater account of the employees’ and their 
employers’ characteristics.  
 
 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
1 These datasets are described in detail in Chapter 4. 
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1.4 Aims and research questions 
 
The general objective of the thesis is to examine the determinants of pay in the 
Malaysian economy from three different perspectives (viz. employees’ perspective, 
employers’ perspective, and both employees-employers’ perspectives). Specifically, 
this study differs from previous studies on pay in Malaysia in more ways than one. By 
using a disaggregated dataset from the PICS-22, this study adds a new dimension to 
pay analysis in Malaysia for the reason that PICS-2 will allow for addressing the 
following questions:  
1. What are the key determinants of the individual workers’ pay in the Malaysian 
manufacturing sector? 
2. How is individual worker’s pay affected by employers’ characteristics such as 
basic human capital, demographic, training, skills, occupation and location? 
3. To what extent have these variables managed to explain pay variation in the 
Malaysian economy? 
4. What are the important determinants of average firm-level pay rates in 
Malaysia? 
5. How do employers’ characteristics such as employer size, firm performance, 
governance, ownership, capital, regional and industrial variation influence the 
average firm-level pay rates? 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
2 PICS-2 obtained from the World Bank’s enterprise survey website 
(http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/). 
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6. Does the Malaysian pay model at the firm level support the theory of 
monopsony?  
7. How is the individual worker’s pay affected by the employer-employee 
specific-effects in the Malaysian labour market? 
8. Between observable worker characteristics and unobservable employer 
heterogeneity, which one is predominant in determining workers’ pay?                           
9. What are the relations between pay structure and firm’s performance and 
input? 
 
1.5 Contribution of the thesis 
 
The special contribution of this study is to include for the first time the employer’s 
perspective in examining the determination of pay in Malaysia. From a theoretical 
perspective, firms are central to many theories of the labour market. For example, 
wages reflect marginal productivity wherein wages differ across firms because firms 
utilize capital to different degrees or offer workplaces that differ with respect to 
amenities – the classical view (Cahuc et al., 2002). Wages motivate workers to put in 
efforts, so employers offer higher wages if they find it hard to monitor their workers - 
the efficiency wage view (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Kruger and Summers, 1988). 
Wage differentials across firms for homogenous workers are due to search frictions – 
the equilibrium search theory (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998; Mortensen, 2003). 
Finally, since the elasticity of the labour supply facing the firm is finite, the monopsony 
theory also emphasizes that the firm is important in any wage determination (Manning, 
2003). 
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The incorporation of the firm-level in empirical research on pay determination in 
Malaysia is facilitated by the availability of PICS-2, which includes both employer 
and employee data. The measurement of labour input at the worker-level as well as at 
the firm-level can be improved by using the employer-employee matched dataset. 
Additionally, richer information on workers’ characteristics in firms can be used to 
model and measure the labour input directly for the different types of employees 
employed in a firm. Furthermore, the theories of wage determination can be tested for 
the case of Malaysia by contrasting estimates of the relationship between the 
employees' characteristics and their productivity with estimates of the relationship of 
these characteristics to wages.  
 
In short, the thesis makes three contributions to the existing knowledge and literature: 
firstly, it examines the effects of workers’ characteristics on pay structure in Malaysian 
manufacturing at the worker-level dataset. Secondly, it examines the determination of 
the average firm level wage rates in the Malaysian manufacturing sector using the 
firm-level dataset. Finally, it examines the role of employer-employee specific effects 
in determining worker’s pay by using the matched worker-firm characteristics dataset. 
 
A further contribution of this study is to include the region of Sabah and Sarawak, 
which has long been neglected in many previous studies due to a lack of data. 
Therefore, this study can provide a more comprehensive picture for Malaysia 
compared to the many previous studies that only captured Peninsular Malaysia. 
Besides, this thesis is among the first of its kind to develop and utilize especially the 
matched employee-employer dataset towards exploring the pay structure in Malaysia.   
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1.6 Research design 
 
This thesis adopts a quantitative approach. This approach comprises four main steps. 
The first step involves reviewing the existing theoretical and empirical literature on 
pay determination. This necessarily provides the background to my analysis. The 
second step mainly involves data collection, data sorting and preliminary data analysis 
that yields descriptive statistics. This research only has access to cross-sectional 
datasets obtained from PICS-2. The descriptive analysis allows one to gauge the 
comparability and reliability of the datasets. The third stage involves an econometric 
analysis, and here the STATA 12 software package is used to estimate all of the 
econometric models. The final stage involves interpreting the empirical findings to see 
whether the results are consistent with the theoretical insights and previous empirical 
findings. 
 
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
 
Apart from this introductory chapter, the remainder of the thesis is organized as 
follows. Chapter 2 reviews both the theoretical and empirical literature on pay 
determination. This chapter consists of two sections. The first is a review of the 
evolution of theories of wages from historical to contemporary periods, and finally to 
alternative theories of the labour market. The second discusses the empirical evidence 
of pay determination in developed and developing countries, and then focusses more 
closely on the case in Malaysia. The literature presented in this chapter sets the 
theoretical background for analysing pay determination in the Malaysian economy. 
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Chapter 3 discusses the background to Malaysia’s economic performance and labour 
market. Specifically, this chapter describes the contribution of Malaysia’s 
manufacturing sector, Malaysia’s wage system and its trend, as well as some issues 
relevant to the Malaysian labour market. 
 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the three datasets used in this thesis. We first 
describe the source, sampling frame, and design of the PICS data. Then, we present – 
by means of a table and graph – the structure of the worker- and firm-level dataset, 
respectively. Next, we outline the construction of the matching procedure and 
introduce the core variables of the matched worker-firm dataset for Malaysia. 
Moreover, we further provide some descriptive statistics and analysis of the sample 
for worker-level, firm-level, and matched worker-firm level datasets. 
 
In Chapter 5, the thesis examines the determination of individual workers’ pay from 
the employee’s perspective alone. In this respect, we focus only on the effects of the 
supply-side factors (i.e. workers’ characteristics) on the individual workers’ pay. We 
use the WLD for Malaysia’s manufacturing sector. Apart from using new datasets 
obtained from PICS-2, this chapter also adds new variables to the Malaysian pay 
equation such as skills, on-the-job training, off-the job training, studying abroad, and 
distance from work – all of which will be estimated based on the extended Mincerian 
wage model using OLS with robust standard errors as well as Quantile Regression 
(QR) analysis. These estimations are conducted separately for all workers, male and 
female. The QR, which was introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978), is employed 
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to control for individual unobserved heterogeneity. The QR extends the regression 
model to conditional quantiles by allowing one to quantify the effects of worker 
characteristics at specific quantiles, e.g. 10th, 50th and 90th quantiles of the individual’s 
conditional pay distribution. 
 
Chapter 6 analyses empirically the effect of employer characteristics on Malaysia’s 
average firm-level pay rates in the manufacturing sector. Initially, this chapter 
discusses briefly the theoretical background to the monopsony model of labour market. 
This chapter utilizes the Malaysian FLD to ascertain the effect of employer 
characteristics and elasticity of the average firm-level pay rates with respect to 
employer-size. In this respect, this chapter presents and discusses the results based on 
an estimation of the Malaysian pay model at two different employer-size measures. 
The former will use employer-size dummies, while the latter will use a continuous 
employer-size variable proxy by log of employment. Both estimations also include 
other important employer characteristics such as productivity, profitability, and 
ownership. In this chapter, the static monopsony model by Manning (2003) was 
adopted as a tool for estimating the Malaysian pay model using the OLS estimator with 
a robust standard error.  
 
Chapter 7 examines the determinants of Malaysia’s pay rates using the matched 
worker-firm dataset.  This study allows for a more in-depth analysis of the worker- 
and firm-specific effects on the individual worker’s pay. Moreover, this matched data 
is capable of capturing the worker-firm specific effect. Due to the unavailability of 
longitudinal matched data, we are unable to disentangle part of this specific effect that 
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is due to unobservable worker or firm heterogeneity. And so, we adapted the two-stage 
estimation strategy proposed by Abowd, Kramarz, Morgalis and Troske (2001) in 
order to control any potential simultaneity bias.  
 
The final chapter summarises and synthesises the main findings of the thesis and 
highlights those factors that determined Malaysia’s manufacturing pay rates from three 
different perspectives. Consequently, this chapter discusses some policy 
recommendations, and then acknowledges some inevitable limitations of the thesis, 
before finally offering some suggestions for further research. 
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 : LITERATURE REVIEW ON PAY DETERMINANTS 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews both the theoretical and empirical literature on pay determination 
and its structure. This review defines the key terms and definitions commonly used in 
the literature on pay determination and its structure, summarises the theories and 
models of pay determination, and then identifies the determinants of pay and its 
structure in developed and developing countries’ labour markets. A review of the 
theoretical and empirical perspectives on pay determination is very important and 
useful for our analyses in the subsequent chapters. The former can build a firm 
theoretical foundation for the empirical analyses, while the latter can help us identify 
the determinants of pay and its structure, as well as providing us with a better 
understanding of the methodology used and limitations of the datasets, estimation 
methods, and results.   
 
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. The second section (2.2) briefly defines 
and measures pay, before evaluating the different concepts and measures found in this 
area. The third section (2.3) explores the evolution of pay determination theories, and 
here historical theories of wages, contemporary and alternative theories of the labour 
market are discussed. Section four (2.4) gives a brief summary of the empirical 
explanations on pay determination in developed and developing countries. Following 
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this, section 2.5 focuses on the empirical evidence on pay determinants in Malaysia. 
The final section (2.6) summarises and concludes this chapter. 
 
2.2 Defining and measuring pay 
 
Before reviewing pay determination theories and evidences, it is important to 
determine the true meaning of workers’ pay and how it is measured. This term is 
critically important to every employer and employee, and bears huge implications 
especially if wrongly interpreted. Workers’ pay or wages are defined as a fixed regular 
payment earned for work or services rendered, typically paid on a daily, weekly, or 
monthly basis. Based on Malaysia’s Employment Act 1955 under section 2, wages 
means basic wages and all other payments in cash payable to an employee for work 
done in respect of his/her contract of service but does not include: 
a) the value of any house accommodation or the supply of any food, fuel, 
light or water or medical assistance, or of any approved amenity or 
approved service; 
b) any contribution paid by the employer on his own account to any pension 
fund, provident fund, superannuation scheme, retrenchment, termination, 
lay-off or retirement scheme, thrift scheme or any other fund or scheme 
established for the benefit or welfare of the employee; 
c) any travelling allowance or the value of any travelling concession; 
d) any sum payable to the employee to defray special expenses entailed on 
him by the nature of his employment; 
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e) any gratuity payable on discharge or retirement; or 
f) any annual bonus or any part of any annual bonuses. 
In other words, wages consist of the basic salary of an employee and any allowances 
in respect of work done. According to section 2 of Malaysia’s Employees Provident 
Fund Act 1991, wages means all remuneration in money, due to an employee under 
his contract of service or apprenticeship whether agreed to be paid monthly, weekly, 
daily or otherwise, and includes any bonus, commission or allowance payable by the 
employer to the employee whether such bonus, commission or allowance is payable 
under his contract of service, apprenticeship or otherwise, but does not include: 
a) service charge; 
b) overtime payment; 
c) gratuity; 
d) retirement benefits; 
e) retrenchment, lay-off or termination benefits; 
f) any travelling allowance or the value of any travelling concession; or 
g) any other remuneration or payment as may be exempted by the Minister. 
 
In this thesis, the term ‘pay’ is used interchangeably with wages, salary, remuneration, 
compensation, and earnings. Mincer (1974) claimed that weekly earnings were 
preferred as a dependent variable in the model. One of the advantages of using hourly 
pay compared to the weekly or monthly one is that it is more precise. For example, 
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some surveys show that men work more hours a week than women, which leads to 
severe inaccuracies in the estimated models of weekly pay (Drolet, 2000). However, 
in the literature on human capital earnings function, other measurements of earnings 
such as (the log of) gross monthly or gross annual earnings have been used as a 
dependent variable, even though there are also some studies based on net earnings. In 
the case of Malaysia, pay is calculated on a monthly basis, and as such, the dependent 
variables used will be (the log of) gross monthly pay instead of hourly pay. Employers 
are required by law to pay workers’ salaries by the seventh day after the last day of the 
wage period. Since workers in some firms work five days, or five and a half days in 
other firms, it is cumbersome and unnecessary to calculate wages on an hourly basis, 
as seen in much of the literature.   
 
2.3  Theoretical review of pay determination and structure 
 
Economists have long developed wage theories to understand wage determinant and 
its structure. Wage theories can help any researcher to understand more precisely the 
functions involved in determining wages. The difference in the types and levels of 
wage issues requiring different kinds of wage theories has produced a revolutionary 
theory of wages. For example, the problem with the general wage level may require 
an explanation about average wages. This is different from those required by the 
problem of particular wages which may require a discussion and description of the 
reasons why A’s wages are more or less than B’s (Davidson, 1898). This section is 
divided into two parts, i.e. firstly historical theories and secondly contemporary labour 
market theories. 
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2.3.1 Historical theories on pay 
 
Theories of wages have also evolved in tandem with the worker’s stages of 
development. The order and character of these theories had changed ever since the 
disappearance of servitude and serfdom to the rise of real freedom (Davidson, 1898). 
The Industrial Revolution that began in Britain had resulted in a gradual change in the 
lot of workers and working conditions in factories across Europe. The influx of people 
due to migration and high birth rates created job-shortages while increased 
unemployment resulted in further domination by employers who were more than 
willing to set lower wage rates (Davidson, 1898). But this situation changed 
significantly when trade unions were formed, giving power to the working classes to 
seek more just wages. When this happened, employers openly joined forces to make 
their power more effective and keep wages down. An appraisal of the current state of 
wage theory needs to consider it from a historical perspective.  
 
Classical economists began their analyses of wages from the platform set out by Adam 
Smith in his book entitled The Wealth of Nations, especially the chapter “of the wages 
of labour”. This platform provides a plausible explanation of the relationship between 
the price of goods and amount of labour required to secure them, what is now known 
as the classical wage theory. This ‘subsistence theory’ is the earliest and oldest theory 
of wages, first introduced by Adam Smith (1723-1790). This theory has undergone 
several stages of revision. Wages are determined according to this theory based on the 
cost of the commodities needed to enable workers to live, and the cost is determined 
by the absolute power of the capitalists and employers. This theory is also recognized 
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as “the iron law of wages”, of which David Ricardo was one of the main proponents 
(1772-1823). Elements of this subsistence theory first appeared in Smith’s The Wealth 
of Nations (1973):  
A man must always live by his work, and his wages must at least be 
sufficient to maintain him. They must even upon most occasions be 
somewhat more; otherwise it would be impossible for him to bring 
up a family and the race of such workmen could not last beyond the 
first generation (57-58).  
 
In other words, the wages paid to employees had to be enough to provide them with 
food, clothing and shelter, making sure they continue to exist and support their 
families. Wages are determined by the cost of labourers’ basic needs; and they are 
clearly based on a real or assumed similarity between wage labour and slave labour. 
Ricardo (cf. Davidson, 1898) suggested that to meet the additional labours required, 
the population must be increased sufficiently by enhancing wages to a level higher 
than the minimum subsistence level, at least in a growing economy. He also stated that 
the average wage level is consistent with the theory of population by Malthus. Thus, 
in the short term, wages above the subsistence level will raise the size of the working 
population and thus increase the supply of labour. Excess supply of labour, however, 
will cause wages to fall back to the subsistence level. 
 
Conversely, wages below the subsistence level will reduce the size of the working 
population and hence the supply of labour. Therefore, an excess demand for labour 
will cause wages to rise above the subsistence level once again. In the long term, the 
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average wage level would conform to the subsistence level. Moreover, Ricardo argued 
that the subsistence theory essentially relies on the habits and customs of people. Based 
on cases in Britain, Stigler (1976) highlighted four drawbacks to the subsistence theory 
of wages. In his first argument, the cost of subsistence during winter exceeds that of 
summer, while the level of wages varies inversely. Secondly, the cost of subsistence 
varies considerably over the years, while wages change slowly. Thirdly, the cost of 
subsistence varies considerably from place to place, even though wages vary a lot less 
in one place. Fourthly, differentiations as to the cost of subsistence over time and place 
are often inversely related to the level of wages. This theory has been criticized due to 
its neglect of the demand aspects of the labour market because it assumes that changes 
in the supply of labour are the basic force that drives real wages to the subsistence 
level. Besides, there are several other weaknesses to this theory. Firstly, it assumes that 
the subsistence level is uniform for all employees. Secondly, it does not explain the 
differences between wages in different occupations. Thirdly, it does not explain wages 
in short-term fluctuations. 
 
The short-term version of the classical wage theory was known as the wages-fund 
theory, which was complementary to rather than a substitute for, the subsistence 
theory. The wages-fund theory was developed in the early nineteenth century. This 
theory was first presented by John Stuart Mill. According to this theory, the average 
wage rate is determined by the demand and supply of labour (Davidson, 1898; Miller, 
1940). The essence of this theory was stated in The Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1973):  
The demand for those who live by wages, it is evident, cannot 
increase but in proportion to the increase of the funds which are 
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destined for the payment of wages. These funds are two kinds; first, 
revenue which is over and above what is necessary for the 
maintenance; and, secondly, the stock which is over and above what 
is necessary for the employment of their masters (58). 
This theory was based on changes in the employers’ level of power, from domination 
to mere predomination. This means that employees have little power to increase their 
wages even by exercising self-restraint and restricting their numbers in the labour 
market. This, according to John Stuart Mill, is because the theory explained short-term 
variations in the general wage level in terms of: (1) the number of available workers; 
and (2) the size of the wage fund. This theory assumed that wages of workers are paid 
from the capital fund (the size was fixed), which presumably had been accumulated 
by the employer within a given period of time such as a year (Miller, 1940). The level 
of average wages is the ratio between the total wage fund and the number of labourers 
employed (Stigler, 1976). Increasing the wage fund by employers, followed by an 
increase in the number of employees as expected, did not increase the wage rate. 
 
According to Davidson (1898), there is a small number of workers who are willing to 
work regardless of the level of wages at any particular time. Besides, in any country at 
a given time, there are funds allocated for the payment of wages, referred to as the 
wage fund. In addition, the distribution of funds to the workers is determined by 
competition, while the wage rate is dependent upon the correlation between the amount 
of funding and the population. He also pointed to many economists who believe that 
wage is affected more by the demand for goods rather than the size of the wage fund. 
The weakness of this theory is to assume that the wage fund is fixed and that it accounts 
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for labour demand. Most employees are paid out of the current production, and both 
employers and employees, however, often talk as if such funds exist, as if they 
determine the amount of labour services needed. They may also accept the implication 
of the theory, advocating for shifting a share of wages from one group of wage earners 
to another. The wage-fund theory discusses the issue of general wages but it fails to 
discuss wage as a particular issue. This is a theory regarding the source from which 
wages are paid rather than explaining the actual differences in wages received 
(Davidson, 1898). 
 
In countering the wage-fund theory, an alternate theory known as the residual claimant 
theory was proposed by Francis A. Walker, who argued that labour receives what 
remains after the payment of rent, profits, taxes and interest out of the national income 
(Davidson, 1898). The employee’s demand for wages represents the residual claimant 
on output after rent, interest, and profit have been deducted. Walker also suggests that 
if productivity of labour increases without increase in capital or land, its residual would 
increase, and this is the germ of any productivity theory. This theory ignores the supply 
side in the determination of wages. It fails to explain how trade unions raise their 
wages. Residual claimant is the right of the employer and not the employee. The labour 
receives its share during the production, so that if firms suffer a loss, labour will bear 
the loss.  
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2.3.2 Contemporary labour market theories 
 
A conventional starting point in economics is the neo-classical model of the labour 
market under which wages are determined by the forces of supply and demand. The 
neo-classical theory assumes that the firm is a wage-taker in labour markets, and that 
the worker is paid according to its marginal product, i.e. the value of an additional 
amount of output produced by an additional worker. In this theory, a worker is assumed 
to be a homogenous input. The competitive labour market theory assumes that labour 
supply is perfectly elastic, namely, at the going wage rate where the firm can hire as 
much labour as it wishes. If there is any improvement in the firm’s profit, this will be 
translated into increased output and employment at the going wage prior to 
improvement in the firm’s profit. In this case, higher wages are paid to workers in short 
supply.  
 
In a competitive labour market, the wage rate paid for labour will be equated with its 
marginal productivity. Therefore, an individual with better marketable skills has 
higher productivity and thus more opportunities in the labour market to earn higher 
wages through a good job. Training and health are other important and integral parts 
of human capital. According to Schultz (1961) and Strauss & Thomas (1995), training 
and health also increase the productivity of workers, hence, their wages, too.  
 
This marginal productivity theory is an employment theory that contrasts those 
discussed earlier in that it gives power to employees through trade unions in 
determining their wages rather than becoming the residual owner of the product. 
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Employees’ wages depend for their efficiency on production. John R. Hicks (cf. Shove, 
1933) assumed that labour is homogenous, and that product and markets are perfectly 
competitive, even as both land and capital are fixed. He argued that in equilibrium, 
labour should receive the same wage, and, that the wage rate must be equal to the value 
of the marginal productivity of labour. Hicks also stated that employers would 
continue to hire workers to the extent that marginal product equals marginal cost. This 
theory also explained the differentials in wages due to differences in marginal product.  
 
The marginal productivity theory also has limitations. This theory only explains the 
nature and behaviour of labour demand, and wage determination only to some extent.  
Since few markets are perfectly competitive, while firms and workers are rarely free 
to enter and leave the labour market without delay, the lack of knowledge on the 
market and the presence of trade unions render the neo-classical model unrealistic as 
well as undermining its popularity. Besides, the neo-classical approach to wage 
determination is also rejected as it overplays the role of the invisible hand of the market 
(e.g. Rubery, 1997; Manning, 2003).  
 
Recently, the existence of inter-firm wage differentials for similar workers has been 
well established in the literature. In other words, similar workers earn very dissimilar 
pay when working for different firms. This is contrary to the most basic neoclassical 
model of the labour market which suggests that pay should be equal for similar 
workers. So, what exactly accounts for such pay differences? There are some 
neoclassical theories that explain the existence of pay differentials in terms of relaxing 
the assumptions of perfect competition, profit maximization, and homogeneity of 
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workers, e.g. human capital theory, theory of equalizing differences, and efficiency 
wage theory.  
 
The human capital theory explains wage differentials as a consequence of disparity in 
the qualities of employees, i.e. in terms of the knowledge, skills, aptitudes, education 
and training of an individual or a group of employees. Human capital is defined as the 
skills, education, health, and training of an individual (Becker, 1962). These 
endowments are considered capital because of their similarity to physical capital, 
which yields returns. Kooreman and Wunderlink (1997) stated it this way: “All such 
qualities of a person, such as knowledge, health, skills and experience that affect his 
or her possibilities of earning current and future monetary income, psychological 
income, and income in kind are called human capital”. The human capital theory 
addresses the heterogeneous nature of the labour market, relaxing the basic 
neoclassical model’s assumption of homogeneity, and it remains the dominant theory 
of wage determination. According to this theory, wages are determined based on the 
marginal product of labour, and human capital is a component for judging the 
productivity of the worker. For example, higher skilled employees should earn higher 
wages.  
 
Workers invest in education, training, health care, or migration, in expectation of 
increasing their productivity. Firms, motivated by a desire to maximize profits, reward 
productivity according to the human capital of each labourer. This theory is principally 
based on education because it provides knowledge and skills (Tilak, 1994). The direct 
effect of education is measured in terms of pecuniary benefits accrued to the individual 
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(Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1974; Hungerford and Solon, 1987; Tilak, 1994; Zuluaga, 
2007). Investment in education enhances the ability of individuals and makes them 
more productive and efficient (Lockheed et al., 1980; Jamison and Lau, 1982). This 
theory analyses the impacts of additional education, experience, and on-the-job 
training on the quality of the labour force. In addition, this theory also analyses 
workers’ and firms’ decisions on investment in human capital. The human capital 
theory may yield even more information on the qualitative dimension of labour supply 
when applied to on-the-job training. Training within firms involves costs. To minimize 
those costs, firms usually try to hire and keep experienced workers. On-the-job training 
can be usefully divided into general and specific training3.  
 
Based on the theory of equalizing differences, often referred to as compensating 
differentials, pay differences across workers are entirely accounted for by the intrinsic 
properties of specific occupations, quality of the working conditions under which they 
work, and the non-wage components of the compensation package. The arguments of 
this theory are based on five properties4. Firstly, ease of learning the occupation – 
tough jobs or jobs that take a long time to learn as well as time spent for training will 
be compensated for with higher wages. Secondly, the agreeableness of the job – 
unpleasant working conditions will have higher wages. Otherwise, preferable working 
conditions will lead workers to accept a lower pay due to the fact that they are being 
compensated in a non-pecuniary form. Thirdly, there is also the degree of 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
3 General training provides skills useful to the firm giving the training as well as to other firms. Specific 
training provides skills useful to the former alone. 
4 It can be traced directly to Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations. 
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responsibility – workers who have higher responsibility will be compensated with a 
higher pay. Fourthly, consistency of job – inconsistent job throughout the year, such 
as workers in agriculture, must be paid more for their labour because their wages must 
be taken into account not only during times of employment but also during times of 
unemployment5. Finally, the probability of success, namely, if the job is unlikely to 
succeed, then the pay is higher than for a job that has a good chance of succeeding.  
 
Another neoclassical explanation of pay differentials is the efficiency wage theory. 
This theory was initially developed in the 1950s to explain why employers paid above 
equilibrium wages to employees. There are several reasons. Firstly, higher wages are 
paid to provide an incentive for employees to exert greater effort and not to shrink6. 
Secondly, offering higher wages than the equilibrium wage rate can attract better 
quality and more productive workers. Thirdly, higher wages also discourage 
employees from forming a union. Fourthly, higher wages will discourage employees 
from quitting, resulting in firms’ turnover cost being reduced. Fifthly, higher wages 
enhance the goodwill amongst employees, resulting in increased productivity and 
profits7.  
 
The efficiency wage theory assumed that workers are heterogeneous, i.e. their 
productivity and ability differ considerably. Furthermore, the wages they receive affect 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
5 However, contrary to this argument,  in most developing countries, agricultural workers are among 
the lowest paid.   
6 For example, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) explain that employers threaten to fire any employee found 
performing below some threshold but only monitor individual worker effort at random due to the cost. 
To make the threat effective, a wage above the worker’s immediate outside option must be paid. 
7 See Akerlof (1982). 
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the effort they put into their work and thus their productivity. The level of effort 
exerted by each worker is difficult to observe and monitor, so if a firm were to cut 
wages, the more productive workers would more likely leave, which means that the 
firm’s productivity would fall, and hence its costs would increase. According to this 
theory, employers have imperfect information on the individual productivity of their 
employees, and therefore use wages to enhance information dissemination 
(Leibenstein, 1957). Empirical evidence that supports the payment of efficiency wages 
includes Krueger and Summers (1988) as well as Blinder and Choi (1990). 
 
2.3.3 Alternative theories of pay determination 
 
It has been increasingly accepted that wage determination is best analysed from the 
perspective that there is some degree of imperfect competition (instead of perfect 
competition) in the labour market. Recently, continued research on pay determination 
has led to a new set of theories which assume that the labour market is imperfectly 
competitive. The non-market clearing views of pay formation include bargaining 
theories, efficiency wage theories, agency theory, search-based-wage theories, and 
monopsony theory.  
 
In the bargaining theory, neither the employer (as in the earlier theories) nor the 
employee (as in the latest) can be the sole determiner of wages. In this theory, wages, 
hours, and working conditions are determined by the power of negotiations between 
employers and workers. Wage rates are determined by the estimate of the employees 
and that of the employers. The estimate done by employees results from the utility of 
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reward and the disutility of labour. While on the other hand, the estimate done by 
employers is based on the indirect utilities provided by employees. Nevertheless, 
Davidson (1898) also argued that factors such as labour productivity, competitive 
situation, investment size, minimum wage legislation, cost of living of the workers, 
and rates paid to others should be taken into consideration by both employers and 
employees in any determination of wages. According to Bhaskar et al. (2002), one of 
the assumptions in a labour market with perfect competition is perfect mobility. 
Employers have to compete with one another to get workers and this would lead to a 
single market wage, such that employers will lose their existing workers 
instantaneously if they try to cut wages. In other words, perfect competition indicates 
that the wage elasticity of the labour supply curve facing an individual employer is 
infinite.  
 
Bryson and Forth (2006) claimed that under perfect competition, workers and 
employers are in turn ‘wage takers’ as they receive a single wage at labour market 
equilibrium. However, disequilibrium may arise over time but it is expected that 
market forces would adjust to it. They also said that the neo-classical theory predicts 
a positive relationship between wages for workers and their productivity. Machin and 
Manning (2002) studied the wage structure for care assistants in residential homes for 
the elderly on England’s “sunshine coast”, which they approximated to be a perfect 
competitive model. This was because they first assumed that there were a large number 
of small firms undertaking a very homogenous activity in such a concentrated 
geographical area. Secondly, the workers they employed were not unionized nor were 
they covered by any minimum wage legislation, such that there were effectively no 
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external constraints on the wage-setting process. They found that the competitive 
model is limited and does not help in explaining the structure of wages in this market. 
This is shown by the existence of a small wage gap within a single firm and a large 
gap between firms. This situation only goes to show that the ‘law of one wage’, in 
which there is a given market wage for each quality of labour, does not seem to hold. 
 
The modern economist opines that remuneration of labour, i.e. wage, is determined by 
interaction of the forces of demand for and supply of labour. Demand for labour is 
derived from the demand of products and services produced by the labour. If the 
demand for a product is high in the market, the demand for labour producing that 
particular type of product will also be high. Conversely, if the demand for the product 
is low, the demand for that particular labour will also be low. In addition, the demand 
for labour will be elastic if the demand for the product it produces is elastic due to 
cheaper substitute(s) of that product being made available in the market. Likewise, the 
demand for labour will be inelastic if the demand for the particular product it produces 
is also inelastic. The wage rate is determined at the point where labour demand and 
supply are equal to each other.   
 
Imperfect competitive labour market theories give rise to different predictions. For a 
monopolistic firm, it is expected that the firm would pay a reservation wage, and if 
wages are paid equally to each worker, then the wage will be smaller than the marginal 
product of labour. Monopsony is a market with a single employer. So that existing 
workers would not be able to move to another firm if and when the employer decides 
to reduce the wage as there is only one firm in the market. However, some may return 
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to non-labour market activities. In a dynamic monopsony model, larger firms pay 
higher wages. At the same time, these firms are subject to lower quit rates and find 
hiring easier and cheaper, thus enabling them to increase in size (Burdett and 
Mortensen, 1998). Unlike monopsony, oligopsony has more than one firm in a market. 
However, even in this market, the employer’s market power still persists. Monopolistic 
competition amounts to oligopsony when there is free entry, thus ensuring that the 
employer’s profits are driven to zero. 
 
Manning (2003a), in his book entitled Monopsony in Motion, initiates a discussion on 
the imperfect competition in labour markets by raising the question: “What happens if 
an employer cuts the wage it pays its workers by one cent?” In a perfect competition 
labour market, assuming that the labour supply curve facing the firm is infinitely 
elastic would result in all its existing workers immediately leaving the firm. In contrast, 
Manning argued that the labour market under imperfect competition differs from that 
under perfect competition because of two assumptions. Firstly, there are important 
frictions in the labour market, such that employers have some market power over their 
workers. Secondly, employers set wages as a way of exercising this market power. 
From these assumptions, it can be said that in an imperfect competition labour market, 
the employer who cuts wages does not immediately lose all his/her workers. Frictions 
in the labour market arising from plausible sources such as ignorance, heterogeneous 
preferences, and mobility costs may force employers who cut wages to recognise that 
their workers quit-rate is faster than earlier rates or that recruitment is more difficult 
instead of immediately losing all their workers. In an imperfect competition, the supply 
labour curve facing the firm is not infinitely elastic.   
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These two assumptions in a monopsony model could describe the decision-problem 
facing the individual employer. In Manning’s perspective, monopsony refers to the 
individual labour supply not being infinitely elastic, i.e. not monopsony, in the sense 
of there being a single buyer of labour. Hence, models of oligopsonistic or 
monopsonistic competition are used to model the market as a whole. Bhaskar et al. 
(2002) argued that both oligopsonistic and monopsonistic competition models are able 
to explain a lot of empirical phenomena in the labour markets. Through a simple model 
with job differentiation and preference for heterogeneity, they were able to explain the 
existence of wage dispersion, the persistence of labour market discrimination, market 
failure in the provision of training, and the unusual employment effects of minimum 
wages. They also added that preference for heterogeneity in jobs, mobility costs, and 
imperfect information is the main source of oligopsonistic power. 
 
According to Bhaskar et al. (2002) and Manning (2003a), recently the labour market 
seems to have monopsonistic characteristics because employers seem to have some 
market power over their workers. This statement was later supported by Manning 
(2004) who argued that labour market intervention, namely minimum wages, trade 
unions, and unemployment benefits, will not necessarily give the trade-off effect 
between efficiency and equality in monopsonistic labour markets. Proponents of 
monopsony argue that such an assumption in a perfect competition is rather extreme 
(i.e. reduction of wages by one cent would cause all workers to move to other firms 
instantaneously) and contrary to common sense and empirical evidence (Manning, 
2003a). 
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Manning (2003b) argued that employers would possess a significant monopsonistic 
power when labour markets become ‘thin’ such that workers have limited job 
opportunities at any given moment. This statement is based on findings in his research, 
namely that workers’ commuting patterns reveal ‘thin’ labour markets. Besides, most 
people tend to look for a job with a maximum wage and a minimum commute even if 
it is somewhat difficult. Nevertheless, the proportion of ‘wasteful’ commuting is in 
reality relatively large. Manning (2006) presents a generalised model of monopsony 
to show that the division between perfect competition and monopsony is diseconomies 
of scale vis-à-vis recruitment. However, through analysis using a British dataset 
containing information on both labour turnover costs and number of recruits, he found 
that there is an increasing marginal cost of recruitment. This result is supportive of the 
view that the labour market is monopolistic because the supply of recruits to the firm 
is not perfectly elastic at any given level of recruitment cost.  
 
Wages are higher in larger firms. The positive relationship between firm size and 
wages is well documented in the literature. A labour market in which wages depend 
on employer size means that jobs are different (Oi and Idson, 1999). A job consisting 
of a vector of variables would normally include the rate of pay, the nature of the tasks, 
opportunities for promotion, the length of the workweek, the stability of employment, 
health and injury risks, and characteristics of the workplace. Jobs can be categorised 
by occupation, industry, ownership (public versus private), geographic location, or 
employer size. 
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The human capital theory states that firm size will be correlated with some dimension 
of labour quality. According to the labour quality hypothesis, large firms hire more 
qualified workers than small firms (e.g. Hamermesh, 1990; Kremer and Maskin, 1996; 
Troske, 1999), and this explains the higher labour productivity and higher wages. 
Large firms hire more skilled workers due to their greater capital intensity and capital-
skill complementarity in the production process (Hamermesh, 1980). In addition, Oi 
(1983) argued that large firms, being more innovative, need more qualified and 
specialised workers. Large firms also have the advantage of matching high-skilled 
workers with a fixed cost when hiring them (Kremer, 1993). Moreover, large firms 
ultimately find it less costly to adopt technologies because they can spread the fixed 
cost of their investment across more workers and output (e.g. Dunne and Schmitz, 
1992).   
 
According to the compensation wage differential theory, large firms tend to be more 
rigid in organisational structure and rely more on rules to discipline workers (Mellow, 
1982). Large firms also impose greater pressure on workers and could thus suppress 
workers’ creativity (Lester, 1967). As a result, workers in large firms may earn a 
compensating wage differential for less satisfactory work (Masters, 1969; Waddoups, 
2007). 
 
The rent-sharing and market power theory claims that large firms have more financial 
resources (e.g. larger profits, better access to credit market) and use their ability to pay 
to increase workers’ morale and effort (Slichter, 1950; Akerlof, 1982). Large firms 
also have more market power and share their excess profits with their workers (e.g. 
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Mellow, 1982; Slichter, 1950; Weiss, 1966). They also offer wages above the average 
market level in an attempt to reduce shirking and turnover costs following the 
efficiency wage theory (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) or simply to avoid or mimic 
unionisation (e.g. Brown et al., 1990; Voos, 1983). 
 
2.4   Empirical studies on pay 
 
Wage rates are the results of interactions between workers and employers within a 
workplace. Understanding these interactions is critical for policy purposes, as one 
might consider operating on the supply- or demand-side of the labour market to 
enhance workers’ pay. Therefore, to understand the interactions between employees 
and their employer, we need data from employees as well as from their employers 
which contain information on both the supply- and demand-side of the labour market. 
Recently, the availability of appropriate matched employer-employee datasets 
(MEED) for European countries has enabled dozens of researchers to examine the 
impact of employees’ as well as their employers’ characteristics on workers’ pay. 
Previous studies that utilized MEED have already produced many important new 
results, especially in the area of labour economics.  
 
Generally, wage determinants can be divided into three groups, i.e. firstly, individual 
worker characteristics; secondly, job characteristics; and thirdly, employer or firm 
characteristics. Individual worker characteristics refer to human capital variables such 
as education, experience and tenure. Job characteristics usually include the type of job, 
the hierarchical position of the worker, functional area, and region. Employer 
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characteristics are often proxy by firm dummies or main indicators such as employer 
size or number of employees, sales, profit, and net income.  
 
Bayard and Troske (1999) examine the employer-size wage premium using a cross-
sectional MEED for manufacturing, retail, and services industries in the United States. 
They found that even after controlling for demographic characteristics, there is a large 
and significant establishment-size wage premium in all industries that is similar to 
previous estimates of the establishment-size wage premium (Brown and Medoff, 
1989). However, that understanding is limited, because most studies to date have used 
either data collected from business establishments or data collected from workers. 
Because these data sources contain information from only one side of the market, they 
are incapable of analysing models that incorporate both the supply of and demand for 
labour. A full understanding of the impacts of recent changes in the labour market and 
a well-informed policy debate into topics such as earnings inequality, employment 
security, firm effects on workers, and the effects of technology on earnings and 
employment depends on the availability of appropriate MEED.   
 
2.4.1 Studies on supply-side determinants 
 
The analysis of supply-side pay determinants is based on Becker’s human capital 
theory (Becker, 1962) and Mincer’s wage equation (Mincer, 1974). According to 
Becker’s theory, education is an investment in current resources for future returns. 
Besides, it is one of the most important components of individual human capital, and 
thus a significant supply-side determinant of pay. In Mincer’s wage model, education 
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is usually measured by years of schooling or levels of educational attainment which is 
assumed to have a linear effect on pay for each year of schooling regardless of the 
attainment level. The estimated rates of return to an additional year of schooling were 
considerably varied across studies. For example, in European countries, this rate was 
at a level between 3.9–5.7 (Jones & Simon, 2005; Flanagan, 1998) and 11.2% 
(Compos & Jolliffe, 2002). In Malaysia, however, the rate of returns on education is 
much higher at between 8.6 and 9.6% (Ismail, 2011) and between 12.3% and 13.7 
(Ismail & Jajri, 2012). In terms of returns on educational attainment, the returns on 
university degree are often estimated at a level of around 50% (Flanagan, 1998) but it 
is also possible to identify estimates exceeding 80% (Campos, Jolliffe, 2002) 
compared to primary education in the case of European countries. Besides the 
quantitative aspect, the qualitative aspect of education also has a significant impact on 
pay determination. For example, the characteristics of educational institutions can 
represent the quality of education obtained. It seems that the pay rates are higher for 
those who graduated from highly selective and elite institutions, even if their 
occupation is controlled (Monks, 2000; James et al., 1989).  
 
Furthermore, the general labour market experience and tenure (i.e. firm-specific work 
experience) respectively accumulated through work experience and on-the-job 
training (Becker, 1962) also have significant effects on pay. In the case of 
unavailability of relevant data for labour market experience, the age or potential work 
experience, i.e. age reduced by years of schooling and age at the beginning of 
schooling (see Mincer, 1974), is often used as approximation of labour market 
experience. Estimated returns on potential work experience are from 4.0% to 6.0% 
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(Ismail, 2011; Ismail & Jajri, 2012) in the case of Malaysia. In addition, returns on 
general labour market experience (which represent statistically significant wage 
premium for seniority) are substantially larger compared to returns on tenure. In the 
case of male workers, differences in returns on potential work experience are between 
1.4% and 2.5%, while for women the differences are between 1.1% and 2.2% 
(Flanagan, 1998). In this respect, we can say that the differences in returns on potential 
work experience are higher in the case of male workers compared to female ones. 
According to Krueger (1991), workers who have computer skills or able to use a 
computer at work were rewarded about 13.9% wage premium in 1989. In addition, 
Krueger also emphasised that there is a significant and different wage premium for 
different computer tasks. 
 
Gender is one of the important control variables in estimating pay determination using 
a pooled sample of males or females. However, one should not interpret the statistical 
significance and magnitude of the gender coefficient directly as gender discrimination 
on the labour market. This is because, the estimation might be biased owing to the 
omitted variables which are systematically correlated with gender. For instance, 
Toutkoushian et al. (2007) and Joy (2003) found a relatively low wage penalty for 
women at a level from -3.9% to -6.0%. There is also the case which indicates a wage 
penalty for women exceeding -20% (for example, Carlson & Persky, 1999; Angle & 
Wissmann, 1981).  
 
Many previous studies on wage determination have included race or ethnicity in their 
model in order to capture the labour market status of different minorities. Nonetheless, 
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there exists a conflict regarding the interpretation of statistical significance and the size 
of race coefficients as race discrimination. This conflict can be seen from the mixed 
results found in various studies that use race as one of the control variables 
(Toutkoushian et al., 2007; Joy, 2003; Carlson & Persky, 1999; Angle & Wissmann, 
1981). In addition, there are also cases where race coefficients were biased due to 
omitted skills (Finnie & Meng, 2002; Neal & Johnson, 1996). In this respect, the biases 
occur due to the fact that skills are not equally distributed among different ethnic 
groups. In estimating the effects on wage of being a member of one of six ethnic groups 
in Canada, Hum and Simpson (1999) found a wage penalty at a level of -24.1% in the 
case of black men. Meanwhile, Pendakur and Pendakur (1998) found that wage 
penalties were only for black men (at a level of -17.4%) and Chinese men (at a level 
of -12.5%). They also suggested that male workers face higher wage penalties in 
relation to their ethnicity compared to female ones. 
  
The marital status is normally included in wage equation in order to capture either 
observable characteristics closely related to a solemnization of marriage (such as 
stability, loyalty, and responsibility), individual’s work effort by spouse’s income 
(such as increased productivity of men financially securing his family), or productivity 
effort of housework specialization within the family (Stratton, 2000). There are 
empirical evidence suggesting that wage premiums for marriage men range 
approximately between 7% and 20% (Hersch & Stratton, 2000). For women, however, 
it was statistically insignificant (Black et al., 2003).   
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2.5  Studies on pay in the Malaysian economy 
 
Several factors have been identified as contributors to the pay structure in Malaysia. 
Factors such as tight labour market, proximity to Singapore, and increased mobility of 
Malaysian workers have been singled out as contributing to pay increase being offered 
to employees in Malaysia (Abdul-Ghani et al., 2001). They stated that a tight labour 
market, where employers compete for workers to fill jobs created by the influx of 
foreign investment induced by the sixth and seventh Malaysia Plan, is a major cause 
of pay increase among many occupations. Besides, in the Johor Baharu area which is 
in close proximity to Singapore, the increased mobility of workers creates competition 
for Malaysian workers among Malaysian and Singaporean firms. Empirical studies on 
wages in Malaysia can generally be divided into two categories: firstly, studies on the 
wage formation; and secondly, studies on wage structure. 
 
2.5.1 Studies on pay formation 
 
Studies on wage formation have been conducted by Ho and Yap (2001), Yusof (2008), 
Goh and Wong (2010), and Tang (2010). These papers specifically examined the 
relationship between real wages, labour productivity, and unemployment in the short 
and long term at the national and industry level. Table 2.1 describes the data, variables, 
methodology, and findings by those studies. In addition, all without exception used a 
co-integration analysis and error-correction model approach. We may summarise the 
key finding from these studies in this way: in the long term, productivity has a positive 
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and significant effect on real wages (Ho and Yap, 2001; Yusof, 2008; Goh and Wong, 
2010; Tang, 2010). 
 
Based on Table 2.1, there are certain differences to be noted among these studies, even 
though all studies applied the same broad method. Firstly, the findings are different 
and inconsistent. Ho and Yap (2001) as well as Goh and Wong (2010) examined the 
relationship between real wages, productivity and unemployment. They found that in 
the long run, a rise in wages would exceed a rise in productivity. This leads to an 
increase in unit labour cost. A one percent increase in productivity leads to an increase 
in real wages by 1.22 percent (Goh and Wong, 2010). Nonetheless, when controlling 
for union density variable, real wages increase by 1.96 percent for every one percent 
increase in productivity (Ho and Yap, 2001). However, when using employment rather 
than unemployment data, it turns out that the rise in wages is less than the rise in 
productivity (Yusof, 2008).  
 
In addition, in the long run, Yusof (2008) found that there exists a positive relationship 
between employment and real wages. Meanwhile, Goh and Wong (2010) found that 
the unemployment rate has no relationship with real wages and productivity. Hence, 
this supports the insider-outsider theory of the labour market, that is, unemployment 
appears to have little effect on wage rates. These different findings may be due to the 
use of different types of data. Yusof (2008) used quarterly data from 1992:1 to 2005:3 
in selected manufacturing industries, whereas Goh and Wong (2010) utilised time 
series from 1970 to 2005 in ten economic sectors in Malaysia. However, both studies 
supported the marginal wage theory or performance-based pay scheme theory rather 
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than the efficiency wage theory, that is, higher productivity leads to higher wages and 
not vice versa. 
 
In contrast to the above studies, Tang (2010) examined the effect of real wages on 
productivity. He showed that there exists a bi-directional causality between 
productivity and real wages both in the short and long term rather than uni-directional 
as found by others. Hence, productivity and wages are complement whereby both 
marginal productivity and efficiency wage theories appear valid for Malaysia. In 
addition, it also indicated a quadratic relationship between productivity and wages in 
the long run, and thus the impact of real wages on productivity is not monotonic.
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Table 2-1: Studies on the relationship between real wages, labour productivity, and unemployment in Malaysia 
Studies Data Variables Methodology Results & Conclusions 
Ho and Yap (2001) 
Malaysian Journal 
of Economic 
Studies, vol. 38 
Annual time-series data (1975 -
1997). 
Data Source: 
Annual Survey of Manufacturing 
Industries, Annual Trade Union 
Reports, and Economic Reports. 
Endogenous: 
Real wages 
Exogenous: 
Productivity, unemployment, 
and union density. 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
unit root test. 
The Engle-Granger two-step 
cointegration test. 
Error-correction model (ECM) by 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. 
In the long-run, productivity and union density have a positive and significant 
effect on wages. Real wages increase 1.96 per cent for every one per cent rise in 
productivity. A one per cent increase in union density will induce a 1.2 per cent 
increase in real wages.  
 
Meanwhile, unemployment rate has a negative and significant effect on wages. 
Real wages decrease by 0.73 per cent for every one per cent increase in 
unemployment rate.   
 
In the short-run, wages are not significantly influenced by productivity and union 
density. However, unemployment rate depresses wages by 0.47 per cent for every 
one per cent rise in unemployment rate.  
 
Over the long-run, wages rising faster than productivity will lead to an increase in 
unit labour cost, thus eroding competitiveness of the Malaysian manufacturing 
sector. 
Yusof (2008) 
Journal of 
Economic Studies, 
vol.35 
Quarterly data from 1992:1 to 
2005:3.  
Data Source: 
The Monthly Statistical Bulletin of 
Malaysia, Department of Statistics 
Malaysia (DOSM). 
 
Endogenous: 
log of real consumption wages, 
log of real product wages, log 
of real wages using GDP 
deflator. 
Exogenous: 
log of productivity, log of 
employment, and log of per 
capita income. 
The ADF, PP, and KPSS unit root test. 
The Johansen multivariate cointegration 
test. 
Vector error correction model (VECM) 
by OLS regression. 
The impulse response function and 
variance decomposition analysis. 
In the long-run, productivity and employment have a positive and significant 
effect on consumption wages (i.e., when CPI is used to measure real wages).  
 
When real wage is measured by GDP deflator, only productivity has a positive 
and significant effect on real wages.  
 
Meanwhile, no relationship among productivity, employment on product wages 
(i.e., when PPI is used). 
 
In the short-run, productivity and wages have a positive and negative effect on 
employment, respectively.  
 
In the long-term, a one per cent increase in productivity results in only at a most 
0.45 per cent increase in real wages. This relationship is uni-directional from 
productivity to wages, thus consistent with the Marginal productivity theory of 
wages. 
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Table 2.1: Studies on the relationship between real wages, labour productivity, and unemployment in Malaysia (continued) 
Studies Data Variables Methodology Results & Conclusions 
Goh and Wong 
(2010) 
International 
Research Journal 
of Finance and 
Economics, vol.53 
Annual time-series data (1970-
2005) in ten economic sectors8 
Data Source: 
The Productivity Council of 
Malaysia and DOSM. 
Endogenous: 
log of real wages per worker 
Exogenous: 
log of productivity and log of 
unemployment. 
The ADF and PP unit root test. 
The Johansen multivariate cointegration 
test. 
The ECM model by OLS regression. 
A long-term equilibrium relationship between seems to exist between real wages 
and productivity for the period 1970-2005, but employment is not connected to the 
real wages and productivity. 
 
In the long-run, productivity has a positive and significant effect on wages. Real 
wages rise by 1.22 per cent for every one per cent rise in productivity.  
 
In the short-run, productivity has a positive impact on wages, but wages have no 
impact on productivity. The adjustment to equilibrium occurs through wages only 
but not productivity. 
 
The increase in real wages exceeds the increase in productivity leads to increase 
in unit labour cost, hence eroding the competitiveness of Malaysia as a centre of 
cheap labour and low-cost production. 
Tang (2010) 
MPRA Paper 
No.24355 online at 
http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/2435
5. 
The monthly data from January 
1983 to November 2009. 
Data Source: 
DataStream 4.0 
 
 
Endogenous: 
log of productivity 
Exogenous: 
log of real wages, and its 
square. 
 
The ADF unit root test. 
VECM model by 
the Johansen multivariate cointegration 
test and the Granger-causality test.  
In the long-run, productivity has a positive and significant impact on real wages, 
and a negative and significant impact on the squared of real wages.  
 
Therefore, results support for the inverse-U shape relationship between wages and 
productivity in Malaysia that is productivity first increases with wages and 
declines thereafter.  
 
Contrary with the earlier studies, the real wage and productivity are granger-cause 
each other (i.e., bilateral causality) in the short- and long-run, and its support the 
efficiency wage theory. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
8 Ten economic sectors, namely: manufacturing, utilities, transportation, finance, government services, wholesale and retail trade, agriculture, construction, mining, and other services. 
48 
  
 
 
Secondly, in terms of their scope and timespan, Goh and Wong (2010) have a few key 
points in their favour compared to others. This is because their study covered all 
sectors of the Malaysian economy. They also dealt with a longer period of time (around 
35 years, i.e. from 1970 to 2005). Meanwhile, studies by Ho and Yap (2001) and Yusof 
(2008) only dealt with the manufacturing industries. Moreover, Ho and Yap (2001) 
and Yusof (2008) only covered a period of 22 years (from 1975 to 1997) and 13 years 
(from 1992 to 2005), respectively.  
 
Thirdly, in terms of the data used, unlike others, Yusof (2008) utilized quarterly data 
rather than yearly data. Moreover, Yusof (2008) used three different measurements of 
real wages rather than one proxy. Yusof’s study examined the relationship of 
productivity and employment to the real consumption wage, the real product wage, 
and the real wage using GDP deflator separately. He also used two different 
measurements to proxy the productivity, namely, value added per worker and real GDP 
per capita. It would be interesting to discuss in more detail the studies of Goh and 
Wong (2010) and Yusof (2008) before highlighting some of their drawbacks. These 
two studies are chosen because one study supports the hypothesis that the elasticity of 
wages with respect to productivity is unitary (Goh and Wong, 2010), while the other 
rejects that hypothesis (Yusof, 2008). 
 
Goh and Wong (2010) re-examined the relationship between real wage and 
productivity (denoted by w and p respectively) using a longer dataset (i.e. 35 years or 
from 1970 to 2005) and different sources of data obtained from the Malaysian 
Productivity Council (MPC). They utilized the real consumption wages per worker as 
a dependent variable, measured by the average nominal wages in 10 economic sectors 
49 
  
 
 
(i.e. manufacturing, utilities, transportation, finance, government services, wholesale 
and retail trade, agriculture, construction, mining, and other services) and deflated by 
the consumer price index. The other two variables used were average productivity 
(measured by real GDP per worker) and the unemployment rate (denoted by u). All 
variables were in logarithms to ensure they are unit-free and to reduce any 
nonlinearities. The ADF and Phillips Perron unit root tests (with the assumption that 
there is no structural break) revealed that all series are I(1). The co-integration 
equations imposed the assumptions of a linear deterministic trend and intercept, and 
assumed away structural breaks, i.e. 
 
     2.1 
  
where is an I(0) random residual and that theoretically we expect  and 
 
 
The Johansen co-integration test confirmed that there exists at least one co-integrating 
relationship among the three variables. The estimated coefficients were =1.28(.054) 
and =0.06(0.051), with the standard errors in parentheses. Estimates of the 
corresponding Error Correction equations9, i.e. 
  2.2 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
9 The corresponding model in this study eliminates unemployment from the short-term specification. 
This is because the Johansen co-integration test had suggested that unemployment is insignificant and 
is therefore not part of the long-term relationship.  
ttutp10t uptw  
t 0p 
.0u 
pβ̂
uβ̂
wttwit
n
i
uiit
n
i
piit
n
i
wiwt vˆupww  





 1
111
0 
50 
  
 
 
  2.3 
  2.4 
 
implied that productivity impacts real wages positively in the short term when the 4th 
lag of productivity term in the real wage equation was positive and statistically 
significant (i.e. estimates of  are jointly significant and add up to a positive 
magnitude). As explained in Feldstein (2008), the long lags would suggest that changes 
in productivity were not fully reflected in real wages immediately. On the other hand, 
the productivity equation implied that real wage does not have any effect on 
productivity in the short term since the lags in real wages and productivity are all 
insignificant in that equation. 
 
To sum up, Goh and Wong (2010) showed that there exists a long-term relationship 
between real wages and productivity in Malaysia from 1970 to 2005; whereas, 
unemployment has a negligible effect on real wages (and the sign is positive, thus 
inconsistent with economic theories). In the special case of Cobb-Douglas technology, 
the marginal product of labour is proportional to the average product of labour, which 
is known as productivity. Profit maximization suggests that the marginal product 
factor should be equal to its real cost. The real cost of labour is the real wage. Hence, 
the wage paid by competitive firms should rise at the same rate as the rise in 
productivity, i.e. elasticity should equal unity. In this study, the hypothesis that 
elasticity of wages with respect to productivity amounts to unity is not rejected.  
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Yusof (2008) examined the short- and long-term relationship between real wage, 
productivity and employment. Yusof’s study used quarterly data from 1992:1 to 
2005:3 for selected manufacturing industries. Other than using the quarterly data, 
Yusof’s study differed from other studies in having used three different measurements 
of real wages and two different proxies for productivity. The real consumption wage 
(denoted by wc) and real product wage (denoted by wp) are computed by deflating 
nominal wages through CPI and PPI, respectively. Another measure of real wage is 
obtained using the GDP deflator (denoted by wg). Meanwhile, the ratio of 
manufacturing output to the number of employees as well as the real GDP per capita 
are used as proxies for productivity (denoted by p and pg, respectively). Another 
explanatory variable is the number of employees used as a proxy for employment 
(denoted by e). The ADF, PP and KPSS unit root tests suggested that all series are I(1). 
The cointegration equations imposed the assumptions of unrestricted intercept and no 
trend, i.e.   
 
       2.5 
       2.6 
       2.7 
      2.8 
      2.9 
                  2.10 
 
where  to are I(0) random residuals and that theoretically we expect  and 
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The Johansen co-integration test confirmed that the variables are co-integrated if wc 
and wg are used in the equation. However, no relationship is found among the variables 
if wp is used. The long-term equation with wc would indicate that the impact of both 
productivity and employment was positive and statistically significant in the long run. 
However, the equation with wg showed that only employment is positive and 
statistically significant in the long run. The estimated coefficients were = 0.450 
(0.066) and = 0.446 (0.041) for equation 2.5, and = 0.075 (0.092) and = 0.395 
(0.056) for equation 2.7, with the standard errors in parentheses10. The results support 
the theory of a positive relationship between real wages and productivity in the long 
run for both equations. However, the results do not support the theory of an inverse 
relationship between real wages and employment in the long run for both equations 
(i.e., and ). 
 
The corresponding Error Correction equations were specified as in the following, 
where equations 2.1 – 2.13 are based on 2.5, while 2.14 – 2.16 are based on 2.711 – 
with i denoting the optimal lag length. 
 
              2.11 
              2.12 
              2.13 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
10 The estimated coefficients for equations 2.6, 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 were not discussed in this study.  
11 Yusof (2008) did not consider the error correction equations with real product wage because the 
Johansen cointegration test suggested that no cointegrating relation was present in that case.  
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              2.14 
              2.15 
                 2.16 
 
Estimates of equations 2.12 and 2.15and the application of the Granger non-causality 
test implied that real wages and employment do not have any effect on productivity 
since all of the lagged explanatory variables were insignificant. Meanwhile, equation 
2.13 implied that productivity has a positive effect whereas the wage rate has a 
negative effect on employment in the short term. In this equation, the estimated 
coefficients were = 0.307 (3.367) and = -0.280 (-2.285), where i = 1 and 
standard errors in parentheses. However, equation 2.16 implied that productivity alone 
has positive effects on employment in the short term, i.e. estimated = 0.335 (3.604), 
where i = 1 and standard errors in parentheses12. Equations 2.11, 2.14 and 2.16  showed 
that the negative error correction term is significant. This indicated that an adjustment 
to equilibrium would occur negatively through real wages and employment in the long 
run. 
 
To sum up, according to Yusof (2008), the Malaysian data suggest that a long-term 
relationship exists between real wages, real productivity, and employment. Yusof’s 
study finds that, in the long run, a one percent increase in productivity results in only 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
12 In any case, this study also used another proxy for productivity – real GDP per capita – and yielded 
similar results. 
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a 0.45 percent increase in real wages. This finding is thus consistent with the marginal 
theory of wages already discussed. However, the theory that real wages inversely 
affect employment is not supported.  
 
Ironically, there are several shortcomings to be pointed out with respect to the studies 
by Yusof (2008) and Goh and Wong (2010). Firstly, these studies assumed a 
monotonic, linear and positive relationship between real wages and productivity. 
Nonetheless, the labour supply perspective noted that the initial increase in wages 
would result in the employee becoming more productive (i.e. substitution effect 
outweighed income effect) because an increase in wages makes leisure more 
expensive, while a further increase in wages will decrease productivity because as 
workers become richer, they are able to afford more leisure (i.e. income effect 
outweighed substitution effect). In microeconomics theory, workers are assumed to 
maximize their utility function, which depends on the choice between income and 
leisure. However, their working hours are tied to their options. As wages rise, workers 
will work more hours to take advantage of the higher wages (more time will be 
allocated to working). Thus, the wage elasticity of labour supply is positive. This 
situation continues until workers have reached the point where their marginal utility 
of leisure outweighs their marginal utility of income. At this point, workers allocate 
less time to working. Hence, the wage elasticity of labour supply becomes negative. 
In light of the empirical evidence, the linear long-term relationship between wages and 
productivity is rejected on the basis of a nonlinear long-term relationship in Turkey 
(Bildirici and Alp, 2008). Meanwhile, in the Malaysian context, Tang (2010) found 
that productivity and real wages have a quadratic relationship (i.e. inverse-U shape 
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curve) in the long run instead of a linear relationship. Thus, offering higher wages does 
not always lead to higher productivity. 
 
Secondly, the aforementioned studies also assumed that the causal relationship is 
unilateral, running from productivity to wages. However, it is just as plausible to have 
a reverse causation from wages to productivity, as noted by Akerlof and Yellen (1986). 
The efficiency wage hypothesis states that wages, at least in some markets, are not 
determined only by demand and supply. It points to the incentive for employers to pay 
their employees more than the market clearing wage rate in order to increase labour 
productivity. Arkelof and Yellen (1986) identified four benefits of higher wage 
payments: (1) fewer shirking of work by employees due to the higher cost of job loss; 
(2) minimizing turnover; (3) improvement in the average quality of job applicants; and 
(4) improved morale. Empirically, in the case of Malaysia, Tang (2010) found that real 
wages and productivity are due to a bilateral instead of unilateral causality in the short 
and long term. This implies that in the short and long run, productivity affects wages 
and vice-versa. Hence, the marginal productivity and efficiency wage theories appear 
valid for Malaysia. 
 
2.5.2 Studies on pay structure 
 
Empirical studies on the wage structure have tried to explain the various structures or 
patterns of wages in the Malaysian economy. Such structure occurs due to the 
differentials created by industry, occupation, geography, race, gender, and groups. 
Most of the empirical studies on wage structure in Malaysia have focused on gender 
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and race differentials, while only a few studies have examined inter-industry 
differentials. 
 
The second category of studies on wages examined the wage differentials in Malaysia. 
A good number of researchers such as Chapman and Harding (1985), Lee and Nagaraj 
(1995), Mohd-Nor (1998), Schafgan (1998, 2000), Mohamad-Nor (2000), and 
Fernandez (2009) have focused on the gender wage gap in Malaysia over the last thirty 
years. These studies have mostly concentrated on: (i) measuring the magnitude of the 
gender wage gap in the Peninsular Malaysia using the regression analysis by Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) on the standard human capital model; (ii) examining the extent to 
which discrimination against women exists in the Malaysian labour market using the 
wage decomposition model by Oaxaca and Ransom (1994). Table 2.2 describes the 
data, variables, methodology, and findings by these studies. Most empirical studies on 
gender wag gap utilized a cross-section at individual level data from various sources. 
Almost all studies on gender wag gap at the individual level found that men earn more 
than women. These gaps arise in part due to productivity differences, discrimination 
in the labour markets, some of which may be traced to past discrimination in education 
and in the labour market. 
 
Chapman and Harding (1985) were pioneers in studies on gender wage differentials in 
Malaysia. They utilized a cross-section at individual level data collected from a survey 
of ex-students of the Mara Institute of Technology13 in their estimating equation, i.e. 
 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
13 The Mara Institute of Technology is one of the higher educational institutions in Malaysia. The survey 
was undertaken in 1979 by the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of Malaysia. 
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           2.17 
 
where, for individual i, w is the log of monthly wages plus one-twelfth of fixed annual 
bonus, edu is years of schooling, exp is length in the labour force, and Z is a vector 
which includes other wage determinants such as ability measure, marital status, and 
occupational dummy. Equation 2.17, including sex dummy variable, was estimated for 
the whole sample, and also for men and women separately. The results show that an 
additional year of schooling adds between five and nine percent to the wages, while 
an additional year of experience has worth in the order of 11 to 15 percent. Failing a 
course (measure for ability) was associated with a 13 to 30 percent reduction in wages, 
while being married was associated with a six to twelve percent rise in wages. The 
average monthly wages calculated from the separate regression for men and women 
were the following: men earned RM1022, women earned RM738. This revealed that 
the gender wage gap exists in Peninsular Malaysia, as women earned only 71 percent 
of men’s earning.  
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Table 2-2: Studies on the gender earning gap in Malaysia 
Studies Data Variables Methodology Results and Conclusions 
Chapman and 
Harding (1985) 
Journal of 
Development Studies, 
vol.21, no.3 
 
A cross-section data in 1979 
Data Source: 
A 1979 survey of ex-students of 
the Mara Institute of 
Technology.14  
No. of obs.: 
- 356 men 
- 249 women 
Endogenous: 
monthly wages 
Exogenous: 
gender, marital status, education, work 
experience, and ability. 
Reduced form and structural 
estimates by OLS based on 
Blinder (1974). 
This study found that less than a third of the average monthly wage difference 
between the sexes of about 34 per cent   
 
The most important factor for determining gender-wage differences is the 
difference in employment distributions of men and women, whereby women tend 
to be in low-paying jobs and thus earn less than men for the same human capital 
endowments. 
 
Lee and Nagaraj 
(1995) 
Journal of 
Development Studies, 
vol.31, no.3 
Data Source: 
A 1991 survey of employees in 
the manufacturing sector of 
Malaysia’s Klang Valley.15 
No. of obs.: 
- 1434 employees from 120 
firms 
Endogenous: 
monthly earnings 
Exogenous: 
education, experience, occupation, training, 
union membership, total hours worked, 
ownership, export-orientation, size of firm, 
marital status, and migration. 
The regression analysis by 
OLS based on Oaxaca 
(1973). 
The most important factor for determining gender-wage differences is the 
difference in employment distributions of men and women, whereby women tend 
to be in low-paying jobs and thus earn less than men for the same human capital 
endowments. 
 
Differences in productive endowments account for only about 54 per cent of the 
monthly earnings differential in Malaysia. 
Returns to experience are higher for men compared to women. 
  
Mohd-Nor (1998) 
IIUM16 Journal of 
Economics and 
Management, vol.6, 
no. 1 
Data Source: 
The Second Malaysian Family 
Life Survey  
(MFLS-2) in 1988.17 
No. of obs.: 
- 4566 male  
- 2476 female  
- Peninsular Malaysia. 
Endogenous: 
monthly earnings 
Exogenous: 
experience and its square, value of weekly 
working hours, dummy for English as a 
medium of instruction schooling, dummy for 
9, 11, and 13 years of schooling, dummy for 
college degree or higher, number of children, 
marital status, and occupation dummy. 
The human capital earnings 
equations estimated by OLS 
regression. 
The Oaxaca and Ransom 
(1994) wage decomposition 
equations.  
This study found that in explaining the earnings differentials between the two 
genders, job discrimination is more important than human capital and family 
characteristics. It is because between 87.5 per cent and 93.9 per cent of gender 
earnings differentials were attributed to unexplained variables. 
 
The major source of discrimination is due to gender bias. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
14 The survey was undertaken by the institute and the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of the Malaysian Prime Minister’s Department (with the assistance of consultants from Harvard 
Institute for International Development). 
15 Malaysia, 1990, Industrial Surveys: Construction, Manufacturing, Mining and Stone Quarrying, 1988 Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics. 
16 International Islamic University Malaysia. 
17 The data collected by RAND Corporation and the National Population and Family Development Board of Malaysia.  
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Table 2.2: Studies on the gender earning gap in Malaysia (continued)tinued) 
Studies Data Variables Methodology Results and Conclusions 
Schafgan (1998) 
Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, 
vol. 13, no.5 
Data Source: 
The MFLS-2 
 in 1988  
No. of obs.: 
- 2147 Malay women and 2023 
Malay men. 
- 1298 Chinese women and 1190 
Chinese men. 
   
Endogenous: 
log of hourly wage, dichotomous wage 
worker  
Exogenous: 
household income, house ownership, land 
ownership, age, primary schooling, 
secondary schooling, potential experience, 
failure, and urban. 
The parametric and semi-
parametric estimation of wage 
functions. 
The Oaxaca (1973) wage 
decomposition technique.  
This study found that returns to education increased among all ethnics for both 
sexes.  
 
In addition, the differences between wages offered to Chinese and Malays were 
significantly higher for women than men.  
Schafgan (2000) 
Journal of 
Development 
Economics, 
vol. 63 
Data Source: 
The MFLS-2 1988 
No. of obs.: 
4575 women and 4173 men in 
Peninsular Malaysia. 
 Endogenous: 
log of hourly wage, dichotomous wage 
worker  
Exogenous: 
household income, house ownership, land 
ownership, age, primary schooling, 
secondary schooling, potential experience, 
failure, and urban. 
The human capital earning 
functions by Mincer (1974) 
Parametric and semi-
parametric estimation of wage 
functions. 
The Oaxaca (1973) wage 
decomposition technique. 
This study found that discrimination among genders occurred for all ethnics in 
Peninsular Malaysia. 
 
The discrimination favouring men in Malaysia still quite prevalent, while for 
Malays the strong level of discrimination favouring Malay men is negated by the 
semiparametric estimation results. 
Mohamad- Nor 
(2000) 
Journal Pengurusan, 
vol. 19 
Data Source: 
A cross-section data from the 
MFLS-2 1988 
No. of obs.: 
300 professional women and 521 
men, 344 clerical  women and 
283 men, 304 sales women and 
530 men, 336 service women and 
507 men, 517 manual women and 
1205 men.   
Endogenous: 
log of monthly earnings 
Exogenous: 
work experience and its square, log value 
of weekly working hours, dummy for 
English as a medium of instruction 
schooling, dummy for 9, 11, and 13 years 
of schooling, and dummy for college 
degree or higher.  
Standard human capital model 
using OLS. 
OLS regression by major 
occupational categories (i.e., 
professional, clerical, service, 
sales, and manual) for both 
gender groups. 
Wage decomposition model 
by Oaxaca and Ransom 
(1994). 
The most important factor for determining gender-wage differences is the 
difference in employment distributions of men and women, whereby women tend 
to be in low-paying jobs and thus earn less than men for the same human capital 
endowments. 
 
The earnings gap seems to be smallest in clerical occupations, which has the 
highest percentage of women, and this gap is largest in occupations with smallest 
percentage of women, such as sales. 
 
Besides differences of endowments factors, discrimination also plays an important 
role that affects gender earnings differentials within each occupation. 
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Table 2.2: Studies on the gender earning gap in Malaysia (continued) 
Studies Data Variables Methodology Results and Conclusions 
Ismail and Mohd-
Nor (2005) 
IIUM Journal of 
Economics and 
Management, 
vol.13, no.2 
Data Source: 
A cross-section data in 1999. 
A survey of workers in six 
major industries18 in the two 
main industrial areas (i.e., 
The Klang Valley, and 
Penang). 
No. of obs.: 
2046 workers at the 
production level (1221 males 
and 825 females). 
Endogenous: 
log of monthly wages 
Exogenous: 
demographic variables (age, age2/100, 
and four ethnic groups); human 
capital variables (tenure, tenure2/100, 
school, school2/100, and two 
categories of on-the-job training); job 
characteristics (contract, full-time, 
part-time, skilled, semi-skilled, 
unskilled); industry characteristics 
(electric and electronic, textile, wood 
and furniture, transportation 
equipment, foods, and chemicals).  
First model consists of 
three wage equations, i.e., 
(i) all male and female, (ii) 
only male, and (iii) only 
female, estimated by OLS. 
Second model used the 
Oaxaca and Ransom 
(1994) wage 
decomposition equation. 
 
This study found that Malay workers have lower wages than their 
Chinese counterparts. 
 
Besides, educational attainment and skill training have a positive 
relationship with the wages level.  
 
Workers in more capital intensive industry received higher wages than 
those in the electrical and electronics industry, although textile industry 
workers received significantly lower wages.  
 
In addition, human capital and demographic factors played a greater 
role in determining wage differentials between genders. 
  
Fernandez (2009) 
Journal 
Kemanusiaan, 
vol.4 
Data Source: 
A cross-section data in 1995. 
Household Income Survey.19  
No. of obs.: 
467,765 employees. 
Endogenous: 
log of annual earnings 
Exogenous: 
experience and its square, education 
levels dummy, log of weekly hours of 
work. 
 
The standard human 
capital earnings model by 
Mincer (1974) using OLS 
regression. 
The wage decomposition 
model by Oaxaca and 
Ransom (1994). 
This study revealed that in most cases, a greater portion of the earnings 
gap was explained by the discrimination factor, while some of the 
disparity was due to gender differences in education, experience, and 
hours of work.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
18 The six major industries were electric and electronic, textile, wood and furniture, transportation equipment, foods, and chemicals. 
19 The survey was carried out by the Department of Statistics, Malaysia. 
61 
  
 
 
Furthermore, about 34 percent of the average monthly wage gap between the two 
genders was due to either women having lower productivity than men, or women 
receiving lower rates of return on human capital than men. Women tend to end up in 
low-paying jobs which is regarded as one of the main factors for their lower average 
wage. In other words, the crowding of a large percentage of women in a limited number 
of occupations has a negative effect on their wages. This implied that the gender wage 
gap in Malaysia was attributable to the occupational crowding effect of labour market 
discrimination wherein females are crowded into low paying jobs. 
 
Mohamad-Nor (1998) utilized a cross-section at individual level data from the Second 
Malaysian Family Life Survey (MFLS-2)20 to measure the magnitude of the gender 
wage gaps and examine the extent of discrimination against women in Peninsular 
Malaysia. The human capital wage equations are estimated using the OLS, i.e. 
 
              2.18 
 
where, for individual i, w is log of monthly wages; HK represents a vector of human 
capital variables (i.e. dummy variables for different levels of high education, 
experience and experience2, working hours and dummy for English as a medium of 
schooling); FM represents a vector of family variables (i.e. the number of children and 
marital status); OC represents a vector of occupational dummies for professional, 
administrative, clerical, sales, and service workers.  
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
20 MFLS-2 dataset collected by RAND Corporation in 1988. 
iiiii OCFMHKw   3210
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The coefficients show that wage structures are different between genders, with males 
being more favored. All human capital variables significantly affect wages. Additional 
education and work experience produce higher returns for both genders. The returns 
on work experience for male workers is almost double that for female workers. In 
addition, the squared terms in experience indicated that the effect of an additional year 
of experience declined over time for both sexes. Furthermore, the presence of children 
has a significant and negative effect on women’s wages but has no effect on men’s 
wages, while being married appears to have a significant and positive effect on men’s 
wages but with no significant impact on women’s wages. Longer working hours 
generate higher earnings for all workers, with female ones receiving higher returns 
than males. In addition, English as medium of schooling has a significant and positive 
impact on both men’s and women’s wages, with men receiving higher returns than 
women. The coefficients for all occupational dummies are significant and have a 
positive effect on men’s wages. For women, however, the coefficients for all 
occupations except services show a positive relationship with men’s.  
 
In addition, this study also determined the estimated cost of being female when 
regressing the following model: 
 
               2.19 
 
where FEM is a dummy for female workers. The predicted wages for female workers 
were about 55.6 percent of the men’s wages without controlling for other factors. 
When a vector of human capital variables is included, the gross female-male wages 
ratio increases to 60.3 percent. The results imply that female workers benefit from 
iiiii OCFMHKFEMw   43210
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getting a higher education, more experience, working longer hours, and having 
received an education in English. The female-male ratio increased to 59 percent when 
only family variables were included. This suggests that the cost of being a female 
worker is reduced slightly when married and having children. Meanwhile, when the 
regression is replaced by a vector of occupation categories, the results indicate that the 
ratio falls drastically to 52.4 percent. The figures indicate that job segregation 
increased the cost of being female. The inclusion of the occupation vector in the 
regression leads to decreases in the ratio to 59.4 percent, which confirms the results 
that job segregation is a key factor that widens the gender wage gap in Peninsular 
Malaysia. 
 
The Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) wage decomposition equation is used to measure the 
endowment and discrimination components as well as the extent of discrimination in 
the labour market. The effects of discrimination are approximated by the residual left 
after subtracting the endowment effects from the overall gap. In an attempt to measure 
the extent of discrimination, the discrimination factor is further broken down into the 
male treatment advantage (MTA) or the amount by which male productivity is 
overvalued, and the female treatment disadvantage (FTD) or the amount by which 
female productivity is undervalued. These may be calculated as follows: 
 
       2.20 
 
where m and f represent the male and female sample, respectively; and are the 
average productivity-determining for male and female sample, respectively;  
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f  are the OLS regression coefficients for the male and female sample, respectively; 
and 
*  is a parameter that represents the return on characteristics that influence the 
wage differentials in the absence of discrimination.  
 
The results from the decomposition wage equation showed that 13 percent of the wage 
gap was due to differences in the endowment characteristics. Meanwhile, the 
differences in returns on those characteristics, of which a large proportion of the 
discrimination component is attributable to overpayment of male workers, account for 
87 percent of the gender wage gap. It was expected that about 11 percent of the wage 
differential on productive advantage has been enjoyed by male workers over female 
workers. When occupational categories are included in the model, it increased the 
discrimination components to 94 percent. These results further strengthen the findings 
whereby gender differences in the distribution by occupation is a key factor in 
widening the wage gap in Malaysia. 
 
To sum up, Mohamad-Nor (1998) found that in explaining the earning differentials 
between the two genders, job discrimination is more important than human capital and 
family characteristics because between 87.5 percent and 93.9 percent of gender wage 
gaps were attributed to unexplained variables. This is consistent with the findings of 
Chapman and Harding (1985). Furthermore, the major source of discrimination is 
MTA rather than FTD, which implied that the gender wag gap was attributable to 
favouritism towards men. This study found that in 1988 the average monthly wage of 
women workers was 59 percent of that earned by men, which is lower than the findings 
by Chapman and Harding (1985).  
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Another group of studies discusses the relationship between the distribution of women 
and men in different occupations and its impact on the wage gap (e.g. Mohamad-Nor, 
2000; Fernandez, 2009). Mohamad-Nor (2000) applied the same approach and model 
to the same data (as in previous studies) in order to examine the occupational effects 
on earnings of women in each major occupational category21 and then compared their 
labour market outcomes to those of men. This study found that gender earnings 
differentials vary within occupations, which contributes to the overall gender wage 
gap. In addition, the wages of men and women are found to be lower in jobs held 
exclusively by women in clerical occupations than the wages of both genders 
employed in predominantly male occupations. This suggested that the higher 
percentage of women in an occupation has a negative effect on wages for that 
occupation. Furthermore, this study revealed that the wage gap seems to be smallest 
in clerical occupations, and largest in sales occupations. Hence, the distribution 
differences between men and women workers in the labour market also explain the 
gender wage gap in Malaysia.  
 
Another study on the intra-occupational gender wage gap was carried out by Fernandez 
(2009), which used the micro cross-section dataset from the Household Income Survey 
(HIS) of 1995. This study examined the gender wage gap issues within nine 
occupational groups consisting of three types of worker domination22. This study 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
21 The major occupational category comprises five groups, namely: Professional (which includes 
professional and administrative jobs), Clerical, Service, Sales, and Manual (which includes agriculture 
and production). 
22 The first four groups of workers, i.e. craft and related trade workers; agricultural and fishery workers; 
legislators, senior officials and managers; plant/machine-operator and assemblers, are male-dominated 
occupations. The fifth through to seventh groups, namely professionals; technicians and associate 
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revealed that, in most cases, a greater portion of the earnings gap was explained by the 
residual or discrimination factor, while some of the disparity was due to gender 
differences in education, experience, and hours of work. In addition, the discrimination 
factor in terms of the gender wage gap tends to be larger in male-dominated 
occupations than female-dominated and gender-integrated ones.  
 
Other studies (Shafgans, 1998; 2000) concentrated on the ethnic wage differentials. 
These two studies used parametric and semi-parametric wage equations, which 
corrected the sample selection bias in the MFLS-2 dataset to estimate the returns on 
education and the extent of gender discrimination. In these studies, discrimination 
refers to that part of the wage gap that cannot be explained by differences in 
endowment as they emanate from discrepancies in the returns on wage-determining 
factors. The Andrews-Schafgans (1998) estimator is used to consistently estimate the 
wage equation intercept in a semi-parametric case. 
 
Schafgan (1998) focused on the level of discrimination between Malay and Chinese 
men and women. This study claimed that returns on education increased among all 
ethnics for both sexes. In addition, the differences between wages offered to Chinese 
and Malays were significantly higher in absolute value for women than men, indicating 
a stronger female ethnic disparity. Furthermore, the decomposition results are not 
indicative of discrimination against Malays among men or women. These semi-
parametrics are in contrast to the parametric evidence that is indicative of 
discrimination favouring Chinese over Malays, with Chinese men (and women) 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
professionals; sales and service workers, are gender-integrated occupations. The last two groups, i.e. 
elementary workers and clerical workers, are female-dominated occupations.  
67 
  
 
 
receiving an unexplained premium between 23% and 27% (21% and 25%). Using the 
same data and applying the same approach as in previous, Shafgans (2000) examined 
the gender wage gap for all Malaysians and separately for Malays. This study found 
increasing returns on education among males and females in Malaysia, and separately 
among Malays as well. Regarding the issue of gender discrimination, women in 
Malaysia are discriminated but not among Malays. For all Malaysia, the extent of 
discrimination favouring men over women is between 63 to 68 percent. 
 
Other studies concentrated on the wage differentials among employees in the 
manufacturing sector (e.g. Lee and Nagaraj, 1995; Ismail and Mohd-Nor, 2005). Lee 
and Nagaraj (1995) utilized data from a 1991 survey of employees in the 
manufacturing sector in the most industrialized and developed region of Malaysia, 
namely, the Klang Valley. The survey covered employees in eleven industries (i.e. 
electrical machinery, apparatus, appliances and supplies, textile, garments and leather, 
food, beverages and tobacco, wood and wood products, paper product and printing, 
fabricated metal products, and chemical products). This study found that about 46 
percent of the male-female monthly pay gap in the Malaysian manufacturing sector 
may be attributable to the effects of discrimination. Discrimination occurs through 
favorable returns on hours worked, establishment characteristics, and experience of 
male workers. However, a large portion of the gap may be attributable to differences 
in human capital endowments. These results contradict Chapman and Harding (1985). 
Overall, women tend to be concentrated in subordinate occupations and appear to be 
paid less for similar human capital endowments, which is consistent with Chapman 
and Harding (1985). 
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Ismail and Mohd-Noor (2005) applied data from a 1999 survey of 2,046 workers in 
six major industries, namely: electrical and electronics, textile, wood-based, transport 
equipment, food, and chemical industries. They found that Malay workers have lower 
wages than their Chinese counterparts. Besides, educational attainment and skill 
training have a positive relationship with the wage level. Workers in more capital-
intensive industries received higher wages than those in the electrical and electronics 
industry, even though textile industry workers received significantly lower wages. In 
addition, human capital and demographic factors played a greater role in determining 
the wage differentials between genders which contradicts Chapman and Harding 
(1995).  
 
In summary, the gender wage gap may be due to the gap in individual productivity and 
labour market discrimination. This labour market discrimination may take various 
forms in terms of the same work. Female workers’ tendency to be crowded in low-
paying jobs is the main factor for their lower average wage. Job distribution of women 
and men does make an important difference in explaining their respective earnings. In 
addition, most of the discriminatory wage differentials were attributable to favourable 
male treatment rather than unfavourable female treatment. Furthermore, most of these 
studies revealed that job segregation also plays an important role in increasing the cost 
of being female. 
 
Athukorala (2004) estimated an inter-industry wage growth model on data from 45 
industries at the five-digit level of the SITC from 1976 to 1995. This study tests the 
postulated wage restraining effect of the presence of foreign-ownership and 
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multinational enterprises in export-oriented industries on the manufacturing wage 
growth. The estimated model is as follows: 
 
             2.21 
 
where WG is the average compound of real wage growth for industry i (i = 45) at time 
t (t =19). The independent variables (their sequence as in the above model) were the 
following: foreign ownership, export-orientation, an interaction for foreign ownership 
and export-orientation, initial wages, employment growth, female share, firm size, 
industry concentration, capital intensity of production, wage share in the production 
cost, public-sector ownership, and union density. According to the wage restraint 
hypothesis, 1̂  and  3̂  are expected to be negative and significant. However, the 
estimated coefficients were 1̂ = 0.01 (0.69) and 3̂ = 0.01 (0.82) for equation 2.21 – 
standard errors in parentheses. Therefore, when appropriately controlled for other 
determinants of inter-industry differences in the Malaysian manufacturing wage 
growth, the wage restraining hypothesis was rejected. There is no strong empirical 
evidence to suggest that the presence of foreign ownership and multinational 
enterprises in the export-oriented industries has a negative impact on real wage growth.  
 
In addition, among the control variables, initial wages, export-orientation, and 
employment growth have a negative and significantly effect on real wage growth. The 
estimated coefficients were 4̂ = -2.62 (4.60), 2̂ = -1.79 (2.29) and 5̂ = -0.06 (1.72) 
– standard errors in parentheses. The female share and capital intensity, however, have 
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a positive and significant effect on real wage growth. The estimated coefficients were 
6̂ = 0.04 (2.95) and 9̂ = 0.43 (1.43) – standard errors in parentheses. Furthermore, 
the firm size variable has the expected (positive) sign but insignificant due to inter-
correlation with the capital intensity variable. 
 
Athukorala and Devadason (2011) investigated the impact of foreign labour 
dependence on inter-industry wage differentials. This study utilized the Annual Survey 
of Manufacturing Industries’ panel data at the five-digit level for the six-year period 
from 2000 to 200523. They examined the postulated wage restraining effect of the 
presence of migrant workers on manufacturing workers via the following model: 
 
  2.22 
 
where the dependent variable is the log of real wage growth for industry i at time t, 
while the independent variables (their sequence as in the above model) were as 
follows: share of foreign workers in total employment (foreign-worker dependence), 
real output, capital intensity, skill intensity, average firm size, foreign ownership, 
export-orientation, industry concentration, trade union dummy, and the dot.com 
dummy. They estimated the above model using fixed effect (FE), random effect (RE) 
estimators, and then re-estimated by combining FE and RE estimators, each with the 
instrumental variable (IV) estimator. The FE estimator (preferred estimator) indicated 
that the coefficient of fwd has the negative sign in both total wage equation and 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
23 This survey was conducted by the Department of Statistics Malaysia (DOSM).  
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unskilled-worker24 equation. It is, however, insignificant statistically in the former, but 
highly significant in the latter. This provides empirical evidence of a statistically 
significant negative impact of foreign workers on the growth of unskilled-worker 
wages. The magnitude of the impact is rather small, as there is only a 1.4 percent 
decline in real wages for a 10 percent increase in the degree of foreign worker 
dependency. Among the control variables, the coefficients of ro, cap, skl and sz are 
highly significant, with the expected signs in both total workers and unskilled-worker 
equations. The estimated degree of elasticity of real wage with respect to each of these 
variables is much larger compared to that with respect to fwd. Thus, there is strong 
evidence for the proposition that factors closely related to manufacturing performance 
and industrial structure are much more important compared to foreign worker 
dependence in explaining real wage behaviour.  
 
In addition, there is no statistical evidence for the hypothesis that greater export-
orientation is associated with lower wages. At the same time, there is only weak 
evidence for the hypothesis that foreign firms tend to pay higher wages compared to 
their local counterparts. Furthermore, this study found that workers in industries where 
trade unions are prohibited on average earn 11.3 percent (for all workers) and 21.7 
percent (for unskilled workers) less than their counterparts in other industries.  
 
In summary, the studies on inter-industry differentials in the Malaysian manufacturing 
industries revealed that factors such as real output, capital intensity, skill intensity, 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
24 Production workers and operatives who earn less than RM2500 per month are defined as unskilled 
workers, whilst professional and managerial workers who earn more than RM2500 per month are treated 
as skilled workers. 
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average firm size, and female share all have a significant and positive impact on the 
real wage growth. Meanwhile, export-orientation, initial wages, employment growth, 
and union density all have a negative impact on real wage growth. In addition, the 
presence of foreign multinational enterprises in the export-oriented industries has no 
significant impact on the real wage growth. Meanwhile, foreign-labour dependence 
has a significant and negative impact on the growth rate of real wages for unskilled 
workers in the Malaysian manufacturing industries. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature regarding the determinants 
of a worker’s pay. This theoretical and empirical review primarily intends to provide 
the foundations and motivations for determinants of pay with regard to the Malaysian 
economy. 
 
In general, theories of wages have been broken down into three broad categories, 
namely, historical, contemporary, and alternative theories of wages. These theories 
have evolved due to changes and development in the labour market. The historical 
theory of wages seems to determine wages based on either the supply- or demand-side 
of the labour market. In contrast, contemporary and alternative labour market theories 
determine wages by considering both the demand- and supply-side of the labour 
market. Nevertheless, contemporary and alternative labour market theories differ as 
the former theory makes use of the assumption of a perfect competition labour market, 
while the latter makes use of the assumption of an imperfect competition labour 
market. 
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In literature on labour economics, there exist many different theoretical models to 
explain wage setting. However, not all of these are of empirical relevance, and we shall 
try to single out those that are relevant to a country like Malaysia. Our review points 
to the human capital theory as the most important and dominant economic theory of 
pay determination and differentials in Malaysia. Besides, it is interesting to specify 
and estimate a pay model (e.g. monopsony model) for the Malaysian economy which 
allows for market imperfections. 
 
From the empirical perspective, pay determinants can generally be divided into three 
groups: firstly, individual worker characteristics; secondly, job characteristics; and 
thirdly, employer or firm characteristics. Individual worker characteristics refer to 
human capital variables such as education, experience and tenure. Job characteristics 
usually include the type of job, the hierarchical position of the worker, functional area, 
and region. Employer characteristics are often proxy by firm dummies or main 
indicators such as employer size or the number of employees, sales, profit, and net 
income.  
 
Most previous studies on pay structure in Malaysia seem to assume that Malaysia’s 
labour market is perfectly competitive. To fill this gap, in this study, I will put to the 
test the notion that Malaysia’s labour market is monopsonistic and in line with what 
has been documented in Manning (2003a). In addition, this study will try to add some 
other labour market variables, namely, workers’ performance, capital stock, regional 
variation, openness, governance, and firms’ performance – all of which I consider 
variables that might explain the determinants of workers’ pay in selected sectors of the 
Malaysian economy such as manufacturing, at least at the micro-economic level. The 
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objective of this study is to address specific questions relating to how the worker’s pay 
is affected by those factors. Interestingly enough, this study is different from previous 
studies partly because it uses firm-level instead of industries-level data.  
 
In previous decades, many studies have analysed the determination of pay based on 
the perfect competition perspective. To date, however, it has been increasingly 
recognized that pay determination is best analysed from the perspective that there is 
some degree of imperfect competition in the labour market. In that regard, recent 
empirical studies have tied pay closely to individual employee characteristics (e.g. 
human capital, and gender), as well as employer characteristics (e.g. firm size, 
productivity, and profitability) by utilizing the matched employee-employer dataset, 
and have shown that both employee and employer characteristics play important roles 
in determining the worker’s pay. This type of research has mainly focused on 
developed countries such as France, Sweden, Portugal, Belgium, and the United 
States. Due to data limitations, however, far less attention has been paid to developing 
countries such as Malaysia. To fill this gap, this study also explores the role of 
employer-employee specific effects on pay determination in the Malaysian labour 
market.   
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 : MALAYSIAN LABOUR MARKET AND PAY 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In Malaysia, the growth of wages is closely related to economic growth and labour 
market conditions. For that reason, this chapter provides an overview of the Malaysian 
economy, as well as the labour market and wages as a necessary background to the 
chapters that follow.  
 
This chapter is set out as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the background to the 
Malaysian economy by reviewing Malaysia’s economic performance and its labour 
market development. This will then be followed by section 3.3 which generally 
explores the contributions of the manufacturing sector towards the Malaysian 
economy. Next, in section 3.4, the wage system and wage trends in Malaysia will be 
discussed. In addition, some issues and challenges to the Malaysian labour market will 
also be discussed in section 3.5. Finally, section 3.6 summarises the chapter and 
highlights several conclusions.   
 
3.2 Malaysian economy and its labour market development 
 
Malaysia is an upper-middle-income South East Asian country, a highly open society 
with a newly industrialized market economy. Malaysia is made up of 11 states that are 
spread out over Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah, and Sarawak. As a diverse society, 
Malaysia has a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-linguistic population. In 2009, 
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its population was about 27.9 million, consisting of Malays (49 percent), Chinese (23 
percent), Indians (7 percent), other Bumiputera (11 percent), and Others that include 
non-citizens (10 percent). In the early 1950s, Malaysia was a commodity-based 
economy which heavily relied on the exports of primary commodities such as rubber 
and tin. But Malaysia has since transformed itself especially in the 1970s towards a 
more diversified and multi-sector economy based on services and manufacturing, 
thereby achieving industrialisation at a faster rate than other Asian countries (ADB, 
2011). Recently, Malaysia has become an export-driven economy spurred on by high-
technology, knowledge-based, and capital-intensive industries (BNM, 2013).  
 
Since its independence in 1957, Malaysia’s economic performance has been one of the 
fastest among developing countries, and one of the most resounding in Asia. 
According to the Commission on Growth and Development (2008), Malaysia achieved 
a spectacular performance from 1967 to 1997 when it became one of 13 countries that 
have recorded an average growth of more than 7 percent per year for a period of 25 
years or longer. Since 1970 and until the recent Asian financial crisis, Malaysia’s GDP 
growth has ‘hit’ the 10 per cent mark on four occasions, i.e. 1973, 1977, 1989, and 
1997 (see Figure 3.1). However, there were several temporary economic downturns 
which began with the first energy crisis in 1973-1974, followed by the second energy 
crisis in 1978-1979. The global downturn in the demand for primary commodities and 
electronics then followed from 1985 to 1986. Then, in 1997 to 1998 came the Asian 
financial crisis, which was followed by the dot-com crash in 2000-2002 (NEAC, 
2009).  
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Figure 3.1 : Malaysian Growth Cycles 
 
      Source: NEAC (2009) 
 
Malaysia has managed to maintain high growth rates over the three and half decades 
from 1970 to 2005, with an average annual growth rate in real GDP of about 7 percent, 
and that despite the crisis which severely affected its economy (Henderson et al., 2002; 
EPU, 2001). During this period, the performance of its economy peaked in the early 
1980s through to the mid-1990s, as the economy experienced sustained rapid growth 
averaging almost 8 percent per annum (EPU, 1990). As a result, Malaysia emerged in 
2008 as the third largest economy in South East Asia and 30th largest economy in the 
world in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), with a gross domestic product (GDP) 
of US$222 billion (EPU, 2010). Nevertheless, in 2009, Malaysia’s per capita GDP 
reached US$14,900 billion and is still growing sustainably at around 5 to 7 percent 
towards its target of becoming a high income economy by 2020. According to the 
Tenth Malaysia Plan or 10MP (2011-2015), Malaysia needs to achieve an annual 
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average GDP growth rate of 6 percent during the 10MP period if it is to achieve this 
target.  
 
Apart from a rapid growth in GDP, Malaysia also experienced significant changes in 
terms of the labour market. The improvement in labour market conditions was 
reflected in lower retrenchments, and a higher number of vacancies and gains in 
employment. As shown in Table 3.1, retrenchments declined by 72 percent from 
25,064 persons in 2009 to 7,085 persons in 2010, due mainly to significantly fewer 
layoffs in the manufacturing sector. Vacancies posted on the JobsMalaysia Portal25 
increased to 1.8 million positions in 2010 compared to 1.5 million positions in 2009, 
due in part to expansion in the export- and domestic-oriented industries. The 
unemployment rate declined to 3.2 per cent of the labour force (2009: 3.7%), following 
stronger growth in employment (1.8%; 2009: 0.4%), and growth in the labour force 
(1.3%; 2009: 0.8%) MOF (2010).
  
 
Labour productivity, as measured by real value-added per worker, grew strongly by 
5.8 per cent, reversing the negative growth of 2.1 per cent in 2009. Growth was 
underpinned by strong productivity growth in the manufacturing (9.5%) and services 
(5%) sectors. Gains in productivity were supported by higher investment in capital, 
greater participation by high-skilled workers and skills-upgrading through technical 
training schemes provided by the government and the private sector (BNM, 2010). 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
25 JobsMalaysia Portal is an automated online job matching system provided by Malaysia’s Ministry of 
Human Resources. 
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Table 3-1 Selected Malaysian Labour Market Indicators, 2006-2011 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010p 2011f 
Labour Force (million 
persons) 
11.5 11.8 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.5 
     Annual change (%) 2.2 2.6 1.7 0.8 0.8 2.5 
Employment (million persons) 11.2 11.4 11.6 11.6 11.8 12.1 
     Annual change (%) 2.2 1.8 1.8 0.0 1.8 2.5 
Unemployment Rate (%) 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.7 3.2 3.2 
Retrenchments (persons) 15,360 14,035 24,033 25,064 7,085 - 
New Vacancies (million) 0.837 0.825 1.059 1.546 1.787 - 
Real labour productivity 
growth (%) 
3.3 4.2 3.1 -2.1 5.8 - 
Real wage per employee in the 
manufacturing sector (% 
change) 
-1.4 2.2 -4.8 1.9 6.4 - 
Notes: p – preliminary; f – forecast  
Source: BNM; EPU, Ministry of Human Resources  
 
 
Although the short-term economic growth has gained some momentum, serious 
concerns have been expressed with respect to the country’s intermediate- and longer-
term growth prospects. The Malaysian growth momentum over the last decade has 
been relatively weak which was attributed to low private investment that fell from an 
average of about 25 per cent of GDP pre-Asian financial crisis to an average of about 
10 per cent of post-crisis GDP. This is aggravated by the shortage of professional and 
skilled workers as well as declining labour productivity growth (MOF, 2010). 
Therefore, Malaysia is seen to be trapped in a low-value-added, low-wage, and low-
productivity structure (Kanaphaty, 2010).  
 
As an open economy, Malaysia’s rapid and impressive economic growth since 1970 
has been closely related with international trade, and the rapid expansion of the 
manufacturing sector resulting from its industry development policies (Athukorala and 
Menon, 1997; UNDP, 2005)26. The manufacturing sector has contributed significantly 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
26 These policies include an outward-looking industrialization strategy and encouragement for export-
platform industries. 
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to Malaysia’s economic development in terms of its contribution to the country’s GDP 
and exports growth, producing more jobs and increased employment rate, as well as 
creating new investment opportunities in Malaysia. 
 
3.3 Contribution of the manufacturing sector to the Malaysian economy 
 
The decade of the seventies (1971-1980) witnessed rapid growth and substantial 
structural transformation in the Malaysian economy. During this decade, the 
manufacturing sector outperformed the rest of the economy by growing at an annual 
average rate of 11.4 percent compared with the GDP’s annual growth rate of 7.8 per 
annum, resulting in a growing per capita income (EPU, 1980). The rapid growth in the 
Malaysian manufacturing sector enabled it to make a significant contribution to GDP 
growth. Table 3.2 shows the share of GDP (%) by sector (1970 – 2005). The GDP 
share of the manufacturing sector has risen from a mere 13 percent in 1970 to nearly 
36 percent in 2005, compensating for the declining share of the primary sectors 
(agriculture, forestry, livestock, and fisheries). 
Table 3-2 Share of GDP (%) by sector, 1970 – 2005 
Sector 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Agriculture, forestry, livestock & 
Fisheries 
Mining & quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Electricity, gas & water 
Transport, storage and 
communication 
Wholesale & retailers, hotel and 
restaurants 
Finance, insurance, real estate & 
business service 
Government services 
Other services 
Total 
 
  30.8 
    6.3 
  13.4 
    3.9 
    1.9 
     
    4.7 
 
  13.3 
 
    8.4 
  11.1 
    6.2 
100.0 
 
  27.7 
    4.6 
  16.4 
    3.8 
    2.1 
    
    6.2 
  
  12.8 
   
    8.5 
  12.7 
    5.7 
100.0 
 
  22.2 
    4.6 
  20.5 
    4.5 
    2.3 
 
    6.5 
 
  12.6 
 
    8.2 
  13.0 
    5.6 
100.0 
 
  20.3 
  10.1 
  19.1 
    5.1 
    1.7 
 
    6.4 
 
  12.7 
  
    8.8 
  12.3 
    3.5 
100.0 
 
  18.1 
    9.2 
  26.9 
    3.5 
    1.9 
    
    6.9 
  
  11.0 
 
    9.7 
  10.6 
    2.2 
100.0 
 
  13.6 
    7.3 
  32.4 
    3.6 
    2.1 
 
    7.3 
 
  11.8 
   
  10.6 
    9.7 
    1.6 
100.0 
 
    8.7 
    6.6 
  33.4 
    3.3 
    3.4 
 
    8.0 
 
  14.9 
 
  11.8 
    7.0 
    2.9 
100.0 
  
    7.0 
    5.5 
  35.8 
    3.2 
    3.4 
    
    8.6 
 
  15.0 
  
  12.4 
    5.7 
    3.4 
100.0 
 Source: Malaysia Plan (years), EPU.  
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The manufacturing sector is clearly the main contributor, having been the largest 
component of total exports; besides, Malaysia is also the world’s 17th largest exporter 
(EPU, 2000). In tandem with its economic industrialization, the composition of 
Malaysia’s exports had gradually shifted from comprising mainly of agricultural and 
mining products to manufactured goods. As shown in Figure 3.2, the development and 
growth in the manufacturing sector were quite rapid. Of the country’s total exports, 
the sector accounted for well over 80 percent in 2000 and even after. By contrast, the 
share of exports by the agriculture and mining sectors, which were previously 
dominant, shows a drastic decline from 40 and 33 percent in 1980 to 7 and 10 percent 
respectively in 2005. Malaysia’s export structure has focussed mainly on electrical and 
electronics (E&E) products, and on primary commodities such as petroleum and palm 
oil. In 2005, more than 40 percent of Malaysia’s exports were accounted for by E&E, 
followed by natural resources (petroleum and chemicals) at roughly 24 percent (EPU, 
2006).  
Figure 3.2 Share of gross exports (%) by sector, 1980 – 2005 
 
             Source: Malaysia Plan (various years), EPU. 
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Corresponding to the economic diversification and major shifts in the sectoral 
contributions to its GDP, Malaysia’s employment structure has changed markedly 
since 1970 (Kuruvilla and Erickson, 1998; Inagami, 1998). The manufacturing sector 
was not only driving force behind the country’s GDP and exports growth but was also 
the main provider of job opportunities, replacing the agriculture sector (Lim, 1987). In 
2005, the manufacturing sector generated 566,300 new jobs, accounting for almost 30 
percent off all new jobs created in the country (Malaysia, 1991). Table 3.3 shows the 
employment share (%) by sector over the period 1980–2005. By 2005, the employment 
share of agriculture, which had been dominant in 1980, was lower than that of 
manufacturing. The agriculture sector had contracted considerably, from contributing 
about 41 percent of total employment in 1980 to merely 12 percent in 2005. In contrast, 
during the same period, employment in the manufacturing sector increased 
significantly from about 16 percent in 1980 to almost 30 percent in 2005.  
 
Table 3-3 Share of employment (%) by sector, 1980 - 2005 
Sector 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Agriculture, forestry, livestock & 
Fisheries 
Mining & quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Electricity, gas & water 
Transport, storage and 
communication 
Wholesale & retailers, hotel and 
restaurants 
Finance, insurance, real estate & 
business service 
Government services 
Other services 
Total 
 
  40.6 
    1.7 
  15.8 
    5.2 
    1.0 
 
    3.8 
 
  12.7 
 
    1.0 
  13.9 
    4.3 
100.0 
 
  35.9 
    1.5 
  18.0 
    5.5 
    1.0 
 
    3.8 
 
  13.7 
  
    1.1 
  14.9 
    4.6 
100.0 
 
  26.0 
    0.6 
  19.9 
    6.3 
    0.7 
    
    4.5 
  
  18.2 
 
    3.9 
  12.7 
    7.2 
100.0 
 
  18.0 
    0.5 
  26.0 
    8.3 
    0.9 
 
    5.0 
 
  16.8 
   
    4.8 
  11.0 
    8.7 
100.0 
 
  15.2 
    0.4 
  27.6 
    8.1 
    0.8 
 
    5.0 
 
  17.1 
 
    5.5 
  10.6 
    9.7 
100.0 
  
  12.0 
    0.4 
  29.5 
    8.1 
    0.1 
    
    5.8 
 
  17.3 
  
   6.0 
    9.8 
  11.0 
100.0 
           Source: Malaysia Plan (various years), EPU. 
 
Malaysia was listed as the world’s 15th most attractive foreign direct investment (FDI) 
destination in the 2014 FDI Confidence Index Report by the global management 
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consultant A.T. Kearney, and a majority of those FDI entered in Malaysia was in the 
manufacturing sector. In 2011, the manufacturing sector accounted for just over half 
of the total FDI inflows or about RM16.85 billion out of RM33.7 billion (DOSM, 
2012). In addition, Malaysia is considered the world’s top manufacturing location, 
followed by Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, and China who are placed second, third, 
fourth and fifth, respectively (Cushman & Wakefield). 
 
Apart from the above, the manufacturing sector also has the capacity to: (1) encourage 
the expansion of the agriculture-based sector via its downstream activities such as 
product processing, packaging and distributing; (2) support the utilization and 
development of R&D and ICT adoption for business and manufacturing purposes; and 
(3) offer and provide the working experience, industrial training and actual case study 
for education and other government sectors in order to enhance the Malaysian 
education sector (Chang, 2012). In short, the manufacturing sector plays a vital role in 
the transformation and development of the Malaysian economy.  
 
3.4 Remuneration system and pay trend in Malaysia 
 
In most countries, the wage formation system is based on collective bargaining 
between the employer and worker representatives. In Malaysia, collective bargaining 
is a formal process which is determined by two important legislations, i.e. the Trade 
Union Act of 1959 and the Industrial Relations Act of 1967. Employers and workers 
are free to establish unions subject to the provisions of the Trade Union Act. The Trade 
Union Act provides for trade unions to be formed on the basis of a particular industry, 
occupation, trade, and establishment (or similar trades, occupations, industries or 
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establishments). Only the trade unions of employers and trade unions of workers have 
the right to represent employers and workers on issues concerning industrial relations, 
which include collective bargaining.  
 
In Malaysia, wage formation is based on its private sector remuneration systems that 
have evolved according to peculiarities of the industry and labour market conditions. 
In this sector, the wage structure may be in the form of salary scale, salary range, 
minimum and maximum annual increment, or collective bargaining. The previous 
remuneration system, which was fixed and not based on productivity, weakens firms’ 
performance in terms of facing fluctuation in demand for output (Abdul-Ghani et al., 
2001). This variation in demand translates into fluctuation in employment (Abdul-
Ghani et al., 2001). This was evident during the slow economic performance in the 
mid-1980s and the economic crisis of 1997-1999, wherein employers laid off some of 
their workers in order to reduce costs in response to slow demand in output (Abdul-
Ghani et al., 2001).  
 
The NLAC of Malaysia has recognized some weaknesses of the fixed remuneration 
system. These are: (1) the general trend of wage increase is rapid and not related to 
productivity improvement; (2) annual increments are pre-determined and are given 
automatically to all workers regardless of the level of performance; (3) remuneration 
is not related to company performance; (4) collective agreements are usually fixed for 
three years and are binding on both parties; (5) terms in the collective agreement 
cannot be reduced even when a new agreement is concluded.  
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Consequently, on 1 August 1996, the Malaysian government introduced the 
Productivity-Linked Wage System (PLWS) which establishes a closer link between 
wages and productivity. Based on the Third Industrial Master Plan, the objectives of 
the PLWS are to: (1) establish a closer link between wages and productivity so as to 
enhance competitiveness and promote employment stability; (2) enable employers to 
develop a broader and systematic approach towards improved productivity and wages 
through the active involvement and cooperation of their employees; (3) enable 
employees to obtain a fair share of the gains that arise from productivity growth and 
performance improvement, thereby promoting equity, social cohesion and enhancing 
the quality of life as well as developing improved skill-related career paths and 
increasing job satisfaction. In short, by linking wages to productivity, it makes the 
following possible to achieve: (1) higher wages for worker and higher profits for 
employers; and (2) greater competitiveness for employers. 
 
Wage formation is a key element in economic growth and economic transformation. 
The real wage growth in the Malaysian manufacturing sector was very much in line 
with the growth of its GDP and development of its labour market. It was also 
influenced by changes in the trade and economic policies of its government. These 
statements can be explained by looking at the trend in wage growth for the 
manufacturing industry as a whole as well as for sub-sectors of the manufacturing 
industry over the years. Wages in the Malaysian manufacturing sector have witnessed 
changing patterns in recent times. As indicated in Figure 3.3, in the early 1970s, the 
real wage rate index (1990 = base year) in the manufacturing sector decreased from 68 
(during 1965-1969) to 60 (during 1970-1974). 
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Figure 3.3 Real Wage Rate Index (1990=100) in Malaysian Manufacturing Sector, 1965-2000 
 
Source: Athukorala, 2001. 
 
Athukorala claimed that “the observed decline in real wages was largely a reflection 
of the shift in the structure of production away from (capital-intensive) import 
substitution activities and towards (labour-intensive) export production. At the same 
time, growth of real wages was also naturally constrained by the excess supply of 
labour in the economy, particularly from rural areas” (Athukorala, 2001: p. 18). Rasiah 
noted that “massive labour-intensive, FDI-dominated expansion in the early 1970s did 
not raise wages because of the low value added nature of production operations and 
high labour reserves due to high unemployment rates” (Rasiah, 2002: p. 38). 
 
However, the index of real wages started to increase in late 1979 to 74.2, and kept on 
rising to 106.6 in 1985. The rise in wages during this period was due to the government 
policy at the time, which put more emphasis on an export-led industry and less on 
import substitution (Athukorala, 2001). Besides, the retrenchment of low-wage 
workers as well as deflationary conditions in the mid-1980s led to increase in wages 
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(Rasiah, 2002). Hence, the higher wage growth prompted the unemployment rate to 
increase by about 8 percent in the mid-1980s and consequently restricted wage growth 
between 1986 and 1989 (EPU, 1986). 
 
The growth rate in wages increased dramatically between 1987 and 1997 in line with 
Malaysia’s economic boom during the same period, before falling off due to the 
financial crisis that later affected the Malaysian economy in 1999, although it regained 
pre-crisis level in 2000 (Athukorala, 2001). Moreover, the tightening of labour market 
also pushed wages up during this period (Rasiah, 2002; EPU, 2006). The general 
perception has been that after the Malaysian economic boom in the ten-year period 
starting from 1987, the labour market has since tightened in recent years. This 
perception is based on a significant increase in real wages and a decline in the rate of 
unemployment. However, Athukorala (2001) revealed three key performance 
characteristics of the Malaysian labour market during these periods which run opposite 
to this general perception. Firstly, despite the notable upward trend in real wages since 
the late 1980s, the rate of growth in real manufacturing wages has constantly lagged 
behind that of employment growth. For example, from 1987 to 2000, real wages grew 
by only 3.4 percent, whereas employment grew by 9.7 percent.  
 
Secondly, the growth in real wages has been significantly slower than that of labour 
productivity, and the gap between the two has widened in recent years. Therefore, 
wage share in value added and the price cost margin, which remained practically flat 
until the mid-1990s, has since steadily increased. Thirdly, real wage growth in 
Malaysia during the 1990s was much slower than that in Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Singapore during the same period and even a decade earlier (Little, 1999). These 
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three features of labour market performance suggest that growth in employment and 
wage rate in Malaysia was consistent with a situation in which the labour demand 
curve shifts along an elastic labour supply curve. 
 
Athukorala (2001) drew a comparison between real wage indices of export-oriented 
and domestic-oriented manufacturing production. The findings of the comparison 
showed that wage growth in export-oriented manufacturing has begun to persistently 
surpass that in domestic-oriented manufacturing from the early 1990s. From 1990 to 
2000, the compound annual growth in real wage in export-oriented sectors was 6.5 
percent, and in domestic-oriented sectors it was 4.4 percent. This evidence is consistent 
with other ones, e.g. Were and Mugerwa (2009) who show that exporting firms are 
more efficient and have higher productivity, and so can pay higher wages. The present 
study tries to include this variable in examining the Malaysian pay structure at the 
firm-level. 
 
Real wages in sub-sectors of the manufacturing industries have also dropped 
dramatically over the last ten years since the Asian financial crisis (Hunt, 2009). As 
stated in the ‘Reshaping Economic Geography Report in East Asia’ and the Pacific 
region, the decline in real wages was in tandem with a decrease in GDP over the last 
ten years. Table 3.3 illustrates that growth in real wages had decreased significantly to 
1.9 percent post-crisis (1998-2007) from 5.6 percent pre-crisis (1994-1997) per annum 
for export-oriented industries. Meanwhile, real wage growth rates had fallen to 1.4 
percent post-crisis from 6.8 percent pre-crisis per annum for domestic industries. 
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Table 3-4 The Malaysian Manufacturing Real Wage Changes 
 
Trade 
Policy 
 
 
Industry 
Real wages growth per annum (%) 
Pre-crisis 
(1994-1997) 
Post-crisis 
(1998-2007) 
 
 
 
EOI 
Average increase for EOI 
Electrical and electronics 
Petroleum, chemical, rubber, plastic products 
and real estate 
Textiles, wearing apparel and leather products 
Wood products, furniture, paper products, 
printing and publishing 
5.6 
6.2 
 
6.0 
 
5.8 
 
2.8 
1.9 
2.5 
 
1.5 
 
-1.3 
 
1.4 
 
 
 
ISI 
Average increase for ISI 
Transport equipment and other manufactures 
Food, beverages and tobacco 
Non-metallic mineral products, basic metal 
and fabricated metal 
6.8 
 
7.9 
6.8 
 
5.9 
1.4 
 
2.5 
1.2 
 
0.6 
 Total manufacturing 5.9 1.8 
Source: Reshaping Economic Geography Report in East Asia 
 
 
3.5 Malaysian labour market and challenges 
 
The NEAC has identified seven critical factors that contribute to the sluggish 
Malaysian economic growth, namely: (1) absence of private investment; (2) 
difficulties of doing business; (3) low value added industries; (4) low-skilled jobs and 
low wages; (5) stagnating productivity growth; (6) insufficient innovation and 
creativity; and (7) lack of appropriately skilled human capital. These factors have 
become important issues and challenges that need to be addressed if Malaysia is to 
achieve its Vision 2020, i.e. transforming the nation into a developed and high-income 
economy by 2020. As a result, the Malaysian government has introduced a new 
development strategy under the Tenth Malaysian Plan 2011-2015 and the New 
Economic Model in order to move the nation forward to the next stage of development; 
in other words, to free itself from the so-called middle-income trap. 
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Over the last year, there has been much discussion on the notion that Malaysia has for 
long been caught in the middle-income trap. The middle-income trap dilemma can be 
explained by ASEAN’s notion of “Glass Ceiling” (Ohno, 2009). There are four steps 
that East Asia’s competing economies must implement in order to catch up with the 
forerunners (see Figure 3.6 for details). Industrialization of developing countries starts 
with the arrival of FDI companies in substantial number. In Stage 1, nearly all inputs 
are imported from abroad, while value-creating processes such as management, R&D, 
production of raw materials and key components, logistics, and marketing are mainly 
performed by foreigners. This situation reflects the fact that simple production, such 
as contract manufacturing of garment and footwear, food processing, and manual 
assembly of electronics parts, is set up for the most part under foreign dominance.  
 
In Stage 2, the domestic supporting industries27 start to develop due to mass contract 
manufacturing and machinery assembly. Most parts and components, except for the 
most difficult, are produced by either the FDI or local suppliers in the country over 
time. However, production is still highly dependent on foreign management and 
technology. Competitive firms and factories continue to be directed by foreign 
managers. Foreign dependency is significantly reduced in Stage 3. Management and 
technology capabilities are internalized, while localization extends from physical 
inputs to human resources. The country becomes an exporter of high-quality 
manufactured products and strongly invests in building production bases abroad. 
Finally, in Stage 4, the capacity to create new products and thereby to lead global 
industrial markets is achieved through innovation.  
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
27 The term ‘supporting industries’ refers to a layer of production establishments that supply parts and 
components to assembly-type manufacturing industries. 
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From a low-income country in 1957, Malaysia efficiently climbed the ladder to attain 
an upper middle income status by 1992. This is due to the successful shift from 
dependence on the primary sector to diversified manufacturing in the 1970s (Ohno, 
2009). Rapid economic growth was also generated by the exports of manufactured 
goods, a proactive government, high savings rate, and strong direct foreign investment 
which supported the building of one of the best developed infrastructures in the region. 
But since becoming an upper middle income economy, like many others, Malaysia has 
largely stuck there28.  
 
Malaysia’s industrial capability now looks less impressive. It started industrialization 
in the 1960s to diversify its economic infrastructure into manufacturing by the use of 
import-substitution and export-orientation strategy. The long-term macroeconomic 
records have been good despite shocks such as the recession in the early 1980s and the 
financial crisis of 1997-1998. But again, Malaysia has failed to move away from a 
heavy-reliance on foreign management and technology in manufacturing (Ohno, 
2009). For example, the Malaysian electronics industry has grown remarkably in terms 
of volume and high-tech materials. However, key components and important processes 
such as design and marketing are still being supplied by FDI firms or through imports. 
As a result, locals only assemble or produce the “easy” parts while most values 
continue to be created and captured by foreigners. After five decades of Malaysian 
industrialization, the lack of discipline and skills among workers and the shortages of 
top and middle management remain key issues for the Malaysian labour market (Ohno, 
2009). 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
28 Based on 2008 data, the World Bank has classified upper middle income countries as those with a 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in the range of USD3,856 to USD11,905. 
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Figure 3.4 : Breaking the “Glass Ceiling” in Manufacturing 
 
Source: Ohno, 2009 
 
 
Why has Malaysia been caught up in this dilemma? It is caused by several factors such 
as price controls and drag from the agricultural sector (Onn, 2010). The price control 
policy was first enforced by the colonial government in 1941 in response to the 
economic hardships after World War 2, and it has since been enforced up until this 
day. Price controls have resulted in lower prices for commodities such as rice, flour, 
sugar, fertilisers, milk, chicken and even bus and taxi fares compared to outside 
markets. Since basic necessities constitute a large component of the Malaysian CPI, 
the cumulative effect of price controls for over sixty years has been a gross suppression 
of Malaysian CPI compared to the global CPI (Onn, 2010). 
 
Increases in workers’ annual pay are linked to the country’s CPI (Onn, 2010). The 
divergence between suppressed Malaysian CPI and that of the rest of the world has 
also led to a corresponding significant divergence of the Malaysian wage rates in 
relation to the rest of the world. This is the major reason why ever since the 1980s, 
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Malaysian wages have fallen behind wages in the rest of the world. For example, a 
graduate teacher starts at RM2,500 per month in Malaysia, compared to RM6,196 in 
Singapore, RM 11,864 in the UK, and RM15,681 in Hong Kong (Onn, 2010).  
  
Besides restraining Malaysian wages, price controls also severely distort the domestic 
economic factor proportions, resulting in many firms using non-efficient economic 
production processes. With diesel and fuel prices being controlled, and workers’ wages 
suppressed, manufacturers opt to use more fuels and labour as inputs instead of more 
machines, resulting in low-quality Malaysian products and, of course, low productivity 
growths (Onn, 2010). 
 
In Malaysia, high-wage jobs have not been created in sufficient numbers. Malaysia’s 
share of skilled labour has declined in 2007, when compared to 2002, across industries 
(MOF, 2010). This reflects the dominance in Malaysia of low value added goods, 
which only require low-skilled labour. According to the experience in more developed 
economies, the proliferation of skilled workers occurs when workers compete to 
upgrade themselves in search of higher wages and when firms see an increased use of 
skilled workers as necessary for raising their profitability.  
 
The two factors are largely absent in Malaysia because in many instances, employers 
do not pay for skills, relying instead on tried and tested means such as a readily 
available pool of unskilled foreign workers and under-priced resources to generate 
profits. Malaysian immigration policies favour low-skilled and cheap labour. Between 
1990 and 2005, foreign workers contributed more than a third of the increase in labour 
supply, of whom over 98 percent were low-skilled contract migrant workers. This 
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situation has led to over-reliance on low-cost and unskilled foreign labour, which has 
sustained the profitability of low-value added business in the short term but which 
provided no incentive to move up on the value chain. It has also largely contributed to 
a dampening effect on wages. As a result of these trends, only 25 percent of Malaysia’s 
labour force are highly skilled workers, compared to a significantly higher proportion 
in Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that the Malaysian economy and its labour market have 
evolved over the last 30 years, due in part to the growing importance of its 
manufacturing sector. The manufacturing sector is the main contributor and driving 
engine that contributes significantly to the growth in the country’s GDP, exports, and 
employment. The growth in manufacturing real wages is influenced by Malaysia’s 
economic growth and its labour market conditions. Factors such as market forces and 
labour productivity have had an impact on changes regarding wages in Malaysia. 
When there were labour shortages in certain labour markets that were competing for 
the same workforce, wages increased at a faster rate compared to when there was a 
surplus of labour and relatively high unemployment. Meanwhile, increases in labour 
productivity have generally led to increases in wages demanded by labour groups.  
However, there are certain issues that restrain Malaysian wage growth such as price 
controls, lack of high-wage jobs and skilled labour, and a pool of unskilled and cheap 
foreign labour. The next chapter will explore three datasets used in this thesis in order 
to investigate wage determination in the Malaysian economy at the micro-level.  
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 : DATASETS AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Studies on pay and the Malaysian labour market have focused almost exclusively on 
factors that determine and shape the country’s current and future supply of labour. For 
the most part, this has been driven by the availability of national datasets albeit limited 
essentially to industry and household surveys produced by the Department of Statistics 
Malaysia (DOSM). For example, data from the Annual Manufacturing Survey (AMS) 
as well as the Malaysian Family Life Surveys (MFLS) have led to a rich flow of useful 
and interesting results on the determination of earning in the Malaysian labour market.  
 
However, a more integrated labour market model would, of course, also need to 
examine the contribution of inter-firm in shaping the domestic labour market. Since 
the recent release of Malaysia’s Productivity Climate Survey (PICS), it has been 
possible to undertake such an endeavour. The main purpose of the survey was to 
identify the key constraints to competitiveness as perceived by firms in the 
manufacturing and selected business support services sectors in Malaysia (World 
Bank, 2005). We make use of datasets from this survey to examine the pay 
determinants in the Malaysian economy at the worker-level, firm-level, and matched 
worker-firm-level datasets. 
  
For that reason, the aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the datasets used 
in the empirical analysis in later chapters. As outlined in Chapter 1, the thesis focuses 
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on three different perspectives in order to examine a number of questions surrounding 
pay determination in Malaysia. These three different analytical perspectives are the 
following: the first relies on employees’ perspective alone, without taking into 
consideration the employers’ perspective; the second depends on employers’ 
perspective alone, without taking into account the employees’ perspective; and the 
third takes into consideration both employers’ and employees’ perspectives. 
 
In doing so, this thesis utilises three types of Malaysian datasets that are available from 
the second wave of Malaysia Productivity Investment Climate Survey (PICS-2) 
(2007/08)
29
. These datasets allow one to focus more closely on three different 
perspectives. The worker-level dataset (hereafter WLD) focuses on the impact of 
employees’ characteristics alone; the firm-level dataset (hereafter FLD) focuses only 
on the impact of employers’ characteristics; while the matched-worker-firm dataset 
(hereafter MWFD) focuses on the impact of both employees’ and employers’ 
characteristics on the determinants of pay and their related structure within the 
Malaysian economy. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, a general description 
of Malaysia’s PICS-2 is given. In Section 4.3, we discuss sampling frames and the 
sample size. Next, in Section 4.4, we present the structure of the worker- and firm-
level as well as matched worker-firm-level datasets for Malaysia. Besides, we outline 
the construction of the matching procedure and introduce the core variables of these 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
29 The PICS-2 datasets were downloaded from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (ES) at 
www.enterprisesurveys.org.  
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datasets. Moreover, we present descriptive statistics of the main variables included in 
our datasets as well as provide some descriptive analyses. Finally, we draw some 
conclusions in the last section.  
 
4.2 Malaysia’s second productivity investment climate survey (PICS-2) 
 
PICS-2 was jointly conducted between October 2007 and January 2008 by the DOSM 
and the EPU, in collaboration with the World Bank. The aim of this survey is to 
understand the climate in Malaysia and how it affects business performance. PICS-2 
was obtained from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (ES) at 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org. Note that the survey data presented on the website 
are primarily in the form of indicators, i.e. firm-level data has been aggregated to the 
country level. To access the complete datasets at the disaggregated firm- and worker-
level, which include answers to all the survey questions, researchers must register with 
the Enterprise Analysis Unit30.  
 
The ES collect a wide array of qualitative and quantitative data from key 
manufacturing and services sectors in every region of the world. The ES topics include 
firm characteristics, gender participation, access to finance, annual sales, cost of inputs 
or labour, workforce composition, bribery, licencing, infrastructure, trade, crime, 
competition, capacity utilization, land and permits, taxation, informality, business-
government relations, innovation and technology, and performance measures. The 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
30 Users of this data are required to protect its confidentiality in accordance with World Bank rules 
governing “strictly confidential” information by completing the Enterprise Surveys Data Access 
Protocol. 
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mode of data collection is face-to-face interviews with firm owners, top managers and 
sampled workers regarding the business environment in their countries and the 
productivity of their firms. These surveys use two instruments, i.e. Manufacturing 
Questionnaire and Service Questionnaire. 
 
Because the ES instrument (questionnaire) has evolved over time in terms of the 
questions asked and the way in which the questions are asked, and because different 
country characteristics have elicited country-specific questions, the data are offered in 
two formats: 
 
1. Standardized survey – which country data are matched to a standard set of 
questions. This format allows for cross-country comparisons and analysis but 
sacrifices those country-specific survey questions which cannot be matched.  
2. Country survey – offers complete survey information for a particular country's 
survey. In this format, the question coding is inconsistent across country 
surveys, even where the questions are identical, and is useful only for a single 
country or limited cross-country analysis.  
 
In the case of Malaysia, firm-level surveys have been conducted twice. The first round 
survey (PICS-1 or PICS 2002) was conducted between December 2002 and May 2003, 
and ultimately 902 firms in the manufacturing sector and 249 firms in the services 
sector took part. The second round survey (PICS-2 or PICS 2007) was fielded between 
October 2007 and January 2008, involving 1,115 manufacturing firms and 303 firms 
in selected business service sectors. Four hundred and eighty-eight manufacturing 
firms and 137 services firms participated in both rounds of survey. PICS-1 was 
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conducted using the standardized survey format, while PICS-2 used the country survey 
format. In addition, PICS-2 datasets are available at the firm- and worker-level, while 
with PICS-1 only data at the firm-level was published by the World Bank’s Enterprise 
Survey. Therefore, the analyses in this thesis are grounded in datasets exclusively from 
PICS-2.  
 
PICS-2 covers both firm- and worker-level datasets. These datasets are generated from 
separate employer and employee questionnaire modules. The employer module was 
carried out in a sub-sample of 1,115 firms covering six regions, different firm size 
categories, legal ownership status and sectors so as to accurately represent the 
population of firms. The sampling methodology of PICS 2007 includes first of all 
generating a representative sample of the whole economy that substantiates assertions 
about the manufacturing and business support services sectors; and secondly, 
generating large-enough sample sizes for selected industries to conduct statistically 
robust analyses.  
 
4.3 Sampling frames and sample size for PICS-2 
 
The sampling frame is taken from the Central Register of Establishments (SIDAP), 
managed by DOSM. The register is updated using information supplied by the 
Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM), Employees Provident Fund (EPF), the 
2006 Economic Census Data, and several regular surveys or censuses conducted by 
the DOSM. For the manufacturing sector, the economic activities are defined 
according to Divisions (2-digit codes) under the Malaysia Standard Industrial 
Classifications (MSIC) 2000, which are identical to the United Nations Statistical 
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Division’s International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities 
(ISIC Rev. 3), up to 4-digit level. For the manufacturing sector, PICS-2 covered 10 
manufacturing industries: food processing; textiles; garments; chemicals; rubber & 
plastics; machinery & equipment; electric appliances; electronics; auto parts; wood & 
furniture. Only firms with more than 10 employees are included.  
 
For the business support service sector, PICS-2 covered 5 industries with two 
employment thresholds. Only firms with 10 employees are covered in the fields of 
information technology, telecommunications, and advertising & marketing; while only 
firms with more than 20 workers are covered for areas such as accounting & related 
professional services, and business logistics industries. Since very small firms would 
normally contribute insignificant information and that a substantial portion of the 
information required is not relevant to small firms, these are excluded from the survey. 
 
In terms of geographical distribution, this survey covers six regions. Four regions are 
located in Peninsular Malaysia, and two in East Malaysia. Within each of the six 
regions, states and areas to be covered are selected based on the concentration of firms, 
as shown in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4-1 Geographical Coverage of Malaysia PICS-2 
Region State Concentration Area 
 
1. Central Kuala Lumpur 
Selangor 
Melaka 
Kuala Lumpur 
Kelang 
Petaling 
Melaka Tengah 
 
2. North Pulau Pinang 
Kedah 
Pulau Pinang 
Kulim 
 
3. South Johor Johor Bharu 
Batu Pahat 
Muar 
 
4. East Terengganu Kuala Terengganu 
Kemaman 
 
5. Sabah Sabah Kota Kinabalu 
 
6. Sarawak Sarawak Kuching 
Source: Malaysia’s PICS-2 
 
The total number of firms in the survey frame is 5,824, involving 3,322 firms from the 
manufacturing sector and 2,502 firms from the business support service sector. From 
the sampling frame, PICS-2 sampled 1,500 firms, of which 1,200 were manufacturing-
based firms, while 300 were business support service-based firms. The total sample 
size for each sector is based on the time constraints of canvassing lengthy 
questionnaires within a short duration (World Bank, 2005). In drawing up the samples, 
a single-stage stratified systematic sampling is used. The sampling frame is stratified 
by sector, state, and industry. Within each sector, the total sample size is distributed to 
the substrata based on proportional allocation as follows: 
 
where  
 ijkn = sample size for industry i, region j, and area k 
 ijkN = total number of firms in industry i, region j, and area k 
N
n
Nn ijkijk 
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 n = total sample size for the sector 
 N = total number of firms in the sector. 
 
To select the sample for each sector, firms within each industry, region and area are 
arranged according to the output value. Selection is then carried out independently for 
each sub-stratum based on a linear systematic method (World Bank, 2005). The 
response rate to the PICS-2 survey for the manufacturing sector is quite high, at about 
92.9%. A successful enumeration is 1,115 firms out of a total sample selection of 1,200 
firms.  
 
The response rate to the workers survey was as high as the first survey conducted in 
2002, with 93.8% from manufacturing and 93% from business support services. The 
final result is a large representative matched employee-employer dataset that covers 
13,140 workers across 1,418 workplaces in both the manufacturing and business 
support service sectors. In particular, PICS-2 consists of 10,350 workers across 1,115 
workplaces in the manufacturing sector and 2,788 individuals across 303 firms in the 
business support service sector. 
 
The focus here, however, is on respondents in full-time employment, aged between 15 
and 64, who reported positive earnings, and in workplaces where more than four 
workers responded to the survey. This leaves about 10,302 employees across 1,043 
manufacturing-based firms, and 2,772 workers across 303 business support service-
based firms. Since business services is not representative of services in general, this 
thesis only utilises samples from the manufacturing sector, as these are representative 
of the manufacturing sector as a whole (World Bank, 2009).   
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4.4 The datasets 
 
This section presents and discusses the datasets that will be used in the later chapters 
of this thesis. First, we discuss the Malaysian WLD that will be utilized in Chapter 5. 
Next, we discuss the Malaysian FLD that will be used in Chapter 6. Lastly, we discuss 
the Malaysian MWFD which will be applied in Chapter 7. 
 
4.4.1 The Malaysian WLD 
 
The Malaysian WLD was obtained from Malaysia’s PICS-2, which in turn was 
generated from a survey of employees wherein a self-administered questionnaire was 
distributed to random samples of workers whose senior managers agreed to participate. 
About 10 workers in each firm were randomly selected, and the selected respondents 
had to complete four sections of the questionnaire. These sections are administrative 
records and ethnicity (Part A); education, skills, and life-long learning (Part B); 
employment dynamics (Part C); and information and technology (Part D).  
 
In particular, PICS-2 involves10,350 employees in the manufacturing sector. The 
focus here, however, is on individuals in full-time employment, aged between 15 and 
64, who reported positive earnings. It concerns 10,311 persons but due to the missing 
value in some variables, only 8,820 employees are included. In addition, workers with 
log of real monthly pay31 that are more (less) than the 75th (25th) percentiles plus 
(minus) 3 times the interquartile range are considered extreme outliers and thus 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
31 Monthly pay is deflated by the corresponding CPI obtained from the DOSM.  
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excluded from the analysis. This leaves us with 8,679 employees in the Malaysian 
WLD.  
 
WLD comprises five categories of variables. The first category is basic human capital. 
It includes the number of schooling years (edu), highest level of education (i.e. 
university degree (deg), high school diploma (dip), upper secondary school (ups), 
lower secondary (lws), work experience and its squared (exp, exp2), and job tenure and 
its squared (ten, ten2). The second category is training and skills which include current 
training (trn), previous training (trp), computer skills (i.e. basic (bcs), moderate (mcs), 
and complex (ccs))32, people skills (pls), vocational skills (voc), and studies abroad 
(sab). The third category is demographic which include gender (fem), marital status 
(mar), citizenship (ctz), races (i.e. Chinese (chn), Indian (ind), and others (oth))33. The 
fourth category is the kind of works (i.e. management (mgt), professional (prf), skilled 
production workers (skl), and non-production workers (npd))34. The final category is 
location (loc) and log distance from workplace (ldis). Table 4.2 includes definition of 
these variables and indicates how they are measured.  
 
One of the disadvantages of this dataset is that it does not have data on the number and 
age of children. For that reason, this study is unable to consider those factors in 
determining the worker’s pay, resulting in the omitted variable bias especially for 
women. This is because women tend to have more career interruptions and intermittent 
employment histories due to childbirth and childcare (Manzoni et al., 2008). Their 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
32 Non-computer skill as a reference group. 
33 Malay as a reference group.  
34 Unskilled production workers as a reference group. 
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careers are more frequently interrupted for reasons of childcare, leading to less 
experience and depreciation of skills (Fouarge and Muffels, 2009). Still, the human 
capital theory (Becker 1985) predicts that, to the extent that mothers spend more time 
outside the labor market (for childbearing and childrearing), the labor market 
experience will explain much of the wage gap between mothers and other women. This 
prediction has been confirmed by several studies, which established that when 
employment experience is taken into account the unexplained difference in wages 
between mothers and other women narrows substantially. For example, Jacobsen and 
Levin (1995) found that controlling for employment experience (and related variables 
such as job tenure) eliminated much of the wage effects of children on women's pay. 
In addition, the presence and age of children are used as proxies for unavailable 
measures of several productivity-related factors. If the omitted productivity variables 
are correlated with gender, it is possible that the gender variable will serve in part as a 
proxy for those omitted variables. Usually, this issue is resolved by including job 
characteristics and fringe benefits as explanatory variables (Solberg and Laughlin, 
1995). However, upon further research, it would be interesting to see how factors such 
as the number and age of children affect wages across different subsamples (i.e. 
male/female, Malay/other ethnicities) in Malaysia.  
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 Table 4-2 The Malaysian WLD variables and definition 
Variable 
Name 
Definition Data Type 
Dependent variable 
lpay Log of real monthly salary before tax, including all allowances and 
bonuses in 2006 in local currency (RM). 
Continuous 
Independent variables:  
Basic human capital 
edu 
 
Education 
Number of years of formal education completed 
Continuous 
deg 
 
College degree 
Equal to 1 if the highest level of formal education attained is university 
and equal 0 otherwise.  
Nominal 
dip 
 
High school diploma 
Equal to 1 if the highest level of formal education attained is high school, 
and equal to 0 otherwise. 
ups 
 
Upper secondary school 
Equal to 1 if the highest level of formal education attained is upper 
secondary school, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
lws Lower secondary school 
Equal to 1 if the highest level of formal education attained is lower 
secondary school or less, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
 (Primary school or less as a reference group) 
exp Potential experience 
 Age – edu – 6. 
Continuous 
exp2 Potential experience squared 
ten Tenure  
Number of years worked in current firm 
ten2 Tenure squared 
Training and Skills 
trn Current training 
Equal to 1 if the worker has received formal training from current 
employer, and equal to 0 otherwise (as a reference). 
Nominal 
trp Previous training 
Equal to 1 if the worker has received formal training from previous 
employer, and equal to 0 otherwise (as a reference). 
bcs Basic computer skills 
Equal to 1 if workers rated themselves as having basic computer skills 
such as being able to print invoices, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
mcs Moderate computer skills 
Equal to 1 if workers rated themselves as having moderate computer 
skills such as being able to print invoices, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
ccs Complex computer skills 
Equal to 1 if workers rated themselves as having complex computer skills 
such as being able to print invoices, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
(no computer skills as a reference group.) 
pls People skills 
Equal to 1 if “4 (very important)” is the response to the question: “in your 
job, how important is dealing with people?” (possible answers range from 
1-4), and equal to 0 otherwise (as a reference). 
voc Vocational skills 
Equal to 1 if having completed a professional certification or skills 
training program such as attending a vocational school or if currently 
enrolled in an after work learning program, and equal to 0 otherwise (as 
a reference). 
sab Studied abroad 
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Variable 
Name 
Definition Data Type 
Equal to 1 if studied abroad, and equal to 0 otherwise (as a reference). 
 
 
Demographic 
fem Female 
Equal to 1 if the worker is female and equal to 0 if male (as a reference). 
Nominal 
mar Married 
Equal to 1 if the worker is married and equal to 0 otherwise (as a 
reference). 
ctz Citizen 
Equal to 1 if the worker has Malaysian citizenship, and equal to 0 
otherwise (as a reference). 
chn Chinese 
Equal to 1 if worker is Chinese and equal to 0 otherwise. 
ind Indian 
Equal to 1 if worker is Indian (including Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Sri 
Lankan) and equal to 0 otherwise. 
oth Others 
Equal to 1 if worker is other than Chinese, Indian, and Malay. Equal to 0 
otherwise. 
(Malay as a reference group) 
Kind of works 
mgt Management 
Equal to 1 if the worker’s type of job is management, and equal to 0 
otherwise. 
Nominal 
prf Professional 
Equal to 1 if the worker’s type of job is professional, and equal to 0 
otherwise. 
skl Skilled production workers 
Equal to 1 if the worker’s type of job is skilled production worker, and 
equal to 0 otherwise. 
npd Non-production workers 
Equal to 1 if the worker’s type of job is non-production worker, and equal 
to 0 otherwise. 
(unskilled production worker as a reference group.) 
Location and distance 
loc Location dummy  
Equal to 1 if workers are from developed states such as Selangor, Kuala 
Lumpur, Melaka, Penang, and Johor, and equal to 0 if workers are from 
less developed states such as Kedah, Terengganu, Sabah, and Sarawak 
(as a reference). 
Nominal 
ldis Log of distance from workplace  
Number of kilometres. 
Continuous 
Source: Author’s definitions using Malaysia PICS-2. 
 
Table 4.3 provides descriptive statistics for the variables in the WLD across gender. It 
is shown that female workers have longer years of schooling than the male ones but 
the latter have longer working experience and tenure. More than half of the employees 
attained a secondary level of education (65%), 40% of whom completed upper 
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secondary school, while 25% only had lower secondary school. Those with tertiary 
level of education (namely, high school diploma and university/college degree) are 
higher among females compared to males. In contrast, the percentage of workers with 
only a primary level of education is higher among males than females.  
 
With respect to training, about 41% and 20% of the workers have attended formal 
training from current and previous firm, respectively. Meanwhile, only 12% of the 
samples have obtained off-the-job training. The percentage of males who attended 
formal training from current employer is slightly lower than that for females. Still, the 
percentage of males with vocational skills is slightly higher than for females. In terms 
of skills, more than 60% of employees have computer skills which ranged from basic 
to complex skills. The percentage of those who have basic, moderate, and complex 
computer skills are 22%, 38%, and 6%, respectively. In addition, the percentage of 
male workers who do not have any computer skills was higher than it was for female 
workers. Moreover, only 30% of the employees have skills in dealing with people, and 
only about 5% have skills from having studied abroad. Those possessing these skills 
are higher among women than men.  
 
In terms of demographics, the majority of workers are male, married, Malaysian, and 
Malay. With respect to the kind of work, most employees are skilled production 
workers, followed by unskilled production workers, non-production workers, 
management and professionals. However, the percentage of male workers in skilled 
production and unskilled production jobs is higher than that for female workers, 
whereas in management, professionals, and non-production positions, female workers 
are more dominant. In terms of location of residence, the majority of employees reside 
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in the developed states (85%), with the highest percentage in Johor (33%), followed 
by Selangor (27%). For the less developed states, Kedah had the highest percentage of 
respondents (7.5%), followed by Sarawak (3%), with Terengganu having the lowest 
(2.2%). 
 
Table 4-3: Mean and Standard deviations – Malaysian WLD 
Variable 
All Male Female 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean   SD 
Basic human capital       
Years of completed schooling 10.63 3.43 10.30 3.50 11.05 3.29 
Level of education:       
University degree 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.29 
High school diploma 0.12 0.33 0.10 0.30 0.16 0.36 
Upper secondary school 0.40 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.42 0.49 
Lower secondary school 0.25 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.21 0.41 
Primary  0.14 0.35 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.33 
Experience 16.31 10.74 17.15 10.59 15.27 10.83 
Experience squared 381.36 450.91 406.18 456.14 350.48 442.44 
Tenure 7.18 7.13 7.68 7.46 6.56 6.66 
Tenure squared 102.45 191.72 114.61 209.08 87.33 166.44 
Training and skills       
Training received in current firm 0.41 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.42 0.49 
Training received in previous firm 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 
Vocational skills 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.30 
Complex computer skills 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.25 
Moderate computer skills 0.38 0.49 0.31 0.46 0.48 0.50 
Basic computer skills 0.22 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.19 0.40 
No computer skills 0.34 0.47 0.40 0.49 0.26 0.44 
People skills  0.30 0.46 0.29 0.45 0.31 0.46 
Studied abroad  0.05 0.22 0.07 0.26 0.03 0.16 
Demographics variables       
Female 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Married 0.66 0.47 0.66 0.47 0.65 0.48 
Citizen 0.91 0.29 0.85 0.35 0.97 0.16 
Ethnicity:       
Malay 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.46 0.50 
Chinese 0.35 0.48 0.30 0.46 0.41 0.49 
Indian 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.30 
Others 0.09 0.29 0.14 0.35 0.03 0.17 
Distance from workplace (KM) 12.15 24.51 12.40 26.81 11.84 21.29 
Log of distance 1.95 1.08 1.92 1.12 1.98 1.02 
Kind of Works       
Management 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.31 0.18 0.38 
Professionals 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 
Skilled production worker 0.37 0.48 0.44 0.50 0.28 0.45 
Unskilled production worker 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.41 
Non-production worker 0.17 0.37 0.12 0.32 0.24 0.42 
State of residence       
Developed states:       
Kuala Lumpur 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 
Selangor 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44 
Melaka 0.37 0.19 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.20 
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Variable 
All Male Female 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean   SD 
Johor 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.46 0.35 0.48 
Penang 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 
Less developed states:       
Kedah 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.26 
Terengganu 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.11 
Sabah 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.14 
Sarawak 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17 
Note: See Table 4.2 for the definition of variables. 
 
 
4.4.2 The Malaysian FLD 
 
The Malaysian FLD was drawn from the employer module of Malaysia’s PICS-2 on 
manufacturing firms. These firms are drawn from the register of companies in the 
Central Bureau of Statistics. This sub-section presents FLD and describes the variables 
used in analysing the average firm-level pay rate determinants in the Malaysian 
manufacturing sector at the firm-level (i.e. chapter 6). The employer module was 
carried out in a sub-sample of 1,115 firms covering six regions, different firm size 
categories, legal ownership status and sectors so as to accurately represent the firm 
population.  
 
PICS-2 covers 1,115 manufacturing firms that are diverse in terms of types of 
products, geographical location, ownership structure, export orientation and firm size. 
Table 4.4 provides detailed distribution of manufacturing firms in Malaysian FLD. 
The majority of these firms are in rubber and plastic industry (25 percent), followed 
by food processing (22 percent), wood and furniture (12 percent), machinery and 
equipment (8 percent), garments (8 percent), electronics (8 percent), chemical (7 
percent), and with the minority in textiles (4 percent), electrical appliances (3 percent), 
as well as auto parts (3 percent) industries.  
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Manufacturing firms are surveyed in nine states, as stated in Table 4.1. More than a 
third of the firms are from Selangor, Kuala Lumpur, and Melaka which is the central 
region of Malaysia, while 7 percent are from Sabah and Sarawak. In terms of 
ownership structure, 26 percent are foreign-funded management firms, of which more 
than 30 percent are owned by the foreign private sector. The share of foreign-funded 
management firms is highest in the electronics industry, and lowest in the wood and 
furniture industry – 68 percent of electronics producers are more than 30 percent 
foreign owned; while only 11 percent of wood and furniture producers are.    
 
In terms of export-orientation35, more than fifty percent (52 percent) of the firms are 
exporters, while another 48 percent are non-exporters. Electric appliances and 
electronics producers are most likely to export their products – approximately four-
fifths of electronic firms are exporting firms. The majority of firms in chemicals, 
rubber and plastics, machinery and equipment, and wood and furniture industries are 
classified as exporters. Export-orientation is relatively low in the auto parts (26 
percent) and food processing (39 percent) industries.  
 
By firm size, the manufacturing firms surveyed are divided into three categories based 
on their total number of employment: first, a small firm is one whose total number of 
employment is less than 50 persons; second, a medium firm is one whose total number 
of employment is between 50 and 149 persons; third, a large firm has more than 150 
workers. In PICS-2, the majority of firms are classified as small (45 percent), while 28 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
35 Exporter refers to a firm that exports more than 10 percent of its total sales, while non-exporter refers 
to a firm whose sales from exports accounts for less than 10 percent of its total sales.   
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percent are classified as medium, and 27 percent are classified as large. Electronics 
and electric appliances firms are most likely to be large at about 66% and 50%, 
respectively.   
 
Table 4-4: Distribution of Manufacturing Firms by Industry, Region, Export-
orientation, Ownership, and Firm size in PICS-2 (%) 
Industries 
1. Food processing 
2. Textiles 
3. Garments 
4. Chemicals 
5. Rubber and plastics 
6. Machinery and equipment 
7. Electric appliances 
8. Electronics 
9. Auto parts 
10. Wood and furniture 
Total 
Percentage 
21.8 
3.6 
8.1 
7.4 
25.2 
8.3 
3.3 
7.5 
3.1 
11.7 
100 
Region 
1. Central 
2. North 
3. South 
4. East Coast 
5. Sabah 
6. Sarawak 
Total 
 
35.6 
23.9 
31.0 
2.6 
2.8 
4.1 
100 
Export orientation 
1. Exporter 
2. Non-exporter 
Total 
 
51.9 
48.1 
100 
Ownership 
1. Domestically-owned 
2. Foreign-owned 
Total 
 
74.3 
25.7 
100 
Firm size 
1. Small (employment < 50) 
2. Medium (50<=employment<150) 
3. Large (employment >=150) 
Total 
 
45.1 
28.3 
26.6 
100 
 
We have a cross-sectional dataset, short in time dimension with one year (i.e. 2006) of 
observations, but long in cross-section dimension with almost 1,115 manufacturing 
firms. After constructing our interest variables in the FLD, we screen the data to check 
if the data have been entered correctly, and then check for missing values, outliers and 
normality. FLD contains firm information of 38 interest variables we need to inspect, 
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clean and treat before they can be used in our analysis. We concentrate on those 
variables that need to be constructed. Firms with missing values in any variables will 
be dropped from the sample. The percentages of observations lost in all datasets are 
around five to seven percent. Meanwhile, the percentages of observations in the 
complete case36 is 6.75 percent (with 725 firms) according to the 2006 dataset.  
 
These variables can be classified into two categories, i.e. interval and nominal 
variables. The first category consists of pay per worker (avpay), productivity per 
worker (lval), profit per worker (pft), percentage of skilled workers (sskl), capital-
labour ratio (clr), percentage of foreign workers (sfor), percentage of higher education 
worker (suniv), percentage of female workers (sfem), value-added per worker (val), 
employer size (lemp), firm age (fage), and technology innovation (tech).  
 
Meanwhile, the second category consists of dummies for large firm (large), medium 
firm (medium), exporter (exp), foreign ownership (fwn), partnership (ptn), private 
limited company (prlc), public limited company (pblc), public corporation (pbcn), 
cooperative (coop), union (uni), double shift (dshf), triple shift (tshf), north (nrt), south 
(sth), east coast (east), Sabah (sbh), Sarawak (swk), garments (grm), chemical (chm), 
rubber and plastics (rp), machinery and equipment (me), electric appliances (ea), 
electronics (elec), automobile parts (auto), wood and furniture (wf), and textiles (txl). 
Table 4.5 provides definition of these variables and indicates how they are measured. 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
36 ‘Complete case’ refers to the complete case on all variables in the dataset. 
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Table 4-5: Firm-level variables and definition 
Variables Definition 
Average pay per 
worker 
(avpay) 
The ratio of monthly manpower costs37 (i.e.: wages and salaries plus 
allowances, bonuses and other benefits) to total employment38.  
Profit per worker 
(pft) 
The ratio of operating revenue to total employment. 
Percentage of skilled 
workers 
(sskl) 
The share of skilled permanent workers (i.e. the sum of the number of 
management, professionals, skilled production and non-production 
permanent workers) in terms of total number of permanent workers (in 
percentage). 
Percentage of higher 
education workers 
(suniv) 
The share of labour with some university or higher level of education. 
Percentage of female 
workers 
(sfem) 
The percentage of total permanent female workers in terms of total 
employment 
Capital-labour ratio 
(clr) 
The ratio of net book value of machinery and equipment to total 
employment. 
Percentage of foreign 
worker 
(sfor) 
The share of foreign permanent workers in terms of total number of 
permanent workers (in percentage). 
Productivity per 
worker 
(val) 
The ratio of value added (defined as total sales minus intermediate costs39) 
to total employment. 
Employer size 
(lemp) 
Total number of permanent and temporal workers. 
Firm age 
(fage) 
Firm age is defined as a reference year minus the year wherein the firm 
started its operations.  
Technology 
innovation 
(tech) 
Percentage of machinery less than 5 years old.  
Exporter 
(exp) 
Defined as equal to 1 if the percentages given for sales exported directly 
and sales exported indirectly amount to more than 10 percent of total sales 
and equal 0 otherwise. 
Foreign ownership 
(fown) 
Defined as equal to 1 if the percentage of the firms owned by a foreign 
private sector is any positive number and equal 0 otherwise. 
Partnership  
(ptn) 
Defined as equal to 1 if the firm’s legal status is partnership, and equal 0 if 
others. 
Private limited 
company 
(prlc) 
Defined as equal to 1 if the firm’s legal status is a private limited company, 
and equal 0 if others. 
Public limited 
company 
(pblc) 
Defined as equal to 1 if the firm’s legal status is a public limited company, 
and equal 0 if others. 
Public corporations 
(pbcn) 
Defined as equal to 1 if the firm’s legal status is a public corporation, and 
equal 0 if others. 
Cooperative 
(coop) 
Defined as equal to 1 if the firm’s legal status is cooperative, and equal 0 
if others. 
 Double shifts 
(dshf) 
Defined as equal to 1 if the type of work shift is double, and equal 0 if 
others. 
Triple shifts Defined as equal to 1 if the type of work shift is triple, and equal 0 if others. 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
37 The total monthly manpower cost is defined as the total annual manpower costs divided by 12.  
38 Total employment is defined as the total number of permanent and temporal workers. 
39 An intermediate cost is defined as the sum of direct material costs, electricity expenditures, fuel and 
other energy expenditures.  
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Variables Definition 
(tshf) 
Union 
(uni) 
Defined as equal to 1 if any of the firm’s employees belong to a trade union 
and equal 0 otherwise. 
north  
(nrt) 
Defined as equal to 1 if region is north, and equal 0 if others. 
south  
(sth) 
Defined as equal to 1 if region is south, and equal 0 if others. 
East coast  
(east) 
Defined as equal to 1 if region is east coast, and equal 0 if others. 
Sabah  
(sbh) 
Defined as equal to 1 if region is Sabah, and equal 0 if others. 
Sarawak  
(swk) 
Defined as equal to 1 if region is Sarawak, and equal 0 if others. 
Garments 
(grm) 
Defined as equal to 1 if Industry is garments, and equal 0 if others. 
Chemicals 
(chm) 
Defined as equal to 1 if Industry is chemicals, and equal 0 if others. 
Rubber and Plastics 
(rp) 
Defined as equal to 1 if Industry is rubber and plastics, and equal 0 if others. 
Machinery and 
equipment 
(me) 
Defined as equal to 1 if Industry is machinery and equipment, and equal 0 
if others. 
Electric appliances 
(ea) 
Defined as equal to 1 if Industry is electric appliances, and equal 0 if others. 
Electronics 
(elec) 
Defined as equal to 1 if Industry is electronics, and equal 0 if others. 
Automobile parts 
(auto) 
Defined as equal to 1 if Industry is automobile parts, and equal 0 if others. 
Woods and furniture 
(wf) 
Defined as equal to 1 if Industry is wood and furniture, and equal 0 if 
others. 
Textiles 
(txl) 
Defined as equal to 1 if Industry is textiles, and equal 0 if others. 
Note: Author's definition based on PICS- 2. Label of the variables in parentheses.  
 
4.4.3 The Malaysian MWFD  
 
Malaysia’s MWFD, used in Chapter seven of this thesis, was constructed from 
Malaysia’s WLD and FLD. Preparing the MWFD for analysis of the Malaysian pay 
structure involves four important steps. First, we review the names and labels of the 
selected variables at the worker- and firm-level data. Second, we verify that each 
variable is correct. This verification involves everything from assessing the internal 
consistency of information to looking for unreasonable distributions. The next step 
involves adding new variables and verifying that they have been created correctly. We 
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apply these three steps to the WLD and FLD individually. Finally, we merge these 
datasets (i.e. WLD and FLD) in order to develop the Malaysian MWFD for analysis. 
By using this dataset, one would get a better understanding of workers’ outcomes 
regarding pay. In this respect, pay can be informed not only by data on the employees 
themselves, as has always been the case, but also by the employers’ own data.  
 
Chapter seven utilises a unique MWFD for one common year (2006), which allows 
for a more in-depth analysis of worker- and firm-specific effects on wages. The dataset 
contains a random sample of 7,059 full-time permanent workers employed in 752 
Malaysian manufacturing firms in the year 2006. It provides information on workers’ 
monthly salaries and other characteristics of the workers and their firms.  
 
4.4.3.1 Worker characteristics 
The dependent variable in our analysis is the natural logarithm of monthly pay for 
employees in 2006. The monthly pay is defined as the sum of monthly salary, including 
all allowances and bonuses, before tax. The effect of education on wages was 
measured by two different variables. First, by a continuous measure of the years of 
completed schooling. Nevertheless, individuals’ years of education seem to be biased 
estimates of education’s true effects because some individuals do not earn degrees, 
while others do not complete their degrees within a standard number of years (Jagear 
and Page, 1996). Therefore, our dataset has information on both years of education 
and the highest level of formal education attained, allowing us to improve on earlier 
estimates. We use five dummies for the highest level of the worker’s formal 
educational attained, namely, degree, diploma as a reference group, upper secondary, 
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lower secondary, and primary plus informal education as well as illiterate – all as direct 
estimates of the effects of academic credentials on pay.  
 
Due to the absence of data on experience, Mincer (1974) proposed the alternative of 
“potential experience”, i.e. the number of years an individual could have worked after 
completing schooling. Assuming that he/she starts schooling at 6 years old and begins 
working immediately after having completed schooling, potential experience is equal 
to age – completed years of schooling – which is 6. In addition to education and 
experience, we also control for tenure, distance from job in kilometres, gender with 
male as reference group, marital status with single as reference group, types of 
occupation (i.e. management, professional, skilled-worker), unskilled worker as 
reference group, received formal training at the current employer, received formal 
training at the previous employer, computer skills (i.e. none as reference group, basic, 
moderate, and complex), studied abroad, and ethnicity (i.e. Bumiputera as reference 
group, Chinese, Indian, and others). 
 
4.4.3.2 Employer characteristics 
Firm performance is based on two variables: firm productivity (i.e. log of value-added 
per worker) and firm profitability (i.e. log of profit per worker). Firm input variables 
are logs of employment, capital, and capital-labour ratio, as well as share of skilled 
workers, female workers, foreign workers, and higher level of education workers in 
the firm. We also controlled for industry fixed-effects at the second stage of analysis 
with nine industry dummies. These are based on the 4-digit SITC for manufacturing 
firms, i.e. textiles, garments, chemicals, rubber and plastics, machinery and equipment, 
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electrical appliances, electronic auto parts, wood and furniture, and food processing as 
a reference group. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses three types of dataset (the Malaysian WLD, the Malaysian FLD, 
and the Malaysian MWFD) as well as the constructing process of such dataset. These 
three dataset were obtained from PICS-2, and have been utilised throughout the 
empirical chapters of this thesis. We choose PICS-2 as the source of our datasets due 
to the availability and representativeness of the dataset.  It is publicly accessible and 
administrated by non-Malaysian authorities. According to Ragayah (2008), the 
Malaysian survey data, e.g. Household Expenditure Survey, is difficult to acquire 
because it has often been classified by the Malaysian authorities as confidential. PICS-
2 is administrated by the World Bank and is easily downloaded from the World Bank 
website once users are granted permission. PICS-2 seems broadly representative of the 
Malaysian firms in the manufacturing sector. Indeed, according to the World Bank 
(2009, p. 170): “The sampling methodology of PICS-2 generates a sample 
representative of the whole economy that substantiate assertions about the 
manufacturing sector and it also generates large enough sample sizes for selected 
industries to conduct statistically robust analyses”. 
 
 In order to construct WLD and FLD datasets, we followed several procedures. Firstly, 
we generate our interest variables for the WLD (FLD) from separate employee 
(employer) questionnaire modules obtained from PICS-2. Secondly, we carried out 
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data reconciliation in order to obtain a reliable dataset. Consequently, both WLD and 
FLD were merged to create the Malaysian MWFD. 
 
Each of the datasets has its own advantages. The Malaysian WLD has the advantage 
that it provides extensive information on individual worker’s characteristics. In 
addition, it also provides data on individual worker’s total remuneration comprising 
total wages, over-time pay, bonuses, and other benefits. As suggested by Schafgan 
(2000), for other than the basic wages, remuneration is an important part of total 
earnings in Malaysia.  
 
The advantage of the Malaysian FLD is that it contains a plethora of information that 
allows us to include employers’ or firm’s perspective in our study of average firm-
level pay rates determinants in Malaysia. It also enables us to identify other labour 
market variables, especially firm’s characteristics (i.e. firm size, ownership, export-
orientation, unionization, firm age, technology, capital intensity, labour productivity, 
and profitability), which might help explain pay determinants in Malaysia. Most 
previous wage studies have detailed information only on workers. In addition, 
compared to other survey data for Malaysia, e.g. Household Income Survey, PICS-2 
also enables us to investigate the elasticity of average pay with respect to the employer 
size due to the availability of data on firm size.  
 
The advantage of the Malaysian MWFD is that it provides the opportunity to examine 
the role of employer-specific effects in determining the worker’s pay through the 
availability of data from both the workers and their employers. Another advantage of 
all datasets is that this data includes the region of Sabah and Sarawak, which has been 
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neglected in many previous studies due to a lack of data. Therefore, this study can 
provide a more wholesome picture for Malaysia compared to the many previous 
studies that only focused on Peninsular Malaysia. Besides, this thesis is among the first 
of its kind to utilize these data so as to explore the pay determinants in Malaysia. 
However, these datasets also have their limitation, as we were unable to carry out a 
dynamic analysis on pay determinants as it is a cross-sectional dataset. 
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 : THE ROLE OF WORKER CHARACTERISTICS ON 
INDIVIDUAL WORKER’S PAY IN THE MALAYSIAN ECONOMY 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, studies on pay formation and its structure in Malaysia are 
crucial, such that the issue has attracted many researchers. Nonetheless, in the case of 
Malaysia, studies on this issue have mainly focused on the macroeconomics 
perspective, and have thus been analysed at the national and industrial aggregation 
level, as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the determinants of the individual workers’ pay 
in the Malaysian manufacturing sector. In particular, in this chapter we analysed how 
individual workers’ pay is affected by employees’ characteristics using the Malaysian 
WLD. Apart from using the new dataset obtained from PICS-2, this chapter also adds 
new variables to the Malaysian pay equation such as skills, on-the-job training, off-the 
job training, study abroad, and distance from work.   
 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature on labour market outcomes in 
Malaysia by means of the richest workers’ characteristics dataset. Apart from 
examining the impacts of basic human capital and demographic variables on the 
individual workers’ pay, with such a new dataset, this chapter also intends to 
investigate whether: (i) addition of new variables (i.e. skills, training, studied abroad, 
occupation, location, and distance from the workplace) in the Malaysian pay equation 
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better explains the variation in monthly workers’ pay; (ii) these variables are important 
in determining the individual monthly workers’ pay; (iii) workers who have skills, 
training, studied abroad, and live far away from their workplace earn higher monthly 
pay than similar workers who do not have skills, training, studied locally, and live 
close to their workplace.  
 
Therefore, this chapter hopes to attain two goals: first, to explain the effects of 
employees’ characteristics on individual workers’ pay and to what extent pay variation 
can be explained by workers’ characteristics alone; secondly, to ascertain whether 
employee characteristics’ effects are heterogeneous across all quantiles as well as 
inter-quantile for all workers, male and female workers, respectively. 
  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the data used and 
presents some descriptive statistics, whilst Section 5.3 focuses on the empirical 
estimation methods. Section 5.4 outlines the empirical results of the supply-side pay 
determinants models of the Malaysian economy using OLS regression. In Section 5.5, 
the effects of workers’ characteristics on individual worker’s pay at different quantile 
pay distributions are explored using Quantile Regression analysis. Finally, Section 5.6 
provides a summary and a few concluding remarks.   
 
5.2 Data description 
 
Malaysia’s WLD, presented in Section 4.4.1, is used to examine the determinants of 
individual workers’ pay in the Malaysian manufacturing sector. Since we use a dataset 
containing employees’ information only, this chapter specifically examines how the 
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individual workers’ pay is affected by the labour supply-side factors (i.e. employees’ 
characteristics such as education, and experience.) while holding the labour demand-
side factors’ effects constant (i.e. employers’ characteristics). In the Malaysian WLD, 
the analysis is restricted to workers who have no missing values for the monthly pay 
and all explanatory variables. Such a restriction leaves us with 8,679 workers in the 
dataset.  
 
5.2.1 Response variable for the Malaysian pay model 
 
As defined in Section 2.2, the worker’s monthly pay is the monthly salary including 
all allowances and bonuses measured in the local currency, i.e. Ringgit Malaysia (RM). 
The monthly pay varies across workers, with a standard deviation of RM 1753 (the 
equivalent of USD 521.69)40. The median of RM1079 is smaller than that of RM1472, 
reflecting skewness of data. The skewness is zero for symmetrically distributed data. 
The value here of 9.57 indicates considerable skewness. The much higher value of 144 
for kurtosis indicates that the tails are much thicker than those of a normal distribution, 
where the reference value is 3 for normally distributed data. We conclude that the 
distribution of the monthly pay data is considerably skewed and has thick tails. A 
standard solution to eliminate these problems is to transform the dependent variable 
by taking the natural logarithm revealed in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
40 The conversion of Ringgit Malaysia (RM) to US Dollar (USD) was based on the exchange rate 
(selling rate) as of 11:30pm, 31 December 2007, as provided by Bank Negara Malaysia, i.e. 1 RM = 
0.2976 USD.  
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Figure 5.1 The estimated density and log of monthly pay in 2006 
 
 
The average worker in Malaysia’s WLD earns just over RM1472 per month, has an 
average 7-year tenure with their employer, 11 years of schooling, 17 years of potential 
labour market experience, and 12.6 kilometres from their residence to their 
workplace41. 
 
5.2.2 Average worker’s pay by categorical explanatory variables 
 
Table 5.1 reports the mean monthly pay, classified by subgroups of each of categorical 
explanatory variables for all workers in pooled sample, and specifically by gender 
samples in the Malaysian WLD. Table 5.1 also provides the differences in pay 
according to gender. In general, the average monthly pay is RM 1,433, and women 
earn 84% of men’s monthly pay (RM 1,300 against RM 1,539).  
 
 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
41 We have discussed the summary statistics for each worker’s characteristics in detail in Chapter 4. 
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Table 5-1: Mean and standard deviations of monthly pay for categorical variables in 
the Malaysian WLD in 2006 
 Pooled Male Female Mean 
differences 
(Male – 
Female) 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean   SD 
Level of education        
University degree 2,455 1239.9 2,763 1307.1 2,161 1095.9 602*** 
High school diploma 1,887 993.0 2,146 1123.1 1,683 822.7 463*** 
Upper secondary school 1,370 788.3 1,504 870.0 1,218 651.9 286*** 
Lower secondary school 1,221 745.0 1,319 791.6 1,050 627.0 269*** 
Primary  1,005 577.5 1,094 661.2 864 371.9 230*** 
Training        
Training in current firm – 
Yes  
1,655 1008.7 1,792 1093.9 1,491 868.8 301*** 
Training in current firm – No  1,279 806.2 1,370 870.1 1,163 699.5 207*** 
Training from previous firm 
– Yes 
1,710 1054.3 1,886 1144.4 1,496 887.5 390*** 
Training from previous firm 
– No  
1,363 860.3 1,453 925.0 1,250 756.9 203*** 
Vocational skills – Yes  1,812 1011.0 1,905 1082.3 1,667 870.1 238*** 
Vocational skills – No  1,382 887.5 1,485 961.6 1,258 770.9 227*** 
Skills        
Complex computer skills 1,961 1083.7 2,177 1168.8 1,729 931.9 448*** 
Moderate computer skills 1,727 998.9 1,964 1124.4 1,538 842.8 426*** 
Basic computer skills 1,358 816.4 1,484 867.6 1,165 688.7 319*** 
No computer skills 1,052 633.4 1,155 701.7 857 412.5 298*** 
People skills – Yes  1,734 1043.6 1,885 1122.6 1,560 914.6 325*** 
People skills – No  1,306 820.5 1,401 892.2 1,184 699.5 217*** 
Place of institution        
Studied abroad  1,658 1339.9 1,584 1350.8 1,930 1269.4 -346** 
Studied locally 1,420 882.5 1,536 953.3 1,284 768.8 252*** 
Marital status        
Single 1,205 708.9 1,217 743.5 1,190 665.0 27 
Married 1,552 983.1 1,703 1054.8 1,359 845.8 344*** 
Citizenship        
Malaysian 1,495 925.4 1,663 1004.0 1,312 791.6 351*** 
Foreign 820 453.3 813 415.8 869 658.2 -56 
Ethnicity        
Malay 1,307 804.9 1,443 867.6 1,132 678.1 311*** 
Chinese 1,777 1006.1 2,011 1102.1 1,565 858.0 446*** 
Indian 1,367 894.3 1,629 995.7 1,087 667.1 542*** 
Others 843 520.6 827 459.4 944 793.7 -117** 
Kinds of Work        
Manager 2,147 1210.0 2,651 1286.9 1,778 1001.3 873*** 
Professionals 2,231 1034.3 2,429 1150.7 2,012 836.8 417*** 
Skilled production worker 1,375 774.9 1,491 800.2 1,146 666.1 345*** 
Unskilled production worker 947 515.0 1,007 585.0 857 371.1 150*** 
Non-production worker 1,290 667.9 1,322 703.5 1,271 644.9 51 
State of residence        
Developed states: 1,464 910.6 1,575 983.2 1,328 792.7 247*** 
Kuala Lumpur 1,614 1040.6 1,694 1068.5 1,507 994.6 187** 
Selangor 1,571 939.3 1,644 1016.2 1,476 818.7 168*** 
Melaka 1,494 950.9 1,741 1015.4 1,258 821.2 483*** 
Johor 1,323 815.6 1,435 877.2 1,195 718.7 240*** 
Penang 1,506 944.9 1,651 1050.3 1,320 749.2 331*** 
Less developed states: 1,256 909.9 1,347 922.8 1,127 761.9 220*** 
Kedah 1,322 891.5 1,374 901.3 1,259 876.8 115 
Terengganu 1,110 979.5 1,230 1097.4 778 368.8 452*** 
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 Pooled Male Female Mean 
differences 
(Male – 
Female) 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean   SD 
Sabah 1,212 873.0 1,300 979.2 1,067 641.4 233* 
Sarawak 1,228 920.5 1,443 1115.1 986 547.6 457*** 
Average 1,433 913.5 1,539 988.1 1,300 791.5 239*** 
Number of observations 8679  4811  3868   
Notes: *, **, and *** denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
In the pooled sample, and in terms of educational attainment, pay increases linearly 
with education; the highest pay is reported for those with higher educational 
achievement. For example, university degree holders received a monthly pay of RM 
2,455, compared with RM 1,887 for high school diploma holders, RM 1,370 for upper-
secondary level qualification, RM 1,221 for lower-secondary level qualification, and 
RM 1,005 for primary level qualification. 
 
With regard to training in current and previous firms, the average monthly pay is 
higher for those who have received such training compared with those who did not get 
any such training. For example, those who received training in their current firms earn 
29% more than those who did not receive training in their current firms. Meanwhile, 
there are no significant differences in monthly earnings between those who have 
received training in current firms and in previous firms.  
 
However, in terms of skills, the average monthly pay is higher for those who have any 
level of computer skills compared to those with no computer skills. In the case of 
people skills, there are no differences. In relation to place of institution, marital status 
and citizenship, the pay received by those who graduated abroad, are married and 
citizens is more than those who graduated locally, are single and foreigners.  
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With regard to ethnicity, the WLD reveals that the monthly pay is highest amongst 
Chinese, followed by Indians, Malays, and then other ethnics. For instance, the data 
shows that Malays earn about 73.6% of the earnings among Chinese (RM 1,777 
against RM 1,307).  
 
With respect to kinds of work, Table 5.1 indicates that the average monthly pay varies 
by occupation, with professional and management positions having the highest earning 
power, followed by skilled production jobs, non-production jobs, and then unskilled 
production jobs with the least pay. Based on that table, on average, professionals 
earned RM 2,231, while managers, skilled production workers, non-production 
workers, and unskilled production workers on average earned RM 2,147, RM 1,375, 
RM 1,290, and RM 947, respectively.  
 
In relation to state of residence, Table 5.1 shows that those who live in the least 
developed states (i.e. Kedah, Terengganu, Sabah and Sarawak) earn less than those 
who live in the developed states (i.e. Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, Melaka, Johor and 
Penang). For example, people in Kuala Lumpur earn on average RM 1,614 per month 
relative to RM 1,322 per month for those who reside in Kedah.  
 
With respect to the gender pay gap, Table 5.1 shows that the average monthly pay 
varies significantly between male and female workers. Male workers earn more than 
female ones in most of the subgroups of each of the explanatory variables except for 
those who studied abroad, are foreigners, and other ethnics. The highest gender pay 
gaps are among those who are working in management positions and have a university 
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degree, where the male worker’s average monthly pay is more than their female 
counterparts by RM 873 and RM 602, respectively. 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the lifetime monthly pay profile of Malaysian manufacturing 
workers, constructed using the Malaysian WLD from Malaysia’s PICS-2007. This 
profile is hump-shaped. It increases in the early stages of their working career, flattens 
out in their 40s, and eventually declines from about the age of 50 until retirement. The 
inverted-U shape of the wage profile means that the well-known hump in lifetime 
earnings – described by Mincer (1974), Welch (1979), and Heckman, Lochner and 
Todd (2006), among others – is not purely a reflection of declines in hours worked 
during the pre-retirement years.  
  
Figure 5.2: Life-Cycle Earnings Profiles 
 
     Source: Author’s calculation from the Malaysia’s PICS-2 
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5.3 Empirical methods 
 
As previously discussed in Chapter 2, the most common approach in estimating the 
determinants and structure of pay is based on Mincer’s wage equation. And so, the 
empirical analysis in this chapter is based on the human capital theory developed by 
Becker (1964), while the estimation of the Malaysian pay equation uses an extended 
version of the human capital earning function proposed by Mincer (1974). Following 
this approach, the individual workers’ pay reflects labour productivity which is 
determined by previous investment in human capital, i.e. it is assumed that an 
individual’s stock of human capital is an important determinant of his or her pay rate. 
Therefore, in addition to these human capital factors, it is common practice nowadays 
to add several other worker characteristics that are believed to affect the worker’s pay 
in the labour market. In order to estimate the Malaysian pay equation, we consider a 
reduced form of equation where the log monthly pay is a linear function of the workers’ 
characteristics as follows: 
 
iiii XPayln                                                                               5.1 
 
where the response variable iPayln  is the natural logarithm of monthly pay (in 
Malaysian Ringgit (RM)) for employee i. iX  represents a vector of the worker’s 
characteristics, while iμ  represents a random disturbance term, which is assumed to 
be an identically independent distribution (iid)  2uσ0, . Pay is analysed by a variety of 
measurements such as annually, monthly, weekly, and hourly in the human capital pay 
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equation literature depending on data availability, and it is always in the logarithmic 
form. Consistent with those literature, the dependent variable in equation (5.1) makes 
use of the log transformation based on the success of the standard (semi-logarithm) 
human capital earnings function (Willis, 1986). In addition, the logarithmic form is 
preferable due to the distribution of log pay being very close to a normal distribution, 
especially log hourly wages (Card, 1999).  The method used here is preferable, given 
that the available data and log transformation are convenient for interpretation in this 
study. Therefore, this study uses the log of monthly pay as the dependent variable.  
 
Meanwhile, explanatory variables iX  in equation 5.1 can be grouped into five 
categories, namely: (1) basic human capital, (2) demographic factors, (3) training and 
skills, (4) kinds of work, and (5) distance and location. We add these categories of 
variables gradually, which will be discussed in the next sub-section. 
 
5.3.1 Model specification  
 
In order to examine the impact of workers’ characteristics or supply-side labour factors 
on the individual worker’s pay in the Malaysian economy, we estimate equation 5.1 
using Malaysia’s WLD in three different specifications, as discussed in the following. 
 
5.3.1.1 Basic pay model 
Basic pay comprises three different models. Initially, we used the basic Mincerian 
specification of the linear model introduced by Mincer (1974). In this model, the 
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natural logarithm of pay is a function of linear term in schooling as well as both linear 
and quadratic terms in labour market experience. Algebraically,  
 
 iiiiii expexpeduPayln 1
2
3211         5.2   
where, 
iPayln  is a log of monthly pay for worker i,  
iedu  is year of completed schooling of worker i, 
iexp is year of potential experience of worker i, 
2
iexp  is year of potential experience squared of worker i, and 
i1  is the disturbance term that is assumed to be iid  20 u, . 
 
In line with the human capital theory, the return on education is expected to be positive. 
As pointed out by Mincer (1958), education should have a multiplicative effect on 
human capital in a simple model, where identical individuals maximize the present 
value of their future income when equalized for all educational levels. The reason is 
that investments in human capital, as with other investments, are only undertaken as 
long as the rate of return (not the absolute return) on any investment exceeds the 
discount rate. Log-linearity of earnings, as a function of years of schooling, is in fact 
a key empirical of the human capital model with identical individuals according to 
Mincer (1958). 
 
Direct information for the expi variable cannot be found in the dataset. To deal with it, 
this study uses the potential labour market experience proposed by Mincer (1974). In 
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this respect, iexp refers to the number of years an individual A could have worked after 
completing schooling. This assumes that he/she starts schooling at 6 years old and 
begins working immediately after having completed the years of schooling ( iexp = age 
– edu – 6). We would expect that iexp  has a positive sign. This is because the more 
experience workers have, the higher the salary they get. Apart from iexp  we also 
include exp2 to our model in order to capture concavity in the observed pay profile.  
 
The second step is to add job tenure and job tenure squared variables in order to capture 
the impact of job seniority on the individual worker’s pay, as suggested by Mincer-
Jovanovic (1981). This mode has been widely estimated using linear in education and 
quadratic in potential labour market experience as well as job tenure in the incumbent 
firm – which can be algebraically represented as:  
 
iiiiiiii tentenexpexpeduPayln 2
2
54
2
3211     5.3
  
where, 
iten is year of work in current firm of worker i. 
2
iten  is year of tenure squared of worker i, 
i2  is the disturbance term that is assumed to be iid  20 u, ,  
and the rest of the variables and parameter symbols have been defined above. 
 
In this model, the effect of work experience on the worker’s pay was measured by two 
variables, namely potential labour market experience and job tenure. In this study, we 
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expect iexp  and teni to have a positive sign. This is because the more experience (or 
tenure) workers have, the higher the salary they get. Apart from iexp  and teni, we also 
include exp2 and ten2 in our model in order to capture concavity in the observed pay 
profile. Concavities occur whenever these two variables have negative signs. 
In the third model, apart from the impact of the worker’s education on pay that was 
measured by a continuous measure of the years of completed formal schooling, we 
include a series of dummies for the highest level of formal education attained by the 
worker (i.e. degree, diploma, upper secondary, lower secondary, and primary 
education as reference) as follows: 
 
 
iiiii
iiiiiii
tentenexpexp
lwsupsdipdegeduPayln
3
2
98
2
76
543211




  5.4 
 
where,  
ideg is a dummy variable for degree as the highest education level, 
idip is a dummy variable for diploma as the highest education level, 
iups is a dummy variable for upper-secondary school as the highest education level, 
ilws is a dummy variable for lower-secondary school as the highest education level, 
i3  is the disturbance term that is assumed to be iid  20 u, ,  
and the rest of the variables and parameter symbols have been defined above. 
 
Based on this model, one can estimate the coefficient of 
1  as the average private rate 
of return on education, which is expected to have a positive sign. Nevertheless, the 
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individual’s years of completed schooling will be biased estimates of the true effects 
because some individuals do not earn certificate or degrees, while others do not 
complete their certificate or degrees within a standard number of years (Jagear and 
Page, 1996).  
 
One of the advantages of Malaysia’s WLD is that it allows for improving the 
estimation by adding the information on the worker’s highest level of educational 
attainment. By including these dummies, it is expected to pick up the marginal effect 
of obtaining a certificate of completion for each type of educational level or one can 
directly estimate the effects of academic credentials on the worker’s pay. We expect
2 , 3 , 4 , and 5 to have a positive sign because workers that hold a degree, diploma, 
upper-secondary qualification, and lower-secondary qualification would earn more 
than those with only a primary school qualification.  
 
These three basic pay models are a benchmark for our estimation of the individual 
worker’s pay in Malaysia. Nonetheless, the disadvantages of this model are that it 
assumes all workers to be identical other than their differences in education and 
experience. In other words, the model assumes that each worker has equal ability, 
equal opportunities, and has been brought up in a similar environment. Owing to these 
advantages, we extend this model by gradually adding other worker characteristics. In 
what follows, we analyse the impact of those characteristics by means of two 
augmented models. 
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5.3.1.2 Augmented Mincerian pay model 1  
It is common nowadays to add other potential determinants of pay to the Mincerian 
pay regression, in addition to the standard human capital factors. The difference due 
to demographic characteristics in the individual worker’s pay is evident in many 
studies. Almost every study employing the Mincerian pay regression includes control 
for workers’ demographic differences. Therefore, we extend our model by including 
dummies of gender, marital status, citizenship, and ethnicity, as follows:  
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 5.5 
where, 
ifem  is a dummy variable for female, 
imar  is a dummy variable for married, 
ictz  is a dummy variable for Malaysian citizenship, 
ichn  is a dummy variable for Chinese, 
iind  is a dummy variable for Indian, 
ioth  is a dummy variable for other ethnics, 
and the rest of the variables and parameter symbols have been defined above. 
 
We know that workers are diverse in their demographic attributes, which have 
implications for their pay. We add a dummy of ifem , as being female may have an 
influence on the decision whether or not to participate in the labour market. We would 
expect 10 to have a negative sign because some labour markets probably have less 
educated and highly skilled women. In addition, women may also work less than men 
due to their household responsibilities. Like gender, marital status also affects the 
136 
  
 
 
individual worker’s decision to participate in the labour market. We add a dummy of 
imar  to separate married workers from those who are single, divorced or widowed. It 
would seem that 
11  has a positive sign because marriage increases the need for 
household tasks.  
 
Many previous studies on pay determinants (e.g. Toutkoushian et al., 2007; Joy, 2003) 
have included citizenship and ethnicity in their model in order to capture the labour 
market status of minority groups. In the case of Malaysia, differences between wages 
paid to Chinese and Malays were significantly higher, indicating a stronger ethnic 
disparity (Schafgan, 1998; 2000). In addition, Ismail and Mohd-Noor (2005) also 
found that Malay workers received lower wages than their Chinese counterparts. An 
indication that there can be substantial differences between Malaysians and foreigners 
is shown in Table 5.1, where citizens’ pay is higher than that of foreigners. When 
observing differences across ethnicities, it can be seen from Table 5.1 that pay is 
highest amongst Chinese, followed by Indians, Malays, and then the other ethnic 
groups. 
 
Therefore, to take into account workers’ citizenship and ethnicity, we add a dummy of 
ictz to separate Malaysian workers from those who are foreigners, while dummies of 
ichn , iind ,and ioth are meant to separate Chinese, Indian, and other ethnics from those 
who are Malays, respectively. We expect that ,12  and 13 may have a positive 
impact, while 
14  may has a negative impact on the individual worker’s pay. For the 
estimation process, male, single, foreigners, and Malays will be taken as a reference 
category. 
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5.3.1.3 Augmented Mincerian pay model 2  
Apart from explanatory variables in the Augmented Mincerian Model 1, other human 
capital (such as training and skills) factors are also important in determining the 
individual worker’s pay. The human capital theory (Mincer, 1958, 1974; Becker, 
1964) suggests that the relative contribution of individual workers depends on the 
knowledge, skills, and other attributes they have. Therefore, equation 5.5 can be 
extended by incorporating dummies of current training, previous training, computer 
skills, people skills, vocational skills, and study abroad. In addition, we also believe 
that the kinds of work and pay are not distributed strictly on the basis of worker 
qualifications. Therefore, we also include the dummies of kinds of work which 
comprises management, professionals, skilled production jobs, non-production jobs, 
and unskilled production jobs (as reference). In this model, we also include distance 
and location factors. The inclusion of these variables is important because these 
regional characteristics may also affect the probability of work activity. This may be 
due to differences in opportunities in different areas and different labour market 
conditions or it may be due to differences in the supply and demand for skilled and 
unskilled workers in different areas. To take into account all factors that have been 
discussed, we extend the augmented Mincerian pay model 1 as follows: 
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 5.6 
where, 
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itrn  is a dummy variable for current training, 
itrp  is a dummy variable for previous training, 
ipls  is a dummy variable for people skills, 
ivoc  is a dummy variable for vocational skills, 
ibcs  is a dummy variable for basic computer skills, 
imcs  is a dummy variable for moderate computer skills, 
iccs  is a dummy variable for complex computer skills, 
isab  is a dummy variable for studied abroad,  
imgt  is a dummy variable for management, 
iprf  is a dummy variable for professionals, 
iskl  is a dummy variable for skilled-production workers, 
inpd  is a dummy variable for non-production workers, 
ildis  is the log of distance from work, while iloc is a dummy variable for developed 
states (i.e. Selangor, Kuala Lumpur, Johor, Penang, and Melaka), 0 otherwise (i.e. 
Terengganu, Kedah, Sabah, and Sarawak),  
iu2  is the disturbance term that is assumed to be iid  20 u, . 
and the rest of the variables and parameter symbols are defined as in equation (5.5). 
 
Based on this model, we expect that the signs of 22212019181716 ,,,,,,  and 
23 are positive. This is because those with more human capital, holding all other 
variables constant, should be more productive, and hence earn more. In addition, there 
is ample evidence to suggest that the more skilled an individual worker is, the more 
likely he/she will be rewarded. In addition, we expect 262524 ,,  and 27 to have a 
139 
  
 
 
positive sign. This is because those occupations should receive a higher salary than 
unskilled production workers.  
 
In terms of distance and location, we expect 28

 and 29

 to have a positive sign. This 
is because the basic urban economic theory argues that households choose their 
residential location to maximize their utility (Muth 1969). In this theory, individuals 
must decide whether they prefer to profit from living in an agglomeration and thus 
face higher costs of living or reside in a sparsely populated peripheral region with 
lower wages but also lower costs of living. Approaches that focus on individual 
decision making mostly imply that employees with higher wages commute longer 
distances. Greater housing demand for high-income households can lead to sorting of 
employees with high wages into longer commuting distances (Brueckner 2000). 
Accordingly, the primary economic explanation for commuting patterns lies in wage 
compensation for pecuniary and time costs. As Manning (2003) argues, monopsony 
and thin labour markets lead to a positive correlation between wages and commuting 
distance. Although workers try to maximize wages and minimize commutes, job offers 
come at an infrequent rate, resulting in longer commuting distances for jobs with 
higher wages. Thus, job search may lead to changes in commuting distances. 
Empirically, however, many studies (such as Manning, 2003) find only a minor 
positive effect on wages.  
 
5.3.2 Estimation strategy 
 
All constant terms and coefficients in equations 5.2 to 5.6 are estimated using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS), with robust standard errors to address heteroscedasticity. One of 
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the shortcomings of this approach is the endogeneity issues. Endogeneity refers to the 
simultaneity problem where the flow of causality is not purely from the explanatory 
variable to the dependent variable. In other words, if we think that changes in the 
dependent variable may cause changes in an explanatory variable or that the dependent 
variable and an explanatory variable are being jointly determined, then there is 
simultaneity, meaning that we would not expect the error term to be uncorrelated with 
the explanatory variable. In our case, for example, endogeneity occurs if explanatory 
variables such as experience or education are not given exogenously but subject to an 
individual's decision, and are thereby at risk of being correlated with unobserved 
factors that affect the worker’s pay. These factors’ impact on the worker’s pay is likely 
to be estimated with a bias, so that the estimates are not going to be consistent. That is 
why the OLS estimation of returns to education suffers from both attenuation and 
omitted ability biases simultaneously. To eliminate these biases, it is necessary to 
apply the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation. However, we do not have suitable 
IV data such as the number of children or education level of parents to be able to 
correct such endogeneity problems. Therefore, we expect that by including 
information on formal education level, occupation, and other human capital variables, 
we might be able to mitigate this problem. 
 
A separate analysis is undertaken for the pooled, male, and female samples. In the 
pooled sample case, we assume that the effects of worker characteristics are the same 
for both men and women, and there are only intercept differences captured by a gender 
dummy. Meanwhile, in the case of gender, we allow for full heterogeneity in pay 
determination by estimating separate regressions for males and females. 
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5.3.2.1 Quantile regression analysis 
Controlling for individual unobserved heterogeneity is necessary in order to obtain 
unbiased estimates of the supply-side pay determinants. An alternative approach is to 
estimate a quantile regression (QR), and this can reveal the effects of worker 
characteristics at different points of the conditional pay distribution. Since individuals 
are located at different quantiles, this can be defined as heterogeneity in ability, 
wherein ability is indexed by its position in the conditional pay distribution 
(McGuinness and Bennett, 2007). This means that those located at the high-end of the 
conditional pay distribution are presumably high-ability workers whilst those located 
at the lower part of the pay distribution are most likely to be low-ability workers. 
 
Moreover, the advantages of using QR are: (1) it is able to capture heterogeneity in the 
effects of different variables where the mean regression would not have been captured; 
(2) it has lesser sensitivity to outliers (Koenker & Bassett, 1978; Mwabu & Schultz, 
1996; Falaris, 2004); (3) it may perform better than OLS in the case where 
heteroscedasticity exists (Deaton, 1997; Lee & Lee, 2006); and (4) it is less affected 
by deviations of error from normality (Buchinsky, 1998).  
 
The QR model assumes that conditional on a vector of worker characteristics ( x ), the 
th quantile of lpay is linear (Koenker and Basset, 1978): 
 
   iii xxlpayQuant         5.7 
giving rise to the linear QR model: 
 iii xlpay           5.8 
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where ix  is a vector of exogenous variables for workers i.  denotes 
the conditional quantile, th  of log monthly pay  lpay given x and where 
  0ixQuant   . The th  regression quantile, 0< <1, is defined as the solution to 
the problem. 
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The above equation could be simplified as: 
   i
i
k xRmin   
where  c is the check function defined as   ec   if 0  or   ec   if .0  
This problem can be solved by linear programming methods, and standard errors are 
obtained by the bootstrap technique42. The calculations were carried out using 1,000 
replicates, this being the usual number of replicas suggested by Davidson and Hinkley 
(1997). This value is acceptable, taking into account that according to the method 
presented by Andrews and Buchinsky (2000), the optimal number of replicas obtained 
varied between 800 and 1,000, depending on the regression quantile estimate43. 
 
Three separate regressions are estimated for the pooled, male, and female samples, 
while the QR estimations are conducted using the same controls as in the OLS 
specification. In this study, the quantiles are 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 0.90. The equality 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
42 Bootstrapping is a method for estimating the distribution of an estimator or test statistics by re-
sampling one’s data, and it provides a way of obtaining standard errors when no formula is otherwise 
available. The bootstrap treats the estimation data as if they were in the population and bootstrap data 
are generated by sampling the estimation data randomly with replacement. For details on bootstrapping 
methods, see Hahn (1995). 
43 Computations use Stata 12.0 software. 
 ii xlpayQuant
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of the estimated coefficients of worker characteristics across quantiles can be tested 
using the Wald test. Two tests are proposed. The first is the test of equality of 
coefficients across quantiles, i.e. to ascertain whether the coefficients of worker 
characteristics are heterogeneous across all quantiles. The second is the inter-quantile 
test, i.e. to test whether the coefficients of worker characteristics between the lower 
quantile (q10) and upper quantile (q90) are heterogeneous. Specifically, testing the 
equality of coefficients across quantiles (joint test) can be written as follows: 
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If H0 is rejected, it means that the coefficients on worker characteristics are not 
homogeneous throughout the workers’ conditional pay distribution. Meanwhile, the 
inter-quantile test takes the following form: 
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Accepting H0 means that the coefficients on worker characteristics are homogeneous 
between the 10th (25th) and 90th (75th) quantiles.   
 
5.4 Empirical results 
 
In this section, we present the estimation results from the OLS estimation of pay 
models given in equations 5.1 to 5.6, followed by more detailed findings from the QR 
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analysis with the same specifications as in the OLS models. For convenience, the 
discussion of the impact of supply-side factors (or worker characteristics) on pay 
determinants based on OLS and QR analyses will be divided into three sub-sections, 
namely: (1) education, experience, and job tenure; (2) demographic factors; and (3) 
trainings, skills, occupations, distance, and locations.  
 
5.4.1 Impact of worker characteristics on worker’s pay using OLS regression 
 
This section discusses the impact of supply-side pay determinants or worker 
characteristics on the worker’s pay, as estimated by OLS for the pooled, male and 
female samples. 
 
5.4.1.1 Education, experience, and job tenure 
As a first step, we present the results from the OLS estimation of the basic Mincerian 
model, Mincer-Jovanovic model, and ‘sheepskin effects’ model, as in Table 5.2. 
Column (1) reports the results from the basic Mincerian specification which only 
include education, experience and experience squared as explanatory variables In the 
next model, i.e. the Mincer-Jovanovic model, we are able to add tenure and tenure 
squared. Therefore, column (2) provides the results from the Mincer-Jovanovic model 
which adds tenure and tenure squared variables to the basic Mincerian model. 
Meanwhile, column (3) reports the results from the ‘sheepskin effects’ model which 
adds dummy variables indicating the worker’s level of educational achievements.  
 
The results in Table 5.2 indicate that all explanatory variables are significant at least 
at the 1 percent of significance level with expected sign. Specifically, the results for 
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each explanatory variable will be discussed in the following. In the case of returns on 
education, the results show that edui has a positive and significant effect on the 
worker’s pay, as predicted by the theory. Each additional year of education is 
associated with a pay increase of 9 percent in the basic Mincerian model. However, 
the return on education has decreased slightly (i.e. from 9 percent to 8.4 percent) when 
we control for tenure based on the Mincer-Jovanovic model. Consequently, as we take 
into account the sheepskin effects, we found that the return on education has decreased 
dramatically from 8.4 percent to 3.7 percent.  
 
In the case of labour market experience, results from Table 5.2 show that the 
relationship between labour market experience and worker’s pay seems to be a 
concave type, and a year of extra experience in the labour market increases an 
individual worker’s pay by 3.5 percent, 2.4 percent and 3.2 percent in the models basic 
Mincerian, Mincer-Jovanovic, and ‘sheepskin effects’, respectively. Another 
important measure is tenure. The coefficients related to tenure suggest that each 
additional year in the current firm raises the worker’s pay by 2.3 percent in the Mincer-
Jovanovic model and 2.7 percent in ‘sheep-skin effects model. Here, we see that labour 
market experience is just a little more rewarding when compared to tenure in both 
models. The estimate for quadratic term reveals that like labour market experience, the 
relationship between the individual worker’s pay and tenure is also one of concave 
nature.  
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Apart from control for the years of completed schooling, we also control for the returns 
on specific credentials of education that are often referred to as “sheepskin effect”44. 
In this respect, we expect the coefficients of dummies that indicate the worker’s level 
of educational attainment (i.e. the highest degree obtained) to pick up the marginal 
effect of obtaining a certificate of completion for lower secondary, upper secondary, 
college diploma, and university degree; and they also capture increasing returns on 
education45. As expected, edui is still significant and has a positive coefficient; 
however, it is much lower than in the previous models (refer to column (3) of Table 
5.2). Meanwhile, the coefficients for each degree obtained are large and significant, 
indicating that employers place a much higher value on having completed one’s 
education46. In fact, compared to those with only primary or no education, having 
completed lower and secondary education raises the worker’s pay by 7.4 and 18 
percent respectively, while workers with a college diploma and university degree have 
54 and 79 percent higher pay, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
44 This effect understands that pay is not necessarily a linear function of time spent in school (Jaeger 
and Page, 1996; Antelius, 2000). In addition, the so-called ‘sheepskin effect’ explains the existence of 
pay premiums for completing the final year of elementary school, high school, or university. Therefore, 
it has been argued that credentials such as a college diploma or university degree are more important 
than a year of schooling per se. That is one reason for adding dummies for worker’s credential in our 
model.  
45 They might also capture the signalling effects. 
46 It is also likely that more capable workers would usually have completed their education. 
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Table 5-2 Basic Mincerian, Mincer-Jovanovic and sheepskin effects models estimated by OLS 
DV: log monthly 
pay 
Model 
 
Basic Mincerian 
Pay model 
 
Mincer-Jovanovic 
Augmented pay 
model 1 
 
Sheepskin effects 
Augmented pay 
model 2 
Explanatory 
Variables: 
Coefficien
ts 
Robu
st SE 
Coefficient
s 
Robust 
SE 
Coefficien
ts 
Robust 
SE 
education 0.090*** 0.002 0.084*** 0.002 0.037*** 0.003 
experience 0.035*** 0.002 0.024*** 0.002 0.032*** 0.002 
experience squared -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
tenure    0.023*** 0.002 0.027*** 0.002 
tenure squared    -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 
Educational attainment  
(ref – primary/ no edu) 
      
degree       0.792*** 0.039 
diploma       0.539*** 0.031 
upper secondary       0.180*** 0.023 
lower secondary       0.074*** 0.02 
constant 5.732*** 0.028 5.808*** 0.028 6.007*** 0.026 
No. of observation 8679  8679  8679  
R-squared 0.249  0.276  0.355  
Adjusted R-squared 0.249  0.275  0.354  
Note:  *, **, and *** denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
 
5.4.1.2 Demographic factors 
Nowadays, it is very common to include other demographic factors in the set of 
explanatory variables of the Mincerian semi-log specification. Therefore, in Table 5.3, 
results of OLS with robust standard errors based on the augmented Mincerian pay 
model 1 are presented. Column (1), as shown in Table 5.3, consists of estimations 
based on the entire sample, involving 8,679 observations. The model explains 45.4 
percent pay variation in Malaysia, as indicated by R-squared. Meanwhile, Columns 
(2) and (3) are based on estimations of the male sample which involves 4,811 workers 
and the female sample which involves 3,868 workers, respectively. The R-squared 
value for the male sample is 46.6 percent, while for the female sample it is 43 percent.  
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In general, we found that almost all explanatory variables are significant at least at the 
10 percent significant level, and the signs of coefficients are, as expected, in the pay 
determination. First, we discuss the basic human capital variables. We see that for the 
Malaysian labour market, education plays a significant role in the process of worker’s 
pay determination. The estimation results show that edu is significant and positively 
related to monthly pay. Based on column 1 in Table 5.3, each additional year of 
schooling is associated with a 2.6 percent higher monthly pay, ceteris paribus.  
 
Regarding the estimation of sheepskin effects, we found that university degree, college 
diploma, and upper secondary levels are significant at 1 percent, while the lower 
secondary level is significant at 10 percent, and the signs of their coefficients are 
positive. Relative to the primary level, those with lower secondary certificates have 
earnings that are about 3.8 percent higher. Those with upper secondary certificates 
earn about 16.5 percent more than those with primary. College diploma holders and 
university degree holders earn, respectively, 49.5 percent and 74.8 percent more than 
primary-level workers.  
 
The returns on past labour market experience and job tenure are found to be 2.7 and 
2.3 percent with each additional year of experience and tenure, respectively. The 
estimation results show that as years of work experience and tenure increase, the 
monthly pay will increase at a decreasing rate (as shown by the negative sign of the 
estimated coefficient associated with experience squared, exp2 and tenure squared, 
ten2). The negative coefficient related to the quadratic term for experience reveals the 
concavity of the experience-wage relationship which is confirmed in almost all 
Mincer-based studies.  
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The effect of gender, marital status, citizenship, and ethnicity on the worker’s pay is 
given by the variables fem, mar, ctz, chn, ind, and oth. We found that all variables 
except oth (i.e. other ethnics) are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Based 
on results in column (1) in Table 5.3, we found that if a worker were female, with all 
other characteristics being the same as her male colleague, her earnings would be 
almost 23 percent less, whereas if the employee has been married, with all other 
characteristics being the same as his/her single colleague, his/her earnings would be 9 
percent more. We also found that if a worker is a citizen, his/her earnings would be 29 
percent more than his/her non-citizen colleague. In terms of ethnic differences, we can 
see that being Chinese and Indian (with all other attributes being the same) respectively 
result in an almost 28 and 5.4 percent wage premium compared to Malay workers.  
 
Table 5-3: Augmented Mincerian pay model 1 by OLS for all workers and by gender  
  
Log monthly  
Pay 
(1) 
All workers 
 
(2) 
Male workers 
(3) 
Female workers 
Coefficients Robust 
SE 
Coefficients Robust 
SE 
Coefficients Robust 
SE 
education 0.026*** 0.003 0.027*** 0.003 0.024*** 0.005 
Educational attainment 
(ref – primary/no edu) 
      
degree 0.748*** 0.036 0.692*** 0.046 0.809*** 0.056 
diploma 0.495*** 0.029 0.441*** 0.039 0.553*** 0.045 
upper secondary 0.165*** 0.022 0.111*** 0.028 0.229*** 0.034 
lower secondary  0.038* 0.019      0.006 0.024    0.078** 0.030 
experience 0.027*** 0.002 0.033*** 0.002 0.023*** 0.002 
experience squared -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
tenure 0.023*** 0.002 0.018*** 0.003 0.030*** 0.003 
tenure squared -0.000*** 0.000  -0.000* 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 
female -0.230*** 0.009 - - - - 
married 0.094*** 0.011  0.1*** 0.015   0.075*** 0.015 
citizen 0.294*** 0.056 0.394*** 0.062      0.051 0.096 
Ethnicity (ref – Malay)       
Chinese 0.284*** 0.01 0.287*** 0.015 0.283*** 0.014 
Indian 0.054*** 0.016 0.099*** 0.024 0.014 0.022 
others      0.077 0.056  0.134* 0.063      0.028 0.09 
constant 5.922*** 0.061 5.813*** 0.069 5.937*** 0.104 
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Log monthly  
Pay 
(1) 
All workers 
 
(2) 
Male workers 
(3) 
Female workers 
Coefficients Robust 
SE 
Coefficients Robust 
SE 
Coefficients Robust 
SE 
No. of. observation 8679   4811 
 
3868 
 
R-Squared 0.454   0.466 
 
0.43 
 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.453   0.464 
 
0.428 
 
Note:  *, **, and *** denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
As acknowledged earlier, women earn significantly less than men. For this reason, a 
separate analysis was also undertaken for males and females, and these results are 
presented in columns (2) and (3) in Table 5.3. In making a comparison by gender, 
human capital variables such as education, experience, and tenure have a positive and 
significant effect on the worker’s pay. Returns on education are between 2.4 and 2.7 
percent, which is slightly higher for males compared to females. Returns on experience 
are between 2.3 and 3.3 percent, which is higher for males. On the other hand, returns 
on tenure are between 1.8 and 3.0 percent, which is higher for females. In terms of the 
‘sheepskin effects’, the pay premium for each educational attainment appears to be 
higher for females than for males.  
 
In terms of demographic factors, we find that among males, marital status, citizenship, 
and ethnicity have positive and significant effects on the worker’s monthly pay. Those 
who are married earn about 10 percent more. Malaysian citizens receive a 39 percent 
higher pay than those who are not. Chinese, Indian, and other ethnic workers 
respectively receive about 29, 10, and 13 percent higher pay than Malay workers. 
Among females, those who are married and Chinese earn respectively about 8 and 28 
percent more than those who are single and Malay; while on citizenship, Indian and 
other ethnic variables remain insignificant.  
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5.4.1.3 Training, skills, occupations, distance and location 
In the next pay model, we add dummies of current and previous training, computer 
skills47, people skills, off-the job training, study abroad, occupations, distance, and 
location, as presented in equation 5.6. Table 5.4 presents the results of this model for 
the pooled, male, and female samples. Column (1) in Table 5.4 reports the estimation 
of the augmented Mincerian pay model 2 for the whole sample. The model explains 
the 55 percent pay variation in Malaysia, as indicated by R-squared. The results 
demonstrate that all incorporated variables are significant in determining the logarithm 
of the worker’s monthly pay except for the lower secondary (lws). 
 
For the human capital variables, we find that education, experience, and tenure are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level with expected sign. Nonetheless, 
augmenting the previous model with a direct measure of training, skills, occupations, 
distance, and locations reduces the strength of years of education as a predictor of 
worker’s monthly pay. The previous specifications suggest that the return on 1 
additional year of education is about 2.7 percent, and falling to 1.7 percent once we 
control for those factors. In addition, experience appears to be worth more than years 
of education, with an additional year of experience adding about 3 percent increase to 
the worker’s pay.  
 
In terms of the ‘sheepskin effects’, we found that all education levels, except lower 
secondary, have positive and significant effects on the worker’s pay. Based on column 
(1) in Table 5.4, the marginal effects of academic credentials on the worker’s pay for 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
47 The categories of computer skills dummy are: basic, moderate, complex, and none as reference. 
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university degree, college diploma, and secondary school are dramatically reduced 
from 75 percent to 43 percent, 50 percent to 25 percent, and from 17 percent to 6 
percent, respectively, compared to the previous model, whereas the marginal effect of 
lower secondary is insignificant.  
 
For demographic factors, we also found that the effects of gender, marital status, 
citizenship, and ethnicity on the worker’s pay are somewhat consistent with the 
previous model. The dummies of training and skills are expected to pick up the 
marginal effect of obtaining those training and skills. The results in Table 5.4 show 
that all these variables have a positive as well as a strong and significant impact on the 
Malaysian worker’s pay. Based on the pooled sample, workers who have attended 
current training earned 8 percent higher than those who have not. Meanwhile, workers 
who have attended previous training earned 4 percent higher than those who have not 
(refer to column (1) in Table 5.4). These results imply that current training has greater 
impact on the worker’s pay compared to previous training. As far as computer skills 
are concerned, compared to those with no computer skill, having a basic computer skill 
raises the pay by 11 percent, while workers with moderate computer skill receive on 
average a higher pay by 20 percent. Workers with complex computer skills have about 
a 22 percent higher pay. In addition, workers who have skills in dealing with people, 
vocational skill or off-the job training, and those who have studied abroad received 
around 3 to 4 percent higher pay than those who have not.  
 
Based on results in column (1) in Table 5.4, we can see that the types of occupation 
that have been included are statistically highly significant with the expected signs. The 
skills and characteristics found in professional workers and managers seem to be 
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especially valuable to the firm, which pays a premium of 35 percent to professionals 
(such as engineers, accountants, lawyers, chemists, scientists, and software 
programmers) and 30 percent to managers relative to unskilled workers, even after 
controlling for education, experience, training and skills. Meanwhile, skilled workers 
(such as technicians, and supervisors) and non-production workers (such as 
administrative and sales workers) earned respectively 13 and 11 percent higher than 
unskilled production workers. 
 
Both variables included in the model, i.e. ldisi and loci , are statistically significant and 
have a positive impact on the worker’s monthly pay. This implies that as the distance 
from workplace increases by a kilometre, the worker’s pay increases by 4 percent. 
Likewise, those who reside in developed states such as Selangor would receive 19 
percent more pay compared to those who reside in least developed states such as 
Kedah.  
Table 5-4 The augmented Mincerian pay model 2 by OLS robust S.E for all and by gender 
DV: 
log monthly pay 
(1) 
All workers 
(2) 
Male workers 
(3) 
Female workers 
Explanatory  
Variables: 
Coefficients Robust 
SE 
Coefficients Robust 
SE 
Coefficients Robust 
SE 
education 0.017*** 0.002 0.016*** 0.003 0.016*** 0.004 
degree 0.429*** 0.032 0.369*** 0.041 0.482*** 0.05 
diploma 0.245*** 0.026 0.204*** 0.035 0.281*** 0.04 
upper secondary 0.056** 0.019 0.029 0.025 0.087**  0.03 
lower secondary 0.011 0.017 -0.009 0.022 0.029 0.02 
experience 0.027*** 0.001 0.029*** 0.002 0.025*** 0.002 
experience squared -0.000*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 
tenure 0.020*** 0.002 0.017*** 0.002 0.025*** 0.003 
tenure squared -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 
female -0.240*** 0.009 - - - - 
married 0.070*** 0.01 0.084*** 0.014 0.045*** 0.013 
citizen 0.199*** 0.05 0.287*** 0.063 0.015 0.077 
Chinese 0.261*** 0.01 0.260*** 0.015 0.260*** 0.013 
Indian 0.043** 0.015 0.074*** 0.021 0.016 0.02 
others 0.099* 0.05 0.134* 0.063 0.072 0.074 
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DV: 
log monthly pay 
(1) 
All workers 
(2) 
Male workers 
(3) 
Female workers 
Explanatory  
Variables: 
Coefficients Robust 
SE 
Coefficients Robust 
SE 
Coefficients Robust 
SE 
current training 0.078*** 0.009 0.063*** 0.013 0.099*** 0.013 
previous training 0.043*** 0.011 0.063*** 0.016 0.019 0.015 
basic comp. skills 0.113*** 0.012 0.088*** 0.016 0.147*** 0.02 
moderate comp. skills 0.204*** 0.012 0.166*** 0.017 0.248*** 0.019 
complex comp. skills 0.219*** 0.02 0.173*** 0.028 0.283*** 0.03 
people skills 0.036*** 0.009 0.030* 0.013 0.044*** 0.013 
vocational skills 0.036** 0.013 0.03 0.018 0.041*   0.02 
study abroad 0.038* 0.012 0.053* 0.023 0.046* 0.015 
management 0.298*** 0.017 0.372*** 0.026 0.220*** 0.022 
professionals 0.351*** 0.019 0.377*** 0.027 0.320*** 0.026 
skilled workers 0.125*** 0.011 0.149*** 0.015 0.081*** 0.017 
non-production 0.107*** 0.013 0.065*** 0.02 0.098*** 0.018 
log of distance 0.038*** 0.004 0.032*** 0.006 0.041*** 0.006 
location 0.186*** 0.011 0.179*** 0.016 0.208*** 0.017 
constant 5.701*** 0.056 5.651*** 0.07 5.611*** 0.088 
No. of. observation 8679  4811  3868  
R-Squared 0.551  0.555  0.545  
Adjusted R-Squared 0.549  0.552  0.541  
Notes: Reference group: primary school, no formal training from current employer, no formal training 
from previous employer, no computer skills, in his/her job not important dealing with people, no 
attendance at vocational school or after-work learning program, studied locally, male, single, Malay, 
unskilled production workers, and live in less developed states; *** denotes statistically significant at 
1%, ** denotes statistically significant at 5%, and * denotes statistically significant at 10%. 
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 5.4 give the estimation results of the augmented 
Mincerian pay model 2 for the sample of men and women, separately. The estimation 
results of the human capital variables demonstrate the same pattern as the previous 
model. The rates of returns on education are equal among male and female workers. 
Returns on experience are between 2.5 and 2.9 percent, which is higher for males. On 
the other hand, returns on tenure are between 1.7 and 2.5 percent, which is higher for 
females. In terms of the ‘sheepskin effects’, the pay premiums for university degree 
and college diploma holders are higher for female workers than their male 
counterparts.   
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In terms of demographic factors, the results are somewhat consistent with the previous 
model. We found that in the case of males, factors such as marital status, citizenship, 
and ethnicity have positive and significant effects on the worker’s monthly pay. Those 
who are married earn about 9 percent more compared to those who are single. In 
addition, local citizens earn about 29 percent higher than non-citizens. Meanwhile, 
Chinese, Indian, and other ethnic workers respectively receive about 26, 7, and 13 
percent higher pay than Malay workers. In the case of female workers, those who are 
married earn about 5 percent higher compared to their single counterparts. Besides, 
Chinese workers earn 26 percent more than Malay workers.  
 
In terms of training and skills, the results indicate that all variables (viz. trni, trpi, bcsi, 
mcsi, ccsi, plsi, voci, and sabi) have a positive sign and are significant at least at the 10 
percent level. The results also found that differences in the rate of returns on current 
training between males and females are smaller (i.e. about 1 percent). On the other 
hand, differences in the rate of returns on previous training between males and females 
are somewhat higher (i.e. about 3 percent). Meanwhile, among males (and females), 
we found that compared to those with no computer skill, having a basic computer skill 
raises their pay by 9 percent (15 percent), while workers with moderate computer skills 
receive on average a 17 percent (25 percent) higher pay. Workers with complex 
computer skills have about 17 percent (28 percent) higher pay. In addition, both male 
and female workers who have skill dealing with people, vocational skill, and those 
who have studied abroad respectively received around 5 to 9 percent higher pay than 
those who have not.  
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From the results in columns (2) and (3), we note that occupations such as managers, 
professionals, skilled workers, and non-production workers have a significant positive 
effect on workers’ pay in the Malaysian labour market. For managers, professionals, 
and skilled workers, the results indicate that males earned more than females when we 
compared their salary with unskilled workers in their gender category. For non-
production category, however, we found that females earned more than males when 
we compared their salary with unskilled workers in their gender category (cf. columns 
(2) and (3) in Table 5.4).  
 
Based on columns (2) and (3) in Table 5.4, there exist some similar results between 
the male and female samples. For instance, we found that both males and females 
receive a 1.6 percent return rate on every additional year of formal education. In 
addition, we found that males and females who are Chinese receive around 26 percent 
more in terms of monthly pay than their Malayan counterparts. Among the males, 
marital status has a significant effect on monthly pay. Those who are married earn 
about 8 percent more. Females who are married earn about 5 percent more than their 
single counterparts. For males, those who are Malaysian citizens earn about 29 percent 
more than non-citizens, while for females the coefficient of the dummy ctz variable is 
insignificant.  
 
Nonetheless, there are several interesting contrasts that emerge when we compare the 
pay structure of the males with that for females. For example, the results show that the 
return on each year of experience is higher for males than for females. This result is 
consistent with that found by Lee and Nagaraj (1995) but at variance with that found 
by Chapman and Harding (1985). On the other hand, the return on each year of tenure 
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is higher for females than for males. Turning to skills and training, we find that females 
receive higher returns on current training; males, on the other hand, receive higher 
premiums as return on previous training. In terms of skills, among females, those who 
have computer skills, skill dealing with people, and vocational skill earned more than 
those who have not. Meanwhile, among males, those who have computer skills, skill 
for dealing with people, and have studied abroad received a higher pay compared to 
those who have not.  
 
The dummy variables for various categories of occupations are generally significant 
at the 1 percent level. Among the males and females, workers in all categories earn 
significantly more than their unskilled counterparts. The premiums of each 
occupational category, with the exception of non-production workers, appear to be 
higher for males than for females.  
 
 
5.4.2 Impact of worker’s characteristics on worker’s pay using QR  
 
In this section, we continue our analysis of the supply-side pay determinants in the 
Malaysian economy using QR. Unlike the OLS regression discussed earlier, where it 
is only possible to know the effect of the explanatory variables in the mean of the 
conditional distribution of the dependent variable, QR allows for an estimation of the 
effects of covariates on different points of the dependent variable distribution. 
Therefore, we carry out this analysis to explore the possibility that different 
explanatory variables uniformly affect the conditional distribution of the dependent 
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variable or do they exert different effects on dependent variables in different quantiles 
of the conditional distribution of dependent variable.  
 
We have estimated our final model (i.e. augmented Mincerian pay model 2) as QR 
model, and as explained in Section 5.3.2.1 we use standard quantiles, namely the 10th, 
25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th quantiles. Tables 5.5, 5.7, and 5.9 give the QR estimation 
results for the pooled, male, and female samples respectively, as indicated in columns 
3 – 7 of each table. As a comparison, the OLS results are also reported in the second 
column of those tables. With OLS, the effects of all covariates on pay distribution are 
assumed to only have location shifts; however, QR assumes location shifts as well as 
the scale and shape of the conditional pay distribution. 
  
All included explanatory variables have the expected sign in all three samples. Very 
few included variables are not statistically significant or different from zero for all 
quantiles. In all samples, the pseudo-R squared is rising with the increasing quantile; 
that is, more is being explained in the high-income quantiles than in the low income 
quantiles of the income distribution. In the following, each explanatory variable is 
discussed in turn: (1) education, experience, tenure, and ‘sheepskin effect’; (2) 
demographic factors; (3) training and skills; (4) kinds of work; and (5) distance and 
locations.  
 
5.4.2.1 Education, experience, and job tenure 
In this study, QR allows observationally identical workers with different unobserved 
abilities to experience different pay levels and different pay paths as the values of 
regressors that measure worker characteristics. The coefficients of regressors may 
159 
  
 
 
differ at different points of the conditional pay distribution and can affect pay 
inequality. The Wald test has been applied to test the equality of each parameter’s 
estimates across all quantiles. In addition, the corresponding p-values for testing the 
equality of individual slope coefficients between two selected quantiles are also 
reported in the same table.  
 
Inspection of the estimated coefficients of edu  and ten in columns OLS and q10 to 
q90 in Table 5.5 reveals that the QR estimates are fairly uniform (around 2 percent) 
across the conditional pay distribution. Since the years of schooling and tenure are 
significantly related to monthly pay at each quantile and that the QR estimates do not 
differ significantly across all quantiles, it can be concluded that years of schooling and 
tenure only affect the location of the conditional pay distribution.  
 
Meanwhile, in the case of ‘sheepskin effect’, the results show that returns on college 
diploma and university degree were statistically significant, different from zero, and 
positive for all analysed quantiles when controlling for other individual worker 
characteristics. However, the return on lower secondary and upper secondary 
qualifications are only significant for the 75th and 90th quantiles. In addition, the 
premium is the following: first, rapidly increasing with more attained education; and 
second, increasing across quantiles and, hence, the pay distribution. Moreover, the 
findings reveal a large degree of heterogeneity across the pay distribution. Workers in 
the low end of the pay distribution (10th and 25th quantile) obtain lower returns than do 
workers in the top end (75th and 90th quantile). Hence, workers with the same level of 
education are not compensated equally. For example, the poor person (10th quantile) 
who has a university degree receives less pay (i.e. 42 percent higher than primary/no 
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education) compared to the rich person (90th quantile) with similar attainment who 
receives a 71 percent higher pay than one with primary/no education. 
 
Making a comparison by gender, the entire sample is disaggregated into two sub-
samples, i.e. one for male workers and one for female workers (see Tables 5.7 and 
5.9). The results in these tables demonstrate that edui are significant in all quantiles 
except for the lowest quantile (10th) in both male and female models. In addition, in 
the case of females, the rates of return on education do not differ significantly across 
quantiles. On the other hand, in the case of males, the rates of return on education 
differ significantly across all quantiles (refer to Tables 5.8 and 5.10).  
 
Turning to the ‘sheepskin effect’, Tables 5.7 and 5.9 show that a university degree and 
college diploma have a positive and significant impact on the worker’s monthly pay 
in all quantiles for both male and female samples. However, the income for female 
workers increases more rapidly with the level of educational attainment than for their 
male counterparts. For instance, a female worker in the median (50th) who has obtained 
a university degree gets a return of 70 percent, while a male worker with the same 
characteristic only receives 44 percent higher than those with primary or no education. 
Meanwhile, the marginal effect of upper secondary for females is positive and 
significant for all quantiles except at the lowest end (10th) quantile, while for males the 
marginal effect of upper secondary is insignificant for all quantiles except for the top 
end (90th) quantile. However, the marginal effects for lower secondary are insignificant 
in all quantiles as well as in the OLS for both male and female samples (refer to Tables 
5.7 and 5.9). In the case of males, the Wald tests (see Table 5.8) show that the inter-
quantile tests between the lowest (10th) and upper end (90th) quantile are statistically 
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significant and different from zero but not significant in the jointly equality test for the 
marginal effect of university degree, while both jointly and inter-quantile tests are 
statistically significant and different from zero for the marginal effects of other 
academic qualifications. In the case of females, the Wald test (refer to Table 5.10) 
shows that the inter-quantile tests between the lowest (10th) and upper end (90th) 
quantile are statistically significant and different from zero for university degree and 
upper secondary, with other tests and qualifications being insignificant.  
 
Results in Tables 5.7 and 5.9 also show that general experience (expi) and specific 
experience (teni) variables are statistically significant, different from zero, and positive 
for all reported quantiles in both male and female samples. Returns on experience for 
female workers are between 1.3 and 3.4 percent, while returns on experience among 
male workers are between 2.2 and 3.3 percent. Meanwhile, returns on tenure for 
females are between 2.1 and 2.6 percent, which is higher compared to those for their 
male counterparts (between 1.6 and 2.0 percent). In addition, the Wald test for general 
experience (refer to Tables 5.8 and 5.10) shows that both jointly and inter-quantile 
tests are statistically significant and different from zero, which means that the returns 
on experience is heterogeneous across quantiles and between the lowest (10th) and 
upper end quantile (90th). However, both jointly and inter-quantile tests suggest that 
the returns on tenure for both men and women are homogeneous across all quantiles 
and between the lower and top end quantile.  
 
5.4.2.2 Demographic factors 
QR analysis shows signs of large measurable inequalities between genders. Female 
workers are also found to receive lower pay as compared to male workers in all the 
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five quantiles. The results from the Wald test in Table 5.6 suggest that the gender gap 
is heterogeneous across all quantiles. Furthermore, Table 5.5 reveals that pay penalty 
increases for women with income group. For the 10th quantile, the pay penalty for 
women is 19 percent less than for their male colleagues and increases to 52, 28, 29, 
and 31 percent for the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th quantile, respectively.  
 
Turning to marital status, Table 5.5 shows that the wage premium for being married 
across the worker conditional pay distribution for the entire sample increases linearly 
with each quantile: from 6 percent at the bottom end to 7 percent at the mid quantile, 
and on to 11 percent at the top end of distribution. However, the Wald test (refer to 
Table 5.6) suggests that this premium is not homogeneous across all quantiles as well 
as between the lowest (10th) and upper end quantile (90th). By gender, the male sample 
closely follows the general pattern, but the Wald test shows no evidence that these 
premiums are heterogeneous at different parts of the worker conditional pay 
distribution48. For women, the wage premium for being married is significant at the 
10th, 75th, and 90th quantiles, while insignificant at 25th and 50th quantiles. In addition, 
the in-between coefficient differences for the married variable is significant (with p-
value = 0.075) in the joint test, but not significant in the equality test between bottom 
and upper 10 percent as well as between the bottom and upper 25 percent. 
 
In terms of citizenship, the result from Table 5.5 indicates that wages of local workers 
relative to non-citizen workers are statistically different from zero and positive for all 
quantiles in the pooled sample, while in the case of males, it was significant and 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
48 Refer to Table 5.11 for the results of the Wald test among male workers.  
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positive for all except for the lowest end quantile. Meanwhile, in the case of the female 
sample, it was insignificant for all quantiles. The pay gap between local workers and 
international workers in the male sample is higher (i.e. around 22 to 44 percent) 
compared to the pooled sample (i.e. around 20 to 34 percent). Furthermore, the Wald 
test (refer to Tables 5.6, 5.8, and 5.10) demonstrates that jointly and inter-quantiles 
tests are insignificant in all samples. 
 
In terms of ethnicity, the QR results indicate that wages of the Chinese relative to 
Malay workers are statistically different from zero and positive for all quantiles in the 
pooled, male, and female samples. Furthermore, the pay gap between Chinese and 
Malay is statistically different across all quantiles as well as between the bottom and 
upper 10 percent and between the bottom and upper 25 percent of the pooled sample 
(refer to Table 5.5). In the case of Indian-Malay, the pay gap is statistically significant, 
different from zero, and positive for quantiles 50th, 75th and 90th in the pooled sample. 
Other ethnics’ pay relative to Malay workers is positive and significant only for 
quantiles 25th and 50th. Nonetheless, Table 5.5 also envisaged that the Indian-Malay 
pay gap as well as other ethnics-Malay pay gap are homogeneous across and between 
quantiles. Meanwhile, by gender, the difference among all ethnics’ pay gap in the male 
samples closely follows the general pattern (refer to Table 5.7). In the case of females, 
Table 5.9 shows that only the Chinese-Malay pay gap follows the general pattern. 
 
5.4.2.3 Trainings, skills, occupations, distance, and locations 
The QR findings indicate that training and skills are important in the Malaysian 
worker’s pay determination, after controlling for the level of human capital and other 
worker characteristics. In terms of training, Table 5.5 shows that the returns on current 
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training are relatively higher compared to previous training in all quantiles. For 
example, at the 50th quantile, those who have attended current (previous) training 
earned about 7 percent (5 percent) higher than those who did not attend current 
(previous) training. From Table 5.6, we can see that the QR estimates of the association 
of previous training with the worker’s pay differ significantly in the equality test 
between the bottom (10th) and upper (90th) quantiles (with p-value= 0.047), but not 
significant in the joint test among all five quantiles. Meanwhile, the same table shows 
that the Wald test for current training is insignificant for both jointly and inter-quantile 
tests. The implication is that current training only affects the location of the conditional 
pay distribution, but not the shape of the distribution.  
 
Furthermore, in comparison by gender, Tables 5.7 and 5.9 indicate that female workers 
received slightly higher returns on current training (i.e. around 9 to 10 percent) 
compared to male ones (i.e. between 5 and 8 percent). However, these tables also 
reveal that male workers received returns on previous training at around 5 to 10 
percent, while female workers did not receive any return on previous training at all 
quantiles. Nonetheless, the Wald tests for male and female samples (refer to Tables 
5.8 and 5.10) suggest that jointly and inter-quantile tests are not significant for both 
current and previous training. These results imply that the returns on current and 
previous training are homogeneous across and between quantiles.  
 
In terms of computer skills, relative to the base of no computer skills at all, the 
estimated coefficients of all the computer skill dummies reveal an association between 
basic, moderate, and complex computer skills and worker’s pay increasing across 
quantiles as well as across levels of computer skills, where the higher the level of 
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computer skills, the higher the worker will earn relative to having no computer skills 
(refer to Table 5.5). In addition, the results also indicate that workers who have skills 
for dealing with people received around 3 to 5 percent higher pay compared to those 
without that skill at all quantiles except for the top quantile. Moreover, we also found 
that those who have vocational skill earned 4 to 6 percent higher pay compared to 
those who did not have any vocational skill for all quantiles except for the bottom end 
(10th) and top end (90th) quantiles. The Wald test (Table 5.6) indicates that both jointly 
and inter-quantile tests are insignificant, which means that returns on dealing with 
people and vocational skills are homogeneous across and between quantiles.  
 
Table 5.5 also demonstrates that all included occupational categories are statistically 
significant at 1 percent level of significance. This indicates that workers employed as 
a professional obtain the highest return (for the median worker, it is 42 percent), and 
with the management category receiving the second highest return (32 percent). 
Skilled-workers and non-production workers obtain 12 and 10 percent premium, 
respectively. Interestingly, these results seem to be consistent with OLS. In addition, 
Table 5.6 reveals that only the returns on skilled-workers differ significantly across all 
quantiles with p-value at 0.025, while the QR estimates for other occupational 
categories do not differ significantly across quantiles. Furthermore, results from the 
Wald test in Table 5.6 also envisaged that returns on manager in the 10th quantile differ 
notably from that of manager in the 90th quantile.  
 
Based on Table 5.5, we also find location to be a significant determinant of worker’s 
pay. This implies that workers living in the developed states namely Selangor, Kuala 
Lumpur, Johor, Penang, and Melaka, are compensated in the form of significant and 
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positive wage premiums at all quantiles in the pooled, male, and female samples. These 
results envisaged that higher wages paid to employees in line with cost of living in a 
particular geographical location. In this respect, cost of living is higher in developed 
states such as Kuala Lumpur (CPI = 2.34), Johor (CPI= 2.78), Penang (CPI= 2.45), 
and Melaka (CPI= 1.92) compared to that of the least developed states such as Kedah 
(CPI= 1.65), Terengganu (CPI= 1.85), Sabah (CPI= 0.88), and Sarawak (CPI= 1.45)49. 
In addition, based on Table 5.6, the in-between coefficient differences for the location 
variable is significant (with p-value = 0.088) in the joint test, but not significant in the 
equality test between bottom and upper 10 percent as well as between the bottom and 
upper 25 percent. Based on these results one can conclude that the location premium 
is heterogeneous across quantiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
49 Refer DOSM (2015). 
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Table 5-5: Augmented Mincerian pay model 2 by the OLS robust S.E and QR – All workers  
Log monthly pay OLS qr10 qr25 qr50 qr75 qr90 
education 0.017*** 0.011** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 
degree 0.429*** 0.351*** 0.399*** 0.442*** 0.502*** 0.539*** 
diploma 0.245*** 0.164*** 0.209*** 0.249*** 0.308*** 0.351*** 
upper secondary 0.056** 0.005 0.012 0.052 0.091*** 0.160*** 
lower secondary 0.011 -0.033 -0.033 0.014 0.049* 0.078* 
experience 0.027*** 0.016*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.034*** 0.029*** 
experience2 -0.00*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
tenure 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 
tenure2 -0.00*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** 
female -0.24*** -0.176*** -0.221*** -0.252*** -0.256*** -0.271*** 
married 0.070*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.067*** 0.072*** 0.106*** 
citizen 0.199*** 0.257* 0.178*** 0.269** 0.198** 0.199** 
Chinese 0.261*** 0.181*** 0.264*** 0.291*** 0.292*** 0.277*** 
Indian 0.043** 0.009 0.026 0.049* 0.038* 0.065* 
others 0.099* 0.209 0.128** 0.179* 0.068 0.023 
current training 0.078*** 0.081*** 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.083*** 0.087*** 
previous training 0.043*** 0.030 0.040** 0.051*** 0.060*** 0.081*** 
basic comp. skills 0.113*** 0.090*** 0.091*** 0.101*** 0.110*** 0.152*** 
moderate comp. skills 0.204*** 0.197*** 0.205*** 0.198*** 0.190*** 0.195*** 
complex comp. skills 0.219*** 0.214*** 0.189*** 0.201*** 0.221*** 0.225*** 
people skills 0.036*** 0.033* 0.030* 0.049*** 0.033** 0.016 
vocational skills 0.036** 0.038 0.055** 0.046** 0.038* 0.019 
study abroad 0.038 -0.014 -0.012 -0.004 0.073** 0.127*** 
management 0.298*** 0.245*** 0.262*** 0.276*** 0.298*** 0.338*** 
professionals 0.351*** 0.322*** 0.359*** 0.353*** 0.330*** 0.329*** 
skilled workers 0.125*** 0.071*** 0.096*** 0.121*** 0.131*** 0.140*** 
non-production 0.107*** 0.086*** 0.109*** 0.095*** 0.111*** 0.087** 
log of distance 0.038*** 0.028*** 0.035*** 0.041*** 0.037*** 0.028** 
location 0.186*** 0.174*** 0.199*** 0.215*** 0.190*** 0.170*** 
constant 5.701*** 5.492*** 5.581*** 5.560*** 5.806*** 6.054*** 
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.551 0.245 0.316 0.368 0.371 0.355 
No. of observation 8679 8679 8679 8679 8679 8679 
Notes: Reference group: primary school, no formal training from current employer, no formal training 
from previous employer, no computer skills, in his/her job not important dealing with people, no 
attendance at vocational school or after-work learning program, studied locally, male, single, Malay, 
unskilled production workers, and live in less developed states; *** denotes statistically significant at 
1%, ** denotes statistically significant at 5%, and * denotes statistically significant at 10%. 
 
Another major advantage that QR has over OLS is that the lower secondary (lws) and 
study abroad (sab) variables become significant at some points of the pay distribution, 
after having been reported as non-significant in the OLS model. These two variables 
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are found to be non-significant in the lower half of the pay distribution, while 
significant in the upper half of the pay distribution. For instance, returns on lower 
secondary at the 75th and 90th quantiles are respectively 5 and 8 percent higher than 
primary/no education, but insignificant at the 10th, 25th, and 50th quantiles.  
 
Table 5-6: Test of slope coefficient equality across quantiles 
 Marginal significance levels (p-values) 
Explanatory variables All quantiles Quantile 0.10 & 0.90 Quantile 0.25 & 0.75 
education 0.285 0.247 0.288 
degree 0.026** 0.002*** 0.028** 
diploma 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.011** 
upper secondary 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.003*** 
lower secondary 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
experience 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
experience squared 0.000*** 0.047** 0.018** 
tenure 0.527 0.652 0.633 
tenure squared 0.426 0.839 0.399 
female 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.006*** 
married 0.060* 0.021** 0.240 
citizen 0.680 0.637 0.376 
Chinese 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.068* 
Indian 0.411 0.122 0.576 
others 0.263 0.123 0.308 
current training 0.803 0.773 0.494 
previous training 0.395 0.047** 0.243 
basic comp. skills 0.255 0.035** 0.314 
moderate comp. skills 0.948 0.953 0.437 
complex comp. skills 0.701 0.826 0.220 
people skills 0.268 0.428 0.876 
vocational skills 0.691 0.566 0.405 
study abroad 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.006*** 
management 0.279 0.027** 0.181 
professionals 0.654 0.891 0.366 
skilled workers 0.025** 0.011** 0.026** 
non-production 0.385 0.996 0.920 
log of distance 0.249 0.976 0.679 
location 0.088* 0.864 0.586 
Notes: Reference group: primary school, no formal training from current employer, no formal training 
from previous employer, no computer skills, in his/her job not important dealing with people, no 
attendance at vocational school or after-work learning program, studied locally, male, single, Malay, 
unskilled production workers, and live in less developed states; *** denotes statistically significant at 
1%, ** denotes statistically significant at 5%, and * denotes statistically significant at 10%. 
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Table 5-7: Augmented Mincerian pay model 2 by the OLS robust S.E and QR – Male workers  
Log monthly pay OLS qr10 qr25 qr50 qr75 qr90 
education 0.016*** 0.007 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.016** 
degree 0.369*** 0.266*** 0.313*** 0.364*** 0.463*** 0.454*** 
diploma 0.204*** 0.136** 0.134** 0.202*** 0.281*** 0.310*** 
upper secondary 0.029 -0.022 -0.017 0.013 0.071 0.120* 
lower secondary -0.009 -0.047 -0.059 -0.015 0.036 0.062 
experience 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 
experience squared -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
tenure 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 
tenure squared -0.000* -0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
female 0.084*** 0.061** 0.093*** 0.077*** 0.096*** 0.100*** 
married 0.287*** 0.158 0.197** 0.363*** 0.314*** 0.329* 
citizen 0.260*** 0.173*** 0.270*** 0.299*** 0.296*** 0.294*** 
Chinese 0.074*** 0.017 0.083** 0.085** 0.083* 0.085 
Indian 0.134* 0.066 0.111 0.243** 0.117 0.092 
others 0.063*** 0.081*** 0.049** 0.051*** 0.069*** 0.084** 
current training 0.063*** 0.042 0.052** 0.083*** 0.091*** 0.095** 
previous training 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.079*** 0.081*** 0.084*** 0.103** 
basic comp. skills 0.166*** 0.165*** 0.178*** 0.161*** 0.143*** 0.140*** 
moderate comp. skills 0.173*** 0.215*** 0.179*** 0.147*** 0.136** 0.133* 
complex comp. skills 0.030* 0.025 0.01 0.037* 0.034 0.01 
people skills 0.03 0.049 0.057* 0.048* 0.007 -0.009 
vocational skills 0.053* 0.009 -0.007 0.015 0.087** 0.139*** 
study abroad 0.372*** 0.377*** 0.374*** 0.360*** 0.363*** 0.396*** 
management 0.377*** 0.344*** 0.397*** 0.372*** 0.347*** 0.363*** 
professionals 0.149*** 0.125*** 0.147*** 0.155*** 0.128*** 0.137*** 
skilled workers 0.065*** 0.077** 0.078*** 0.064** 0.042 0.052 
non-production 0.032*** 0.026** 0.027*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.030** 
log of distance 0.179*** 0.186*** 0.195*** 0.194*** 0.167*** 0.165*** 
location 5.651*** 5.579*** 5.544*** 5.459*** 5.790*** 5.979*** 
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.555  0.253 0.324  0.373   0.376 0.363  
No. of observations 4811 4811 4811 4811 4811 4811 
Notes: Reference group: primary school, no formal training from current employer, no formal training 
from previous employer, no computer skills, in his/her job not important dealing with people, no 
attendance at vocational school or after-work learning program, studied locally, male, single, Malay, 
unskilled production workers, and live in less developed states; *** denotes statistically significant at 
1%, ** denotes statistically significant at 5%, and * denotes statistically significant at 10%. 
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Table 5-8: Test of slope coefficient equality across quantiles among male workers 
 Marginal significance levels (p-values) 
Explanatory variables All quantiles Quantile 0.10 & 0.90 Quantile 0.25 & 0.75 
education 0.034** 0.200 0.889 
degree 0.146 0.046** 0.032** 
diploma 0.086* 0.029** 0.009*** 
upper secondary 0.084* 0.013** 0.025** 
lower secondary 0.074* 0.034** 0.006*** 
experience 0.024** 0.055* 0.089* 
experience squared 0.370 0.621 0.609 
tenure 0.705 0.713 0.755 
tenure squared 0.338 0.344 0.818 
female 0.339 0.239 0.886 
married 0.207 0.263 0.175 
citizen 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.287 
Chinese 0.311 0.248 0.992 
Indian 0.307 0.863 0.945 
others 0.327 0.933 0.326 
current training 0.398 0.170 0.129 
previous training 0.965 0.660 0.862 
basic comp. skills 0.689 0.538 0.146 
moderate comp. skills 0.695 0.254 0.348 
complex comp. skills 0.441 0.650 0.271 
people skills 0.309 0.187 0.082* 
vocational skills 0.021** 0.013** 0.007*** 
study abroad 0.938 0.774 0.800 
management 0.664 0.802 0.257 
professionals 0.437 0.725 0.415 
skilled workers 0.827 0.593 0.227 
non-production 0.760 0.793 0.344 
log of distance 0.719 0.554 0.245 
Notes: Reference group: primary school, no formal training from current employer, no formal training 
from previous employer, no computer skills, in his/her job not important dealing with people, no 
attendance at vocational school or after-work learning program, studied locally, male, single, Malay, 
unskilled production workers, and live in less developed states; *** denotes statistically significant at 
1%, ** denotes statistically significant at 5%, and * denotes statistically significant at 10%. 
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Table 5-9: Augmented Mincerian pay model 2 by the OLS robust S.E and QR – Female workers 
Log monthly pay OLS qr10 qr25 qr50 qr75 qr90 
education 0.016*** 0.008 0.013* 0.013** 0.017*** 0.018** 
degree 0.482*** 0.436*** 0.467*** 0.528*** 0.540*** 0.621*** 
diploma 0.281*** 0.233*** 0.249*** 0.319*** 0.351*** 0.360*** 
upper secondary 0.087**  0.072 0.068* 0.103** 0.107* 0.182*** 
lower secondary 0.029 0.029 -0.001 0.032 0.045 0.085 
experience 0.025*** 0.013*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
experience squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
tenure 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 
tenure squared -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000*** 
female 0.045*** 0.056** 0.023 0.023 0.045* 0.090*** 
married 0.015 0.213 0.082 -0.034 0.009 0.059 
citizen 0.260*** 0.189*** 0.271*** 0.281*** 0.267*** 0.251*** 
Chinese 0.016 0.003 0.008 0.019 0.008 0.027 
Indian 0.072 0.226 0.147 0.012 -0.004 0.091 
others 0.099*** 0.091*** 0.103*** 0.090*** 0.102*** 0.088*** 
current training 0.019 0.013 0.019 0.026 0.034 0.047 
previous training 0.147*** 0.084*** 0.076*** 0.136*** 0.156*** 0.192*** 
basic comp. skills 0.248*** 0.202*** 0.205*** 0.245*** 0.257*** 0.217*** 
moderate comp. skills 0.283*** 0.178*** 0.184*** 0.298*** 0.305*** 0.297*** 
complex comp. skills 0.044*** 0.046* 0.046** 0.053** 0.031 0.01 
people skills 0.041*   0.033 0.071** 0.034 0.037 0.037 
vocational skills 0.046 -0.044 0.089 0.049 0.113* 0.069 
study abroad 0.220*** 0.180*** 0.179*** 0.195*** 0.219*** 0.290*** 
management 0.320*** 0.282*** 0.337*** 0.308*** 0.309*** 0.333*** 
professionals 0.081*** 0.005 0.031 0.061** 0.100*** 0.195*** 
skilled workers 0.098*** 0.064* 0.111*** 0.089*** 0.102*** 0.097* 
non-production 0.041*** 0.030*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.034*** 0.030* 
log of distance 0.208*** 0.174*** 0.220*** 0.231*** 0.223*** 0.187*** 
location 5.611*** 5.388*** 5.463*** 5.639*** 5.701*** 5.820*** 
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.545  0.248 0.315  0.365  0.362  0.339  
No. of observations 3868 3868 3868 3868 3868 3868 
Notes: Reference group: primary school, no formal training from current employer, no formal training 
from previous employer, no computer skills, in his/her job not important dealing with people, no 
attendance at vocational school or after-work learning program, studied locally, male, single, Malay, 
unskilled production workers, and live in less developed states; *** denotes statistically significant at 
1%, ** denotes statistically significant at 5%, and * denotes statistically significant at 10%. 
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Table 5-10: Test of slope coefficient equality across quantiles among female workers 
 Marginal significance levels (p-values) 
Explanatory variables All quantiles Quantile 0.10 & 0.90 Quantile 0.25 & 0.75 
education 0.757 0.245 0.439 
degree 0.404 0.076* 0.336 
diploma 0.415 0.106 0.107 
upper secondary 0.217 0.062* 0.452 
lower secondary 0.363 0.276 0.296 
experience 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
experience squared 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.034** 
tenure 0.390 0.316 0.924 
tenure squared 0.566 0.452 0.418 
female 0.075* 0.269 0.331 
married 0.618 0.495 0.505 
citizen 0.000*** 0.041** 0.862 
Chinese 0.960 0.692 0.992 
Indian 0.505 0.528 0.178 
others 0.797 0.912 0.979 
current training 0.921 0.349 0.564 
previous training 0.014** 0.018** 0.008*** 
basic comp. skills 0.268 0.735 0.077* 
moderate comp. skills 0.021** 0.076* 0.012** 
complex comp. skills 0.552 0.252 0.518 
people skills 0.471 0.924 0.291 
vocational skills 0.462 0.393 0.721 
study abroad 0.196 0.028** 0.261 
management 0.683 0.433 0.560 
professionals 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.013** 
skilled workers 0.359 0.438 0.739 
non-production 0.526 0.976 0.507 
log of distance 0.075* 0.744 0.900 
Notes: Reference group: primary school, no formal training from current employer, no formal training 
from previous employer, no computer skills, in his/her job not important dealing with people, no 
attendance at vocational school or after-work learning program, studied locally, male, single, Malay, 
unskilled production workers, and live in less developed states; *** denotes statistically significant at 
1%, ** denotes statistically significant at 5%, and * denotes statistically significant at 10%. 
 
5.5 Conclusions  
 
This chapter set out with the objective of examining the effects of the worker’s 
characteristics on worker’s pay in the Malaysia economy using the Malaysian WLD. 
Compared to previous studies, analyses of pay determinants using the Malaysian WLD 
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have been able to explain more than 50 percent of the individual worker’s pay 
determinants in Malaysian manufacturing. In addition, the OLS and QR results in our 
findings are somewhat consistent and almost all workers’ characteristics included in 
the model are statistically and highly significant.  
 
Findings from this chapter seem to highlights the importance of human capital 
variables in determining the individual worker’s earning power. Based on the findings, 
higher education level is the key determinant of the individual worker’s pay. 
Moreover, from the QR analysis, this study also suggested that workers with the same 
level of education are not compensated equally. Apart from education level, training 
also play an important role in determining workers’ pay. Workers who attended 
training receive a higher pay than those without training. Interestingly, training from 
current employer has a bigger impact on pay than training from a previous employer 
or off-the-job training.  
 
Apart from the human capital variable, other factors such as demographic factors, 
occupation, location, and distance from home to workplace are also important in 
determining workers’ pay. The results also suggested that females earn less than males, 
married people earn more than singles, local workers earn more than non-citizen 
workers, and Chinese and Indians seem to have better pay than Malays. Moreover, 
workers in professional employment and management are paid significantly higher 
salaries than those in other types of jobs. Besides, workers who live in developed 
region receive higher wage premiums compared to those who live in least developed 
ones.   
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Even though education level and training are important in determining workers’ pay, 
the fact of the matter is that only 26.4 percent of the Malaysian workforce had tertiary 
certification, while more than half of those employed in 2014 only had a secondary 
education (DOSM, 2015), while about 6.6 million Malaysian workers are low-skilled 
(Khazanah Research Institute, 2015). These circumstances have occurred due to 
certain obstacles being faced by employers in their effort to provide training for their 
workers. For example, some employers argued that: (1) training is not affordable 
because of limited resources; (2) training is costly because of high labour turnover; (3) 
firms lack knowledge about training techniques and organization; (4) and the firm uses 
a mature technology, so learning by doing is sufficient (ILO, 2008).  
 
To address this issue, the Malaysian government has introduced training schemes such 
as Double Deduction Incentives for Training (DDIT)50 and Human Resource 
Development Fund (HRDF). Under the DDIT Scheme, employers could send their 
workers to approved training institutions including SIRIM, NPC, CIAST, German-
Malaysia Institute (GMI), SDCs in Penang and Perak, and various public training 
institutes such as ITIs and IKMs. Alternatively, under this scheme employers could 
also apply directly to MIDA for approval of their planned training programmes. 
Meanwhile, the HRDF scheme provides greater flexibility to employers in choosing 
training and advanced education programmes for their workers. In this respect, 
employers are allowed to provide financial assistance to: (1) help workers pursue 
masters or doctoral degrees, particularly in new and high technology areas; (2) train 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
50 The objective of Double Deduction Incentive for Training (DDIT) was to encourage firms to train 
workers especially in skill areas related to new products as well as processes and productivity and 
quality improvement by permitting employers to deduct double the amount of allowable training 
expenses on their tax return. 
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workers despite employers having outstanding unpaid levies or outstanding interest on 
levies; and (3) provide practical training at their premises to students of universities or 
training institutions. Among training activities under the HRDF scheme are Computer-
Based Training Scheme, Technology and Computer-Aided Training Scheme, English 
Language Programmes for Workers, Industrial Training Scheme, and SME Training 
Partners Scheme.  
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 : THE EFFECTS OF EMPLOYER CHARACTERISTICS ON 
THE AVERAGE FIRM-LEVEL PAY RATES  
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has concluded that from the employees’ perspective, their 
characteristics (particularly level of education, skills and training) played an important 
role in determining the individual worker’s pay, at least in Malaysia. However, it is 
interesting to explore what factors would drive pay determinants from the Malaysian 
employer’s perspective. Furthermore, in the empirical review in Chapter 2, it was 
suggested that employers’ characteristics (such as firm size, profit, and firm 
performance) are crucial in determining the pay rates. In addition, studies on pay 
determinants at the firm-level in Malaysia remain somewhat limited.   
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the impact of employers’ characteristics on 
determinants of the average firm-level pay rates using the Malaysian WLD. Moreover, 
the theory of imperfect competition in the labour market has also highlighted the 
importance of employers’ characteristics in influencing firm-level pay rates. Apart 
from Athukorala and Devadason (2011), the role played by employer characteristics 
in this regard is relatively unexplored. In addition, most empirical studies on pay 
formation in Malaysia that have been reviewed do not account explicitly for the market 
structure; and if it does, it only uses a perfectly competitive structure. Therefore, this 
chapter will also provide some evidence on pay determinants in the Malaysian 
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economy at the firm-level with a more detailed analysis that explicitly allows for an 
imperfectly competitive structure, i.e. monopsony.   
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the theoretical framework 
of the study. Section 6.3 sets out the empirical methods used and provides some 
descriptive data on the Malaysian FLD that will be used in this chapter. Section 6.4 
presents the empirical results, and Section 6.5 concludes with the findings of the 
chapter.   
 
6.2 Theoretical framework 
 
In the case of Malaysia, most previous studies have not examined the wage elasticity 
of labour confronting a firm. Manning (2003a), in his book entitled Monopsony in 
Motion, had raised the question: “what happens if an employer cuts the wage paid to 
his workers by one cent?” In a perfectly competitive labour market, assuming that the 
labour supply curve facing the firm is infinitely elastic, this would result in all workers 
immediately leaving the firm. In contrast, Manning argued that the labour market 
under imperfect competition behaves differently than when under perfect competition 
because of two assumptions. Firstly, there are important frictions in the labour market, 
such that employers have market power over their workers. Secondly, employers set 
wages as a way of exercising this market power. In an imperfect competition, the 
supply labour curve facing the firm is not infinitely elastic. In this chapter, the Manning 
monopsony model will be adopted as a vehicle for estimating the wage equation for 
Malaysia using the firm-level dataset. The monopsony model has never been 
employed in the Malaysian context, and this study will attempt to fill that gap.  
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6.2.1 Static model of monopsony    
 
In our study, the static model of monopsony follows that by Manning (2003, Chapter 
2). Suppose that in the labour market there is only one single firm that pays a wage w 
to all workers. Let N(w) denotes the labour supply curve to the firm and w (N) its 
inverse. Given a level of employment N, the total labour costs are w (N)N, and revenue 
function is Y(N) where the price of output is normalised to 1. The firm maximizes 
profits optimally choosing the level of employment (N) 
 
N)N(w)N(Y         6.1 
        
This leads to the first order condition for profit maximization that equates marginal 
revenue with marginal cost, such that 
 
N)N('w)N(w)N('Y        6.2 
  
The left-hand side of equation 6.2 is the marginal revenue product of labour (MRPL). 
Given the usual assumption that the MRPL is declining in employment (N), this 
implies that the employer with monopsony power will hire less labour and pay lower 
wages than an otherwise equivalent employer in a competitive labour market. 
 
The right-hand side is the marginal cost of labour (MCL). The MCL has two parts. 
First, the wage, w, that must be paid to the newly hired worker. Second, the increase 

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in wages, w’, that must be paid to all existing workers. Equilibrium is on the labour 
supply curve with the wage paid to workers being less than their MRPL.  
 
Although the firm is making positive profit on the marginal worker, there is no 
incentive to increase employment because doing so would require increasing the wage 
(to extract the extra worker), and this higher wage must be paid not just to the new 
worker but also to all the existing workers. One particular useful way of representing 
the choice of the firm is to consider the marginal cost of labour as a mark-up on the 
wage. The mark-up being given by the elasticity of the labour curve facing the firm is 
)w(N/)w('wNNw  , and let   be the inverse of this elasticity. Then, equation 6.2 
can be written as 
 
  



Nww
w'Y 1
       6.3 
 
where the proportional gap between the wage and MRPL is a function of the elasticity 
of labour supply curve facing the firm, which is referred to the rate of exploitation 
(Pigou, 1924; Hicks, 1932). A benchmark case is given by a perfectly competitive 
labour market where Nw  and 0  in equation 6.3 indicating that wage will be 
equal to the MRPL. The working hypothesis is that the labour supply elasticity is 
positive but low and quite far from the competitive benchmark. The whole analysis 
can be summarised in Figure 6.1. Based on this figure, the graph shows that 
employment is determined where the marginal product is equal to the marginal cost of 
labour, with a lower equilibrium wage and lower employment than the competitive 
outcome. 
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Figure 6.1: The static model of monopsony 
 
    Source: Manning (2003) 
 
6.2.2 The correlations between employer characteristics and pay rates 
 
Let us consider that all employers face the same supply curve of labour, N(w), but 
differ in their revenue function, Y (N, A), where the difference in A is the source of 
employer heterogeneity. Assume that 0


A
Y
, so an increase in A is a positive shock 
for the employer. For instance, we know that firms differ in terms of the technologies 
they use. Therefore, in this case, A can be an advancement in technology such as the 
effects of robotic technologies that cause shifts in the MRPL.  
 
Obviously, each employer will want to choose the level of employment (or, 
equivalently, the pay) to maximize profit: 
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 N)N(w)A,N(Y        6.4 
 
Leading to the first-order condition 
 
 )N()N(wN
N
)N(w
)N(w
N
)A,N(Y






1     6.5 
 
where w(N) is the inverse of the labour supply curve to the firm, and )N( is the 
inverse of the wage elasticity of the labour supply curve facing the firm. An increase 
in A raises both the average and marginal revenue product of labour, so that an increase 
in A raises the left-hand side of equation 6.5 and the optimal wage rises. There is then 
a positive correlation between the level of profit and that of pay. This statement can 
also be explained by Figure 6.2.  
  
Figure 6.2 : Relationship between employer heterogeneity and worker’s pay 
 
 
                                  Source: Manning (2003) 
 
182 
  
 
 
Based on Figure 6.2, an increase in the marginal revenue product of labour (MRPL) 
curve from P0 to P1 will also increase the optimal wage paid by w0 to w1. Profitable 
firms have a high demand for labour and can only get extra labour by paying higher 
wages. Meanwhile, in examining the correlation between profit per worker and pay 
rates, we are interested in knowing how variations in A affect w
N
Y
N


. If we denote 
the elasticity of the revenue function with respect to N by )A,N( , then we have  
 











 1
11
)A,N(
)N(
ww
N
Y
)A,N(
w
N
Y
N 



    6.6 
 
Based on equation 6.6, if both the revenue function and labour supply function are iso-
elastic, then the model predicts a positive correlation between profits per worker and 
wages. It is possible to overturn this if the labour supply function is not iso-elastic: in 
particular, if  is declining in N as then the right-hand side of equation 6.6 could 
conceivably by declining in the wage.  
 
In general, this section has shown how monopsony can explain the correlations 
between employer characteristics and wages. More specifically, this section attempts 
to explain the positive link between employer size and wages utilizing the static 
monopsony model. Assuming that firm i has a revenue function, this is given by  




 1
1
1
iii NAY         6.7
        
where iA  is a shock to the MRPL curve. We further assume that on the supply-side of 
the labour market, the wage that the firm pays is given by  
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
iii NBw           6.8 
where iB  is a shock to the supply curve. In this case, these supply shocks represent 
differences in local market conditions (due to regional differences or skill differences) 
or differences in the attractiveness of non-wage attributes among firms. We are 
interested in determining a consistent estimate of  , namely, the inverse elasticity of 
the labour supply curve facing the firm. 
 
The firm will choose a level of employment, N, where the MRPL equals the MCL, so 
that the chosen level of employment, N, will satisfy 
    iiii NBNA 
 1         6.9 
or, in log-linear form 
    



 1ln
1
log iii baN                   6.10 
where  Aa log and  Bb log . The chosen wage will be given by 
    



 1ln
1
log iii baw                   6.11 
If iA  are positive shocks to MRPL, then employment and wages will increase, even if 
there is only a minor effect on wages to the extent that employers do have some labour 
market power  0 . Meanwhile, if iB are positive shocks to the labour supply curve, 
then employment will decrease while wages will increase. 
  
Now, let’s make the following assumptions about the observability of the shocks  ba,
: 
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biibi
aiiai
vxb
vxa




                    6.12 
where x  is a set of explanatory variables. For the sake of notational simplicity, we 
assume that the same variables affect both a and b. Of course, a particular variable can 
be constrained to affect only the demand or supply shocks by imposing a restriction 
whereby its coefficient in the other equation is zero. Assume that shocks v are 
independent of x and jointly distributed with the mean zero and covariance matrix 
. Denote by 
2
a the variance of 
2, bav  the variance of bv and ab the covariance between 
av and bv . 
 
Now consider how one might set about estimating  . First, one might think about 
estimating the relationship between the log wage and log employment by OLS, 
controlling for other factors (x) thought to be relevant. A regression of log  iw  on 
 ii xN ,log  estimates  iwE log    ii xN ,log . The following proposition tells us what 
we may expect to find. 
 
Running a regression of log  iw  on  ii xN ,log  estimates  
 iwE log    ii xN ,log     iNlog   
                                           ibab x  1ln                                           6.13 
where 
abba
bab



222
2


                     6.14 
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Equation 6.13 says that this approach will only give an unbiased estimate of   if 0
, which implies that av  can be written as bv plus some uncorrelated noise. A special 
case for this is when there are no unobserved supply shocks. In this case, all firms have 
the same labour supply curve (conditional on x), while variation on N caused by 
unobserved demand shocks will trace out the labour supply curve. If av  and bv are 
uncorrelated, the estimates of   have a downward bias as in equation 6.14, implying 
that 0 . Intuitively, unobserved shifts in the labour supply curve cause wages and 
employment to move in opposite directions, making the slope of the supply curve less 
positive than it really is.  
 
Equation 6.13 can also be used to understand the argument that the estimated 
employer-size wage effect overstates the true value of   (which must be the case if 
one believes that labour markets are competitive and 0 ). One would expect high-
quality workers to have a high level of a (as their productivity is high) and a high level 
of b, as b will partly reflect the wages paid by other firms. So, one would expect the 
unobserved labour quality to result in 
2
bab    or, equivalently, that the expectation 
of (a – b) be increasing in b. If, for example, proportional differences in a are reflected 
in proportional differences in b, then this is exactly the situation in which we can obtain 
an unbiased estimate of  .    
 
6.3 Empirical methods 
 
In order to examine the role played by employer characteristics in determining the 
average firm-level pay rates in Malaysia, we adapted the static monopsony model by 
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Manning (2003), which has been discussed earlier. In this respect, we include 
employer characteristics as explanatory variables in our pay models. The model 
specifications and variables used in the analysis are discussed herewith. 
 
6.3.1 Model specifications 
 
6.3.1.1 Employer size 
There is strong evidence in the empirical literature in favour of a significant and 
positive relationship between wages and employer size – what is commonly known as 
the employer size-wage effect51. Accordingly, first, we regress the log of average 
monthly pay per worker on two dummies for employer size categories without controls 
as follows:  
iiii elmediumlavpay 1210 arg      6.15               
     
  
where 
 ilavpay  : log average monthly pay per worker. 
 imedium  : medium-size firms (50 to 150 employees). 
 iel arg  : large-size firms (more than 150 employees). 
 i1   : error term. 
 And the i subscript represents an individual firm. Employees in large firms earn more 
because they are more productive (Idson & Oi, 1999). We use the reliable proxy for 
employer size in the Malaysian FLD, which is the total number of employees in the 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
51 For example, Brown and Medoff (1989); Brown et al. (1990); Oi and Idson (1999). 
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firm. We construct employer size dummies, namely largei firms with more than 150 
workers, mediumi  firms with a total number of workers between 50 and 150, and small 
firms with less than 50 workers (as reference). We expect that if the market is perfectly 
competitive, we should find 021  and . But usually, one finds that 021  and  is 
rejected in favour of 021  and . 
 
6.3.1.2 Firms’ human capital  
The above model does not control for human capital variables. Thus, in the next step 
we include a set of the firms’ human capital variables (i.e. share of skilled workers, 
share of female workers, share of higher education workers, and share of foreign 
workers) to control for differences in worker quality among firms, as follows: 
 
 
ii
iiiiii
sfor
sunivsfemssklelmediumlavpay
26
543210 arg




           6.16                
  
where, 
 isskl  : share of skilled workers (%). 
 isfem  : share of female workers (%). 
 isuniv  : share of higher education workers (%). 
 isfor  : share of foreign workers (%). 
 i2  : error term. 
And the rest of the variables and parameter symbols are defined as in equation 6.7. 
However, Brown and Medoff (1989), Troske (1997), Mazumdar (1983) and Valenchik 
(1997) have argued that there is strong evidence that 021  and , even when 
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differences in human capital are taken into account in both developed and developing 
countries.  
 
We incorporated the composition skills of labour within each firm, which are 
represented by the share of skilled labour (sskli). Skilled labour is the sum of permanent 
management52, professionals53, skilled production workers54, and non-production 
workers55. The share of skilled labour is the percentage of skilled labour in terms of 
total employment56. In addition, we also include the composition of worker 
qualification variables, which is represented by the share of labour with some 
university or higher level of education (sunivi). We believe that these two variables are 
important based on the idea that both average educational level and skills in the firm 
are likely to be positively correlated with wages (Lucas, 1988). 
 
We also control for the gender composition of the workforce within each firm in terms 
of the share of female workers (sfemi) in the firm, since this has been shown to have a 
negative effect on worker’s pay (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). This variable is defined 
as the percentage of total permanent female workers in terms of total employment. 
Moreover, the share of foreign workers (sfor) within each firm is included as suggested 
by Athukorala (2011), since foreign labourers have a statistically significant negative 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
52 Management refers to persons making management decisions, and exclude supervisors. 
53 Professionals refer to trained and certified specialists outside management such as engineers, 
accountants, lawyers, chemists, scientists, and software programmers. Generally, professionals hold a 
university-level degree. 
54 Skilled production workers are technicians involved directly in the production process or at a 
supervisory level and whom management considers to be skilled. 
55 Non-production workers refer to support, administrative, sales workers not included in management 
or among professionals. 
56 Total employment is the total number of permanent workers, not including temporary workers. 
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impact on wages in Malaysian manufacturing. Accordingly, we expect 53  and to 
have a positive sign, while 64  and  should have a negative sign. 
 
6.3.1.3 Firm’s performance  
Studies on pay that utilized data with workplace characteristics have been able to 
explain 60 to 80 percent of the pay variations (Abowd and Killingsworth, 
1983).Workplace characteristics, which can be expected to influence average worker’s 
pay, include firm’s performance, ownership, legal-status, market-orientation, firm age, 
types of work shift, union density, technological innovation, type of activity, and firm 
location. Accordingly, we add those employer characteristics variables to explain the 
average firm-level pay determinants, as follows: 
 
iiiiii
iiiii
iiiiii
iiiiii
tshfdshfexptechfage
cooppbcnpblcprlcptn
unifownlpftlclrlvalsfor
sunivsfemssklearglmediumlavpay
32120191817
1615141312
11109876
543210








 
     6.17
 
 
where,  
 
ilval
 : productivity (log of value added per worker) 
 
ilclr
 : capital stock (log of capital labour ratio) 
 
ilpft
 : profitability (log of profit per worker) 
 
ifown
 : dummy of foreign ownership 
 
iuni
 : dummy of union density 
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iptn
 : dummy of partnership legal status 
 
iprlc
 : dummy of private limited company legal status 
 
ipblc
 : dummy of public limited company legal status 
 
ipbcn
 : dummy of public corporation legal status 
 
icoop
 : dummy of cooperative legal status 
 
ifage
 : firm’s age 
 
itech
 : technological innovation 
 
iexp
 : dummy of export orientation 
 
idshf
 : dummy of double shifts 
 
itshf
 : dummy of triple shifts 
 i3  : error term 
and the rest of the variables and parameter symbols are defined as in equation 6.8.  
 
Firm performance is based on two variables: firstly, firm productivity (i.e. lval) 
measured by the ratio of value-added to total employment. Value-added is defined as 
output (i.e. total sales) minus the intermediate cost57. Secondly, firm profitability (i.e. 
lpft), which is represented by profit per worker measure as the ratio of operating 
revenue to total employment. This measure avoids managerial and accounting 
discretion and best captures the employer’s ability to pay. We expect 7 and 9 to have 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
57 Intermediate costs are defined as the sum of direct material cost, electricity expenditures and fuel, 
and other energy expenditures.  
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a positive sign. This is because firms with greater productivity and greater ability to 
pay are able to pay higher wages. 
 
6.3.1.4 Firm’s input 
In addition, we also include a firm input variable, namely log of capital labour ratio 
(lclri)
58, to capture how the average worker’s pay is affected by the capital stock. 
Capital labour ratio is calculated as the net book value of machinery and equipment 
divided by total employment. We expect 8 to have a positive sign.  
 
6.3.1.5 Firm’s ownership and legal status 
 
On average, foreign firms in all countries appear to pay higher wages than domestic 
firms (Lipsey & Sjoholm, 2001). To account for this, the dummy variable, fowni, is 
introduced where the value of one indicates that less or more than 30 percent of the 
firm is foreign-owned, with domestically owned as reference group. A firm’s legal-
status is represented by five categories: partnership59 (ptni), private limited company
60 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
58 More exactly, the logarithm of total employment and capital of the firm proves to be more adequate 
than their identity (i.e. level).  
59 A partnership refers to a group of individuals who agree to contract and carry on a business with the 
objective of making a profit. Generally, a business partnership must comprise at least 2 members and 
should not exceed 20 members. 
60 A private limited company refers to a private corporation established to undertake a business with the 
objective of making profit, with a minimum of two and maximum of 50 members. The shareholders 
control business operations and are restricted to transferring their shares. 
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(prlci), public limited company
61 (pblci), public corporation
62 (pbcni), and co-
operative63 (coopi), with individual proprietorship
64 as reference group.  
 
 
6.3.1.6 Type of work shifts  
The type of work shift is measured by two categories of dummies, i.e. double shift 
(dshfi) and triple shift (tshfi), with single shift as reference group. We expect 20  and 
21  to have a positive sign.  
 
6.3.1.7 Export orientation 
Market orientation variable refers to exporter (expi), i.e. the firm which exports more 
than 10 percent of its sales, with non-exporter as reference group. We expect 19  to 
have a positive sign.  
 
6.3.1.8 Union density 
The firm’s union density is represented by union dummy (unii), i.e. a firm in which 
more than 10 percent of its workers are union members, with others as reference. We 
expect
11 to have a positive sign.  
 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
61 A public limited company refers to a private corporation established with limited liability by a 
minimum of 2 members to operate a business with the objective of making a profit. The shares are 
openly held, and in the case of a company listed on the stock exchange, the shares are freely transferable.  
62 A public corporation refers to an undertaking set up under a Special Act of Parliament or by the State 
Legislature.  
63 A co-operative refers to a voluntary association with unrestricted members and registered under the 
Co-operative Act 1993. Funds are collectively owned to meet the needs of members. 
64 An individual proprietorship refers to a business, operated and owned by one person for his own 
profit. 
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6.3.1.9 Firm’s age 
Firm’s age (fagei) refers to the number of years a firm has been operating. We expect 
17  to have a positive sign.  
 
6.3.1.10 Technological innovation 
Technological innovation (tech) is measured by the percentage of firm machinery that 
is less than 5 years old. We expect 18  to have a positive sign. 
  
6.3.1.11 Regional and industrial variation 
Finally, equation 6.9 can be further improved by including five regional dummies 
(namely North, South, East Coast, Sabah, and Sarawak)65 and nine industrial dummies 
based on four digit ISIC for manufacturing firms (i.e. garments, chemicals, rubber and 
plastics, machinery and equipment, electric appliances, electronics, automobile parts, 
wood and furniture, and food processing)66 to control for firms’ geographical and 
sectoral location, as follows: 
 
6.18 
 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
65 The Central region as reference group. 
66 The food processing industry as reference group.   
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where, 
 
inrt
 : dummy of north region. 
 isth  : dummy of south region.  
 
ieast
 : dummy of east coast. 
 
isbh
 : dummy of Sabah. 
 
iswk
 : dummy of Sarawak. 
 igrm  : dummy of garments industry.  
 
ichm
 : dummy of chemicals industry. 
 
irp
 : dummy of rubber and plastics industry. 
ime  : dummy of machinery and equipment industry.  
 
iea
 : dummy of electric appliances industry. 
 
ielec
 : dummy of electronics industry. 
iauto  : dummy of automobile parts industry.  
 
iwf
 : dummy of wood and furniture industry. 
 
itxl
 : dummy of textile industry. 
 i4  : error term. 
And the rest of the variables and parameter symbols are defined as in equation 6.9.  
 
In fact, there are studies that argued for the workers’ pay being influenced by the 
location of the firm. For example, Schafgans (2000) pointed out that employees in 
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urban areas in Malaysia earned higher pay than those who work in rural areas. 
Meanwhile, Fally et al. (2010), Hering & Poncet (2010), and Ma (2006) claimed that 
there exists a positive and strong correlation between supplier access and market 
access on the one hand and workers’ pay on the other, as was the case in Brazil and 
China. In the case of Malaysia, firms that are located in urban areas, particularly in the 
Central region, possess good supplier access and market access compared to other 
regions such as north, south, east coast, Sabah and Sarawak. We expect all five region 
dummies to have negative signs because we believe that the average firm-level pay 
rates in those regions are less than that of the Central region (i.e. Klang Valley)67. Pay 
differences exist across industries owing to unmeasured differences in the productive 
endowments of employees (Gibbons & Katz, 1992). Therefore, we expect the industry 
dummies to have positive or negative signs.  
 
6.3.2 The estimation strategy 
 
All regression models are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors to address 
heteroscedasticity. Before running the regression, I first checked for the correlation 
between independent variables through VIF (Variance Inflation Factor), and found no 
signs of high multicollinearity. VIF values for most of the variables are around 1 and 
2, and the tolerance (1/VIF) value is higher than 0.2 for all the independent variables68. 
As a rule of thumb, if the VIF value is greater than 10 or tolerance is lower than 0.1, 
then multicollinearity is a problem.  
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
67 Klang Valley is Malaysia’s most developed region. Moreover, the cost of living in Klang Valley is 
higher than other regions stated above. 
68 Refer to Table 6.4 in the appendix to this chapter.  
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Estimating the equations using Malaysia’s WLD, which was obtained from Malaysia’s 
PICS 2007 by OLS, requires that the hierarchical character of the data I am dealing 
with is neglected (where workers are grouped into larger units, i.e. workplaces). As 
pointed out by Wooden and Bora (1999), individuals from the same workplace have 
to some extent similar characteristics when compared with those from other 
workplaces. Given the fact that not all these characteristics can be measured 
empirically, it follows that the disturbances might be correlated. In this case, the 
assumption of independence is violated.  
 
For the estimation, we initially run OLS regression of the log average monthly pay per 
worker on two dummies associated with each firm size categories69, and then add other 
employer characteristics variables to see how they affect the magnitude and 
significance of the coefficient on employer size. We estimate the determinants of 
average firm-level pay rates using four specifications of the Malaysian pay model that 
were discussed in Section 6.3.1.  
 
In the next step, we regress the log average monthly pay per worker on the continuous 
employer size variable (i.e. log of employment) in order to obtain a summary measure 
of the effect of employer size on average firm-level pay rates, that is, the employer 
size-pay elasticity. In this respect, we only replace dummies of employer size with log 
of employment, while other specifications remain unchanged.  
 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
69 Note that the categorization of employer size in the Malaysian FLD distinguishes firms with less than 
50 employees as small, firms with over 150 employees as large, while medium-size is firms with 
employees between 50 and 149, which will be the omitted category in the regressions.  
197 
  
 
 
6.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
6.3.3.1 Dependent variable 
The summary descriptive statistics indicate that the average (mean) monthly pay per 
worker is RM 1,841.94, while the median (50th percentile) average monthly pay per 
worker is RM 1,502.56. This means that half of the workers earn less than RM 
1,502.56 per month and half earn more. The mean monthly pay per worker is 
significantly higher than the median monthly pay per worker, and most workers earn 
less than the average. This is a characteristic of right skewed distributions. 
 
 The interquartile range (75th percentile – 25th percentile) is RM 2,339.27 – RM 
1,072.08 = RM 1,267.19. Variability in pay is high: although the median pay is RM 
1,502.56, the central half of the sample earns between RM 1,072.08 and RM 2,339.27. 
The interquartile range: the lowest quarter of the sample earns less than RM 1,072.08 
while the top quarter earns more than RM 2,339.27. By all accounts, the average 
monthly pay per worker varies considerably. Using the logarithm of average monthly 
pay per worker produces a more symmetric, bell-shaped distribution, with the mean 
(7.35) and median (7.31) closer together, as shown in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.3: Histogram of the log of average monthly pay 
 
 
6.3.3.2 Explanatory variables 
In this chapter, we utilise the Malaysian FLD in order to examine how the average 
monthly workers’ pay is affected by employer characteristics. Table 6.1 depicts the 
value of mean key variables in the Malaysian FLD by firm size. In general, the average 
monthly pay per worker in the manufacturing sector is well over RM 1,800.00. When 
we break up the firms’ size into small, medium and large firms, we find that large firms 
received the highest average of monthly pay per worker of RM 2,059.16. At the same 
time, small and medium firms occupied the second and third place, with an average 
monthly pay per worker of RM 1,795.56 and RM 1,691.71, respectively.  
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Table 6-1 : Mean and standard deviations by firm size (Malaysian FLD) 
  All  Small (281firms) Medium (227 firms) Large (217 firms) 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
avmpay 1841.94 1164.60 1795.56 1220.59 1691.71 977.01 2059.16 1241.83 
lavmpay 7.35 0.58 7.31 0.60 7.28 0.55 7.48 0.55 
small 0.39 0.49        
large 0.30 0.46        
sskl 49.28 28.15 53.47 28.01 46.47 27.11 46.78 28.86 
sfem 33.04 25.09 31.76 25.15 31.58 24.02 36.22 25.91 
suniv 16.38 16.42 13.97 17.28 15.45 13.41 20.48 17.41 
sfor 23.95 25.25 17.86 23.30 28.35 25.12 27.25 26.33 
lval 11.10 1.12 11.01 1.17 11.08 1.00 11.22 1.16 
lclr 9.70 1.89 9.46 2.16 9.99 1.52 9.71 1.84 
lpft 11.90 1.12 11.71 1.14 11.95 1.04 12.10 1.12 
fown 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.25 
uni 0.29 0.45 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.52 0.50 
ptn 0.07 0.26 0.12 0.33 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.19 
prlc 0.86 0.35 0.79 0.41 0.92 0.27 0.87 0.34 
pblc 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.25 
pbcn 0.00 0.06 0.01  0.10 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.10 
coop 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.00  0.06 0.00 0.07 
fage 18.18 9.75 18.16 10.43 18.12 9.40 18.29 9.24 
tech 23.49 26.08 21.55 27.02 24.98 26.89 24.45 23.85 
exp 0.54 0.50 0.31 0.46 0.57 0.50 0.79 0.41 
dshf 0.28 0.45 0.19 0.39 0.33 0.47 0.35 0.48 
tshf 0.21 0.41 0.07 0.25 0.22 0.42 0.39 0.49 
nrt 0.23 0.42 0.18 0.39 0.25 0.43 0.27 0.44 
sth 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.32 0.47 
east 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 
Sbh 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.23 0.04 0.18 0.02 0.15 
Swk 0.05 0.22 0.10 0.30 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.12 
Grm 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.18 0.04 0.19 
Chm 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.25 
Rp 0.08 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.29 
Me 0.24 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.28 0.45 0.22 0.41 
Ea 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.33 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 
Elec 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.23 
Auto 0.08 0.27 0.02 0.13 0.06 0.23 0.18 0.38 
Wf 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.18 0.05 0.22 
Txl 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.34 0.08 0.28 
Source: Calculated by the author using Malaysian FLD obtained from Malaysia’s PICS-2. 
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In addition, Table 6.1 indicates that 49 percent of workers in manufacturing are skilled 
workers comprising management, professionals, skilled production workers, and non-
production workers. Specifically, the majority of skilled workers work in small firms 
(about 53 percent), while around 46 percent work in medium and large firms. In 
contrast, most higher educated workers work in large firms (20 percent), followed by 
medium firms (15 percent), and then small firms (13 percent). Meanwhile, the share 
of female workers is higher in large firms at around 36 percent. This is followed by 
small and medium firms at around 32 percent each. On average, some 24 percent of 
foreign workers work in manufacturing firms in Malaysia. Most foreign workers work 
in medium and large firms. In each medium-size firm, 28 percent are foreign workers, 
while in each large firm about 27 percent are foreign workers. With respect to firms’ 
age, the majority of firms in our sample have been doing business for around 18 years. 
 
 
6.4  Empirical results 
 
6.4.1 The effects of employer characteristics on the average pay rates 
 
This section presents the results of a cross-sectional OLS estimation of the average 
firm-level pay rates determination in the Malaysian manufacturing sector. The unit of 
analysis is a firm. Table 6.2 presents the OLS estimates on determinants of average 
firm-level pay rates based on two employer-size dummies, i.e. medium and large, with 
small firm acting as reference category, as presented in equations 6.7 – 6.10. Model 1 
includes only employer size dummies; while in model 2 (apart from employer-size 
dummies), we also include the firm’s human capital variables. In model 3, we add 
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other employer characteristics, while regional and industrial variations are included in 
model 4. The aim of this analysis is to examine the effect of employer characteristics 
on the average monthly pay per worker.   
 
First, we note that employer size wage premium is positively significant, which is in 
line with the finding in previous studies that pay tends to increase with employer size 
(Idson and Oi, 1999; Soderbom et al., 2005). Based on model 1 in Table 6.2, the 
coefficient associated with the dummy for medium and large firms gives an average 
firm-level pay rates differential of 0.037 and 0.194, respectively. In terms of 
percentage, the pay premiums in medium and large firms are 3.8 percent and 21.4 
percent respectively70 over small firms.  
 
Model 2 of Table 6.2 reports estimation results of the pay model, where the human 
capital variables are included as explanatory to control for differences in workers’ 
quality. The inclusion of the firm’s human capital has led to the coefficient of dummy 
for medium and large firms being reduced slightly compared to model 1. This shows 
that part of the employer size pay gap can be explained by the firm’s human capital 
(namely, percentage of skilled workers, percentage of female workers, percentage of 
higher education workers, and percentage of foreign workers) differences across firm. 
The average monthly pay per worker for medium and large firms is 2.6 percent and 
16.5 percent more than that for small firms, respectively.  
 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
70 This percentage corresponds to the anti-log of the regression coefficient minus one. 
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In addition, we found that all the firm’s human capital variables played a significant 
role in determining the average firm-level pay rates. The coefficients of sskli, sfemi, 
sunivi, and sfori are statistically and highly significant with the expected signs (refer to 
model 2 in Table 6.2). Shares of both skilled and higher education workers positively 
affect the average workers’ pay. When sskli and sunivi increase by 1 percent, the 
average workers’ pay increases by 0.42 percent and 0.9 percent, respectively. In 
contrast, shares of both female and foreign workers in the firm negatively affect the 
average workers’ pay. When sfemi and sfori increase by 1 percent, the average monthly 
pay per worker will decrease by 0.25 percent and 0.4 percent, respectively. 
 
Meanwhile, the third model in Table 6.2 reports estimation results for the average pay 
per worker which combine both human capital variables with workplace 
characteristics. Introducing the effects of firm performance, firm input, ownership, 
type of work shifts, export orientation, union density, firm’s age, and technological 
innovation (in model 3) does not change the employer size gap for medium firms, 
whereas the gap is substantially reduced for large firms (0.12). In other words, the 
average pay premium in large firms decreases to 12.4 percent (in model 3) from 16.5 
percent (in model 2). This implies that some of the employer size pay gap can be 
explained by the firm’s characteristics, as included in model 3.  
 
Apart from employer size, employer characteristics such as firm’s productivity, firm’s 
performance, firm’s input, and foreign ownership all played an important role in 
determining the average monthly pay per worker. Based on model 3 in Table 6.2, the 
coefficients of lvali, lpfti, lclri, and fowni are statistically and highly significant with a 
203 
  
 
 
positive sign. This indicates that firms with higher productivity, higher ability to pay, 
and high capital intensity tend to pay higher wages.  
 
The estimated coefficients for lvali, lpfti and lclri are 0.07, 0.13 and 0.02, respectively. 
This means that an increase by 1 percent in productivity, profitability, and capital 
labour ratio will lead to increases of 7 percent, 13 percent, and 2 percent in the average 
worker’s pay rates, respectively. Likewise, as suggested by Lipsey and Sjoholm 
(2001), foreign-owned firms do pay higher wages than domestically owned ones. 
Foreign-owned firms offer a pay premium of 0.096 log points or around 10 percent 
over domestic firms. Meanwhile, results in model 3 also found that variables such as 
trade union, legal status, firm’s age, technological innovation, exporter, and types of 
work shift are insignificant. 
 
In order to control for firms’ geographical and sectoral location, the regional and 
industrial dummies are taken into account in model 4 of Table 6.2. In both cases, the 
central region and food processing industry serve as reference categories. The 
inclusion of regional and industrial variation reduces the employer-size pay premium 
for medium and large firms. In addition, the effects of the firm’s human capital 
variables as well as other employer characteristics are somewhat consistent with 
results from model 3, even though regional and industrial effects are included in the 
model.  
 
Based on model 4 of Table 6.2, we also pointed out that the firm’s location is important 
in determining the average firm-level pay rates in Malaysia, since all regional dummies 
are statistically significant with an anticipated negative sign. These results seem to 
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suggest that the average monthly pay per worker in the central region is greater than 
in other regions. Those results also indicate that the second highest average firm-level 
pay rates goes to the south region, and the third highest to the north region. This is 
followed by Sabah, Sarawak, and the east coast. In terms of industry, the results show 
that only rubber & plastic, machinery & equipment and auto parts industries remain 
positive and statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level. This implies that 
workers in those industries enjoy higher pay compared to those in the food processing 
industry. The results also indicate that among the three industries, firms in machinery 
& equipment industry have the highest average pay rates. This is followed by auto 
parts and rubber & plastics industries. 
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Table 6-2: Determinants of average firm-level pay rates by the OLS with robust SE 
Explanatory 
Variables 
  
Dependent variable: log of average monthly pay per worker (RM) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
medium 0.037*** 0.025** 0.024** 0.022** 
large 0.194*** 0.153** 0.117** 0.100** 
sskl 
 
0.004*** 0.003*** .00254*** 
sfem   -0.003** -0.002** -0.001** 
suniv   0.009*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
sfor   -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
lval     0.073** 0.060** 
lclr     0.021** 0.020** 
lpft     0.131*** 0.140*** 
fown     0.096* 0.090* 
uni     0.060 0.030 
ptn     0.150 0.120 
prlc     0.041 0.022 
pblc     0.170 0.130 
pbcn     -0.260 -0.31 
coop     -0.574*** -0.515** 
fage     0.001 0.001 
tech     0.000 0.001 
exp     0.020 0.001 
dshf     0.001 -0.01 
tshf     0.001 0.01 
nrt     
 
-0.170** 
sth     
 
-0.051** 
east     
 
-0.320** 
sbh     
 
-0.260** 
swk     
 
-0.302** 
grm     
 
0.030 
chm     
 
0.101 
rp     
 
0.136** 
me     
 
0.243** 
ea     
 
0.201 
elect     
 
0.062 
auto     
 
0.182** 
wf     
 
0.120 
txl     
 
0.080 
_cons 7.28*** 7.15*** 4.51*** 4.59*** 
Observations 725 725 725 725 
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.226 0.375 0.396 
R-squared 0.021 0.232 0.393 0.425 
Notes: Small, sole proprietorships status, single shifts, central region, and food & processing industry 
are the reference categories. Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level is indicated by 
***, ** and * respectively. 
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6.4.2 The elasticity of the average pay rates with respect to employer size 
 
Table 6.3 gives the results of estimation of average monthly pay per worker on the 
employer size pay elasticity by taking employer size as a continuous variable, i.e. log 
of employment (lempi). In fact, this variable replaces the dummy of employer size, as 
indicated in equations 6.7- 6.10. Meanwhile, the specifications of models 1-4 are the 
same as in Table 6.2. This analysis will enable us to examine the magnitude of the 
employer size pay effect on the worker’s pay by estimating the elasticity of labour 
supply curve facing the firm, which has been discussed in the theoretical framework 
in Section 6.2. 
 
Based on model 1 in Table 6.3, and in the absence of any control variables, the 
coefficient on employer size (which is proxy by log of employment) is positive and 
highly significant. This indicates that the elasticity of average firm-level pay rates with 
respect to employer size is approximately 5 percent. When the firm’s human capital 
variables are included in model 2, the size of the coefficients associated with employer 
size increases slightly to 0.045. The results also show that the firm’s human capital 
variables are statistically and highly significant with expected signs. Moreover, the 
magnitude of their coefficients for each variable is somewhat consistent with the 
results in model 2 of Table 6.2.    
 
Consequently, the inclusion in model 3 of other employer characteristics variables (i.e. 
firm’s performance, firm’s input, ownership, type of work shifts, export orientation, 
union density, firm’s age, and technological innovation) substantially reduces the 
effect of employer size, leaving an estimated pay differential of 2 percent. Meanwhile, 
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with the inclusion of regional and industrial variables in model 4, the results show that 
the employer size effects on average worker’s pay remain unchanged. In addition, the 
results also show that the effects of employer characteristics on the average worker’s 
pay are somewhat consistent with results in models 3 and 4 in Table 6.2.    
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Table 6-3: The elasticity of average firm-level pay rates with respect to employer size 
estimated by the OLS with robust standard errors 
Explanatory  
variables 
Dependent variable: log of average monthly pay per worker (RM) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 
lemp 0.047** 0.045*** 0.023** 0.020** 
sskl   0.004*** 0.003*** .00254*** 
sfem   -0.003** -0.001** -0.0009 
suniv   0.009*** 0.005*** .00482*** 
sfor   -0.004*** -0.003*** -.00286*** 
lval     0.075** .0614* 
lclr     0.019 0.0185 
lpft     0.130*** 0.139*** 
fown     -0.088 -0.088 
uni     0.071 0.035 
ptn     0.150 0.111 
prlc     0.028 0.012 
pblc     0.171 0.126 
pbcn     -0.252 -0.309 
coop     -0.564*** -.0507** 
fage     0.001 0.002 
tech     -0.001 -0.001 
exp     0.023 -0.005 
dshf     -0.004 -0.010 
tshf     0.002 0.010 
nrt       -0.102** 
sth       -0.040** 
east       -0.105** 
sbh       -0.153** 
swk       -0.113* 
grm       0.037 
chm       0.103 
rp       0.140* 
me       0.201 
ea       0.249*** 
elect       -0.059 
auto       0.188* 
wf       0.125 
txl       -0.080 
_cons 7.15*** 6.93*** 4.48*** 4.56*** 
Observations 725 725 725 725 
Adjusted R2 0.00946 0.223 0.372 0.394 
R-squared 0.0108 0.229 0.389 0.422 
Notes: Sole proprietorships status, single shifts, central region, and food & processing industry are the 
reference categories. Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level is indicated by ***, 
** and * respectively. 
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6.5  Conclusions 
 
This chapter tried to explore the factors that determine the average pay rates in the 
Malaysian economy from the employer’s perspective using firm-level data. Using the 
Malaysian FLD that was obtained from Malaysia’s PICS-2, we estimate the 
relationship between employer characteristics (particularly the employer size) and the 
average firm level pay rates. Through this study, we tried to fill the gap in the literature 
on pay determinants at the firm level, with special reference to the case of Malaysia. 
In this chapter, we first explore the effect of employer characteristics on the average 
firm-level pay rates. Afterwards, we then examine the elasticity of average firm-level 
pay rates with respect to the employer size so as to provide some evidence of imperfect 
competition in the Malaysian labour market.  
 
The regression results provide evidence, in line with the observations of Idson and Oi 
(1999) and Soderbom and Teal (2004), that larger employers pay higher wages than 
smaller employers. Medium firms (between 50 and 150 employees) and large firms 
(more than 150 employees) pay higher wages compared to small firms, even after 
controlling for the firms’ human capital and employer characteristics including 
regional and industrial variation. The elasticity of pay with respect to employer size 
(proxy by log of employment) is 0.0496 in the absence of any controls. Despite 
controlling for a large array of firms’ human capital and other employer characteristics 
including locations and industry factors, the elasticity of average firm-level pay rates 
with respect to employer size still exists at around 0.0205. Therefore, there seems to 
be strong evidence for characterising the labour market in Malaysia as one with a 
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monopsonistic market structure where firms with bigger market share also have a 
higher mark-up on their pay.  
 
Similarly, the share of skilled and higher education workers in the firm is positively 
correlated with the average monthly pay per worker as expected, whereas the share of 
female and foreign workers has a negative association. The latter could either be an 
indication that female workers are less productive or those female workers are 
employed in less productive firms.   
 
Apart from employer size and the firm’s human capital, firm’s productivity, firm’s 
profitability, capital, foreign-owned, regional and industry variations also played an 
important role in determining the average firm-level pay rates. From the findings, we 
can also conclude that the firm’s profitability and employer size are the key to 
determining the average firm-level pay rates in Malaysian manufacturing. In this 
respect, one can say that the Malaysian labour market supports the theory of 
monopsony and rent sharing, whereas in a less competitive market, the employer may 
be able to share higher rents (profits) with employees, and by definition market power 
varies positively with the size of the employer (Arkelof and Yellen, 1990). 
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Annex Chapter 6 
 
Table 6-4: VIF test for multicollinearity problem 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
prlc 4.67 0.21 
lpft 4.29 0.23 
lval 3.52 0.28 
ptn 3.35 0.30 
pblc 2.19 0.46 
ea 1.89 0.53 
tshf 1.74 0.57 
medium 1.73 0.58 
txl 1.72 0.58 
large 1.67 0.60 
auto 1.61 0.62 
sth 1.60 0.63 
rp 1.55 0.64 
elect 1.53 0.65 
dshf 1.53 0.66 
uni 1.48 0.68 
nrt 1.43 0.70 
exp 1.43 0.70 
sfem 1.40 0.72 
sfor 1.39 0.72 
me 1.38 0.72 
swk 1.34 0.75 
suniv 1.33 0.75 
east 1.33 0.75 
lclr 1.30 0.77 
chm 1.27 0.78 
sskl 1.26 0.80 
coop 1.25 0.80 
wf 1.24 0.81 
elect 1.23 0.81 
pbcn 1.21 0.83 
fage 1.21 0.83 
Sbh 1.19 0.84 
fown 1.11 0.90 
tech 1.10 0.91 
Mean VIF 1.73 
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 : THE ROLE OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE SPECIFIC 
EFFECTS IN DETERMINING THE INDIVIDUAL WORKER’S PAY  
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
To date, most of the empirical studies on pay determination in Malaysia have had to 
rely on individual-level data alone. In addition, few studies on developing countries, 
particularly Malaysia, have been able to direct the attention to the potentially important 
role in wage determination that is played by the firm or employer characteristics. In 
addition, studies in this area have rarely used data on workers that matched those of 
their employers. This is an important omission because recent advances in economic 
analysis of the labour market elsewhere have found that estimates derived from 
matched employee-employer data (e.g. on returns on education) are often substantially 
different from findings based on a more restricted dataset.  
 
In Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis, we have analysed the determinants of pay at the 
worker- and firm-level. Analysis in Chapter 5 uses only workers’ information, while 
analysis in Chapter 6 uses firms’ information, with limited information on individual 
workers. As a complementary to both analyses, this chapter is aimed at examining the 
role played by both worker and employer characteristics in determining the worker’s 
pay in the Malaysian economy. To perform this task, we utilise a cross-sectional 
Malaysian MWFD from the Malaysian manufacturing sector in 2006. To my 
knowledge, this study is the first empirical analysis of pay determination that includes 
employer-employee specific effects from within the Malaysian economy. Specifically, 
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the aims of this chapter are to examine first of all the roles of worker and firm 
characteristics in determining pay in the Malaysian economy; secondly, it will also 
examine the worker characteristics’ net effects on pay; and thirdly, the role of 
employer-specific pay policies in the pay formation process.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 discusses the importance of the 
matched worker-firm dataset. Section 7.3 provides the theoretical motivation for this 
empirical study. Section 7.4 provides a description of data and variables used. Section 
7.5 discusses the methodology and estimation strategy. Section 7.6 discusses the 
empirical results before drawing some conclusions. 
 
7.2 The importance of matched employer-employee dataset 
 
Wage rates, productivity and profitability are labour market outcomes driven by the 
interactions between two parties, i.e. employers and employees. It is crucial and timely 
to understand these interactions in light of the dramatic changes in the international 
economy over the past several decades (Haltiwanger et al., 2007). For example, if there 
are changes in technology or job restructuring at the firm level, these changes also 
affect employees in those firms. Consequently, any policies ought to be driven by a 
certain understanding of their repercussions. Theoretically, the determination of wage 
rates by employers is based on the demand-side (i.e. employees’ characteristics) and 
supply-side (i.e. employers’ characteristics) of the labour market. Empirically, the 
strength of each factor can only be assessed if the observed characteristics of 
employers and employees are simultaneously captured, as well as allowing for the 
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unobserved person and firm effects within the regression equation that explains the 
determination of wage. 
 
Until recently, most econometric analyses of wage determination were based on 
datasets that had only the supply-side (i.e. worker- or household-level) or demand-side 
(i.e. firm-level). Therefore, the understanding of the interactions between employers 
and workers has been limited, as these data sources contain information from only one 
side of the market, let alone being incapable of analysing models that incorporate both 
aspects of supply and demand. In recent years, data that combine employees’ 
characteristics and specifications of the firms they work in – i.e. matched employer-
employee datasets (MEED) – have become increasingly available. These datasets 
therefore combine the observations on typical firm-level variables (e.g. value added, 
and factor employment) with socio-demographic data (e.g. employees’ age, job tenure, 
ethnic origin, gender, experience, skill, and pay). MEED has led to an explosion of 
interest in research on the outcomes of labour market interactions between firms and 
their employees. As explained in Abowd and Kramarz (1998), there are generally two 
types of MEED, i.e. cross-sectional and longitudinal. Cross-sectional MEED is based 
on surveys of firms and their workers via face-to-face interviews with human resource 
managers and workers. On the other hand, longitudinal MEED is based on 
administrative data which track firms and their workers over time. Although cross-
sectional data contain a smaller number of observations than longitudinal data, they 
are richer in covariates.  
 
Why is the creation and availability of MEED important? This is due to their potential 
advantages over other data. Generally, there are four advantages of these data (Bryson 
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and Forth, 2006). Firstly, it can provide a full understanding of the dynamics and 
interactions between employers and their employees in the labour market. This is 
because the data provide information about workers’ specific characteristics which 
match up with the specific characteristics of their workplace. Secondly, it can provide 
a thorough analysis based on unobserved information from both sides (i.e. employer 
and employee) and is able to overcome some of the biases inherent in data that rely 
solely on firms or workers. Thirdly, this data allow for the analyses of relative 
contributions to the wage distribution and other labour market features that are 
attributable to intra- and inter-firm dispersion as it involves multiple observations of 
workers within multiple firms. Fourthly, longitudinal MEED can tackle employer and 
employee selection processes as well as the antecedents and consequences of practice 
or worker adoption, thus permitting a more rigorous assessment of causal processes 
than might not otherwise be the case. 
 
7.3 The importance of employer-employee specific effects on pay determinants 
 
Workers with similar capacity would not be paid differently if the law of one price 
were to hold in the labour market. But why do such workers get different wages and 
why do similar firms pay different wages? This important question has motivated 
numerous studies that attempt to isolate the causes of wage heterogeneity as well as 
identifying significant market factors that are statistically related to wages (see, for 
example, Becker, 1993; Murphy and Welch, 1992).  
 
There are three groups of studies that tried to explain the causes of wage heterogeneity. 
One of them suggested that wage heterogeneity is related to permanent unmeasured 
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differences among individual workers, otherwise known as ‘a person fixed effect’. 
Another group had focused on the extent to which wage heterogeneity is related to 
permanent differences among employers, or ‘a firm fixed effect’. Still, a third or recent 
group of studies suggested that wage heterogeneity is related to both person and firm 
fixed effects. Along with the availability of MWFD71, the appropriate econometric 
techniques to estimate firm and worker fixed effects in wage equation, as well as the 
computing facilities, are clearly needed in order to provide a proper understanding of 
pay determinant and its structure.  
 
Abowd, Kramarz, and Morgalis (1999, henceforth AKM) combined these three 
elements to focus on wage determination with unobserved heterogeneity. They 
proposed distinguishing between “employer effects” which stem from firms’ 
characteristics, and “employee effects” due to workers’ characteristics. As can be seen 
in Figure 7.1, distinguishing between the two effects and capturing the net contribution 
of each one on pay can be rather complicated due to the way these effects are 
transmitted. Clearly, both the specification of the regression equation and the 
estimation method used will have to be carefully considered for estimates to be robust. 
 
Figure 7.1: Conditions Requiring MEED 
 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
71 See Abowd and Kramarz (1999) for descriptions of the matched employer-employee datasets that are 
currently available.  
217 
  
 
 
AKM was the first to focus on wage determination with unobserved heterogeneity. 
They proposed an empirical framework for estimating individual and firm effects on 
wage equation using a French longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset. This 
type of data enables them to estimate the relationship among various wage policies 
and firm-level economic variables.  
 
By means of the Malaysian MWFD, we are able to control for both observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity among workers and their employer-firms. However, with a 
single-year MWFD, we are unable to separately identify and estimate worker fixed 
effects (the effects that are due to unobservable worker heterogeneity) and firm fixed 
effects (the effects that are due to firm heterogeneity). We can only estimate the cluster 
fixed effects (the effects that are due to the sum of employer fixed effects and the mean 
value of the worker’s fixed effects for each firm).  
 
7.4 Data description and variables 
 
7.4.1 Malaysian matched worker-firm dataset (MWFD) 
This chapter utilises a unique Malaysian MWFD72 for one common year (2006), which 
allows for a more in-depth analysis of worker- and firm-specific effects on wages. The 
dataset contains a random sample of 7,059 full-time permanent workers employed in 
752 Malaysian manufacturing firms in 2006. It provides information on workers’ 
monthly salaries and other characteristics of both workers and firms.  
 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
72 This has been discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
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7.4.2 Employee-level variables 
 
The dependent variable in our analysis is the natural logarithm of monthly pay for 
employees in 2006. The monthly pay is defined as the sum of monthly salary, including 
all allowances and bonuses before tax. The effect of education on wages was measured 
by two different variables; first, by a continuous measure of the completed years of 
schooling and second, by the highest level of formal education attained. Nevertheless, 
the individual’s years of education will be biased estimates of their true effects because 
some individuals do not earn degrees, while others do not complete their degrees 
within a standard number of years (Jagear and Page, 1996). Therefore, our dataset has 
information on both years of education and the highest level of formal education 
attained, allowing us to improve on earlier estimates. We use five dummies for the 
highest level of the worker’s formal education, namely degree, diploma as a reference 
group, upper secondary, lower secondary, and primary plus informal education, as well 
as illiterate – all as direct estimates of the effects of academic credentials on wages.  
 
Due to the absence of data on experience, Mincer (1974) proposed the alternative of 
“potential experience”, i.e. the number of years an individual could have worked after 
completing schooling. Assuming that he/she starts schooling at 6 years old and begins 
working immediately after having completed schooling, the potential experience is 
equal to age – completed years of schooling – 6. In addition to education and 
experience, we also control for tenure, distance from job in kilometres, gender with 
male as reference group, marital status with single as reference group, types of 
occupation (i.e. management, professionals, skilled-worker, with unskilled worker as 
reference group), formal training received at the current employer, formal training 
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received at the previous employer, computer skills (i.e. none as reference group, basic, 
moderate, and complex), study abroad, and ethnicity (i.e. Bumiputera as reference 
group, Chinese, Indian, and others). 
 
7.4.3 Employer-level variables 
 
Firm performance is based on two variables: firm productivity (i.e. log of value-added 
per worker) and firm profitability (i.e. log of profit per worker). Firm input variables 
are logs of employment, capital, and capital-labour ratio, as well as share of skilled 
workers, female workers, foreign workers, and workers with a higher level of 
education. We also controlled for industry fixed-effects at the second stage of analysis 
with nine industry dummies. These are based on the 4-digit ISIC for manufacturing 
firms, i.e. textiles, garments, chemicals, rubber and plastics, machinery and equipment, 
electrical appliances, electronics, auto parts, wood and furniture (with food processing 
as reference group).  
 
7.5  Empirical methods 
 
In this section, we consider the model of the Malaysian pay equation by using cross-
sectional matched employer-employee data. The aim of this chapter is to examine the 
role of employee characteristics (e.g. education) and firm characteristics (e.g. firm 
performance, firm size) in determining the pay structure in the Malaysian economy. 
Even though the matched data enabled us to estimate the statistical firm effect, we 
cannot separately distinguish the part of this effect that is due to unobservable 
employee heterogeneity versus unobservable employer heterogeneity with cross-
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sectional data. We therefore apply the two-stage estimation strategy proposed by 
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (2001). 
 
The first stage is to examine a linear structure for pay in which the logarithm of 
monthly pay is explained by the measured employee characteristics and the firm effect. 
Although with this dataset we are able to estimate the firm effect, we cannot identify 
the part of this effect that is caused by the unobservable worker or firm heterogeneity. 
The second stage is to relate the estimated effect of measured worker characteristics 
and estimated firm effect on pay to firm performance (i.e. logarithm of value added 
per worker) and firm-size (i.e. log of employment). 
 
7.5.1 The linear pay model with firm-specific fixed-effects 
 
We start with a pay equation in which workers’ pay depends both on employee 
characteristic (level of education) and employer characteristics (performance and firm 
size), as follows: 
 
ijjijij FXPay   21ln       7.1 
       
where ijPayln  is the log of the monthly pay of worker i working at firm j, ijX   is the 
observable characteristic of worker i (years of schooling), jF  is a vector of observable 
characteristics of firm j (performance and size), ij  is the disturbance term, and i = 
1,…,N; j = 1,…,J. 
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Least squares estimates β1 and β2 from equation 7.1 might be biased due to the problem 
of endogeneity. This problem may have arisen for two reasons. Firstly, equation 7.1 
contains only controls for the observable effects of workers and firms. It does not take 
into account worker and firm unobserved heterogeneity. The absence of controls for 
unobserved time-invariant employee and employer effects would have caused the 
omitted variable bias. For example, an omitted ability in pay equation is where an 
individual’s years of schooling are likely to be correlated with unobserved ability. In 
addition, although the effects of firm performance on pay can be interpreted as rents, 
they may also be a result of unobserved employee and/or employer characteristics. For 
example, high-ability workers might be systematically sorted into high-performance 
firms. To control the potential omitted variable bias, we add worker and firm fixed 
effects into the pay equation. 
  
Secondly, simultaneity arises when firm performance and firm size are determined 
simultaneously along with pay. For example, based on the efficiency wage models, 
high wages can induce high productivity or profits, and high productivity or profits 
can provide high wages. There is an accounting relation from wages to profits; by 
definition, higher wages reduce profits. This bias has a negative effect on profit 
estimate. We consider this problem by examining the effects of firm performance and 
size and other firms’ inputs on wages according to the two-stage procedure described 
below. 
 
Using matched firm-worker data and methods of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 
(1999), we were able to quantify worker and firm fixed effects as well as estimate these 
effects simultaneously within the same regression. In order to include worker and firm 
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fixed effects in the pay equation so as to obtain a fully specified regression model, we 
propose modifying equation 7.1 as follows:  
 
ijiJijijij XPay   )(1ln
,     7.2 
 
where ij  is a person-effect representing unobservable worker heterogeneity, )i(J  is 
a firm-effect representing unobservable firm heterogeneity, υij is the disturbance term, 
and the rest of the variable and parameter symbols are defined as in equation 7.1. The 
specification model for equation 7.2 now contains both observed and unobserved 
worker and firm effects. Since only in one year (i.e. 2006) can information on workers 
be matched with information on their employing firms, we cannot directly estimate the 
effects θij and )i(J . Instead, we estimate a single unrestricted firm effect for each firm 
j, which may be interpreted as )()( iJijiJ   ,  
 
where )i(J  is the estimated firm effect that consists of a combination of the average 
individual worker effect within the firm and the true firm effect. Thus, the individual 
worker’s pay using worker-level data is represented by the following equation: 
 
ij1)i(Jij1ij XPayln   .      7.3 
      
In the first stage, we estimate equation 7.3 at the employee-level using the least-
squares estimator. We do not have panel data that would allow us to control for a 
person’s unobserved fixed effects; however, we expect that by including information 
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on formal education level, occupation, and other human capital variables, we might be 
able to mitigate this problem. 
 
7.5.2 Analysis of firm heterogeneity 
 
In the second stage, we use the firm-level data to analyse the firm characteristics, as 
listed in Section 7.4.3. In order to explain the firm-specific fixed-effects (i.e., the firm-
specific compensation policies), we perform regression of these firm-specific effects 
on firm-level variables as follows:  
jjj eFc
ˆ     j = 752      7.4 
Where j̂  is the estimated firm-specific fixed-effects obtained from the first stage 
estimation, jF  is the vector of observable employer (i.e., firm) characteristics, and je  
is the disturbance term. We estimate equation 7.4 by using OLS estimator. 
 
7.5.3 An estimation of the relations between pay structure and firms’ 
performance and input 
 
Pay structure comprises two components, namely, the average firm-specific effects in 
the pay equation and the average predicted pay in the firm. Therefore, apart from the 
estimated firm-specific effects ( j̂ ), we also calculate the average predicted pay in the 
firm, taking into account the individual characteristics of employees. We denote this 
average by j1 X̂ . In order to estimate the relation between the estimated components 
of pay and firms’ performance as well as firms’ input, we conduct another firm-level 
analysis as follows: 
224 
  
 
 
 jjJjj v)X
ˆ(Q   2110    7.5 
 
where jQ  represents each firm’s performance and inputs variables as listed in Section 
7.4.3; 0 , 1  and 2  are the parameters to be estimated; j  is a fixed industry effect; 
and jv  is the disturbance term. The result from this equation explains the relation of 
pay components to firm characteristics. From these results, we can examine the 
relation between pay structure and firm performance on the one hand, and pay structure 
and firm inputs on the other.   
 
7.6  Empirical results 
 
In this section, we first present the estimation results of the first stage of our analysis, 
namely the pay estimation including firm-specific fixed-effects at the employer-level. 
Next, we present the results of the second-stage analysis, namely the impact of firm 
characteristics on firm-specific pay policies. Finally, we present the relation between 
the pay structure and firm performance on the one hand, and pay structure and firm 
inputs on the other. 
 
7.6.1 The relative importance of observable characteristics and firm-specific 
effects 
 
Table 7.1 shows the result for pay estimation from equation 7.3. The result from this 
equation explains the impact of observable worker characteristics including the firm-
specific effects on the monthly pay of Malaysian manufacturing workers in 2006. Most 
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of the worker characteristics have a significant impact on pay except for tenure 
squared, training at the previous employer, studying abroad, and other ethnicity 
dummies. The R-square value of this model is 0.577, meaning that about 58 percent 
of the variability in the pay determination of workers is explained by regression on 
worker characteristics and firm-effects.   
 
Based on Table 7.1, the result on education indicates that an additional year of 
schooling is associated with a 1.5 percent increase in monthly pay (holding all other 
independent variables constant). In addition, the results on experience and job tenure 
indicate that one additional year of experience and job tenure raises pay by 1.1 and 0.9 
percent respectively, holding other factors constant. The results also imply that 
experience has a diminishing effect on pay. 
 
As expected, distance has a positive and significant effect on the worker’s monthly 
pay. This means that the farther the distance from the workplace, the greater the pay 
that the worker gets. A coefficient of 0.02 indicates that the impact of distance on pay 
is somewhat smaller, where a one-percent increase in the distance from the workplace 
causes pay to increase by only 0.02 percent.  
 
The results also suggested that workers with a higher educational level earn more 
compared to those with a lower educational level. Based on Table 7.1, we can see that 
workers who hold a university degree get a 12-percent higher pay than the diploma 
holder. Meanwhile, workers who have completed upper secondary, lower secondary, 
and primary education receive respectively, 14, 15, and 18 percent less pay compared 
to the diploma holder.  
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In the case of training and skills, the results in Table 7.1 show that training from the 
current firm is statistically significant and has a positive sign, while training from a 
previous firm is insignificant when it comes to determining the worker’s pay. Workers 
who received training from their current employer get better pay than those who had 
not received such training. Based on the results, workers who received training from 
their current employer receive a five-percent higher pay than those who had not 
received such training. Moreover, we can see from Table 7.1 that workers who have 
computer skills get more pay than those who do not have any computer skills. 
Compared to those with no computer skills, having basic computer skills raises the pay 
by eight percent, while workers with moderate computer skills receive on average a 
higher pay by 12 percent. Workers with complex computer skills have a 14-percent 
higher pay.   
 
As far as occupation is concerned, Table 7.1 indicates that all types of occupation that 
have been included are statistically and highly significant with the expected signs. 
Managers and professionals (such as engineers, accountants, lawyers, chemists, 
scientist, and software programmers.) receive respectively 29 and 28 percent higher 
wages than unskilled production workers. Meanwhile, skilled workers (such as 
technicians, and supervisors.) and non-production workers (such as administrative and 
sales workers) receive respectively 13 and 8 percent higher wages than unskilled 
production workers. Turning to demographic factors, gender, marital status, and 
ethnicity are statistically significant. Based on results in Table 7.1, we found that 
females earn 15 percent less than males, married people earn five percent more than 
singles, and Chinese and Indians seem to have better pay than Malays.  
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To sum up, the results from the first stage analysis imply that both observable worker 
characteristics and unobserved firm-specific effects play an important role in pay 
determination in Malaysia. However, the impact of firm-specific fixed-effects (with a 
coefficient of 1.028) on pay is greater than the impact of observable worker 
characteristics such as education (with a coefficient of 0.015) and experience (with a 
coefficient of 0.011) on pay.  
 
Table 7-1: Least Squares Estimates of the Determinants of Monthly Pay, Including Firm Fixed-
Effects 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Robust S.E 
Education 0.0150*** 0.0045 
Experience 0.0110*** 0.0012 
Experience2                 -0.0004*** 0.0012 
Tenure 0.0098*** 0.0022 
Tenure2                  0.0001 0.0001 
Log of distance                  0.0245** 0.0086 
University degree 0.1180*** 0.0338 
Upper secondary                 -0.1380*** 0.0262 
Lower secondary                 -0.1470*** 0.0352 
Primary school                 -0.1780*** 0.0499 
Female                 -0.1510*** 0.0170 
Married                  0.0493** 0.0175 
Management 0.2870*** 0.0371 
Professional 0.2760*** 0.0389 
Skilled production 0.1300*** 0.0255 
Non-production                  0.0759** 0.0281 
Current training                  0.0532* 0.0237 
Previous training                  0.0173 0.0219 
Basic comp. skill                  0.0839* 0.0224 
Moderate comp. skill                  0.1270*** 0.0244 
Complex comp. skill                  0.1480** 0.0398 
Study abroad                  0.0942 0.0597 
Chinese                  0.1850*** 0.0227 
Indian                  0.0655* 0.0268 
Others                  0.1370 0.0942 
Firm fixed-effects                  1.0284*** 0.0050 
Constant                  6.4727 0.0449 
No. of observations                  7059 
R-squared                  0.577 
Adjusted R-squared                  0.525 
Rmse                  0.470 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of monthly pay in Ringgit Malaysia (RM). All included 
variables are shown in the table. A constant is included in regression. Significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent level is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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Table 7-2:  Correlation among the components of workers’ pay 
  
Log Monthly Pay Firm-effects Worker 
characteristics 
Residual 
Log Monthly Pay 1.0000 
   
Firm-effects 0.6272 1.0000 
  
Worker characteristics 0.5473 0.2042 1.0000 
 
Residual 0.6505 -0.0000 -0.0000 1.0000 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the regression in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.2 shows the correlations for the components of the workers’ pay. The 
components of pay are divided into observable worker characteristics, unobservable 
firm-effects, and residual. From the table, one can see that the correlation between 
unobserved firm-effects and log of real monthly pay is greater than the correlation 
between observable worker characteristics and log of monthly pay. This implies that 
in the case of Malaysia, unobserved firm-effects are important in explaining the 
variation in log pay. 
 
7.6.2 The impact of firm characteristics on firm-specific pay policies 
 
In the previous sub-section, we have introduced a firm-specific fixed-effect for each 
firm. These specific fixed-effects represent a base level of pay; hence, they are an 
important feature of firm-specific pay policies. As shown in Table 7.1, firm-effect 
variable is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This indicates that the role of 
firm-specific fixed-effects is crucial towards determining the worker’s pay in 
Malaysia. Moreover, Figure 7.2 has reported that the values of firm-specific fixed-
effects lie between -1.516 and 2.948, with an average value of -0.005. 
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Figure 7.2: The estimated firm- specific fixed-effects 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
752 -.005 .369 -1.516 2.948 
 
By using the above figures, we have calculated the average pay, highest pay, and 
lowest pay as follows: 
(1) Average pay = -0.005 + 6.98 = 6.972 = RM 1066.35 per month73. 
 
(2) Highest pay = 2.948 + 6.98 = 9.925 = RM 20434.91 per month74. 
 
(3) Lowest pay = -1.516 + 6.98 = 5.461 = RM 235.00 per month75. 
 
Based on the above figures, we found that the highest pay is around 19 times higher 
than the average pay, while the lowest is about five times lower than the average pay.  
Consequently, this sub-section focuses on firm-specific effects so as to explain their 
values from the firm-level variables. In order to explain such fixed effects, we perform 
regression on these fixed-effects for the firm-level characteristics’ variables. The 
results are shown in Table 7.2. 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
73 6.98 = mean of log real monthly pay (refer to Table A7-2).  Exp (6.972)  = 1066.35. 
74 exp(9.925) = 20434.91. 
75 exp(5.461) = 235.00. 
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Table 7-3: Regression of firm-specific fixed-effects on firm-level variables in 2006 
The dependent variable: Estimated firm-specific fixed-effects 
Firm Characteristics Coefficients 
Log employment               0.0472*** 
Log value-added per worker               0.0471*** 
% of female workers              -0.0020*** 
% of higher education workers               0.0019** 
% of foreign workers              -0.0024*** 
Foreign owned                0.0486* 
Single shift              -0.0630* 
Double shift              -0.0585* 
North              -0.1890*** 
South              -0.0753** 
East Coast              -0.3770*** 
Sabah              -0.2880*** 
Sarawak              -0.3760*** 
Constant              -0.5000*** 
No. of observations              752 firms 
R-squared              0.27 
Notes: All included variables are shown in the table. Pure domestically owned, triple work shift and 
Central region as a reference group for their own categorical variables. ***, **, and * denotes 
statistically significance at 1%,5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 
Based on Table 7.3, we found that firm size76 has a positive impact on firm-specific 
fixed-effects, as expected. A coefficient of 0.047 indicates that when a firm is hiring 
one percent more worker, the average firm-specific effects ( )average(j̂ ) would increases 
by 0.047. The increase(s) of ( )average(j̂ ), in turn, would lead to increases in changes to 
the average firm-specific effects ( )average(j̂ ) by 0.0422 (i.e. -0.005 + 0.0472). As a 
result, the average pay77 will increase from RM1,066.35 to RM1,121.25. Based on 
these figures, one can also conclude that the average pay would increase about RM 
54.00 as a firm hires one percent more worker. 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
76 The firm size is proxied by the log of employment. 
77 Average Pay = 0.0422 + 6.98 = 7.0222 (antilog = RM 1,121.25).  
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 Table 7.3 also shows that the log of value added per worker is statistically significant 
at the one percent level and has a positive sign. The coefficient of 0.0471 implies that 
when a firm increases its productivity by one percent, the average firm-specific effects 
( )average(j̂ ) would also increase by 0.0471. Then, such an increase would cause changes 
in the average firm-specific effects ( )average(j̂ ) to reach 0.0421. Accordingly, the 
average pay78 will increase from RM1,066.35 to RM1,121.14. In other words, the 
average pay would increase about RM 54.00 as a firm raises its productivity by one 
percent. 
 
In addition, the firm’s share of higher education workers also has a positive impact on 
firm-specific fixed-effects. A coefficient of 0.002 indicates that a one-percent increase 
in a firm’s share of higher education workers (holding all other factors constant) would 
correspond to an increase in the average firm-specific effects ( )average(j̂ ) by 0.002. 
Such increases would then cause changes in the average firm-specific effects (
)average(j̂ ) to increase from -0.005 to -0.003. Accordingly, the average pay will 
increase from RM1, 066.35 to RM1, 068.49. Based on figures calculated above, we 
can also say that the average pay would increase by around 0.2 percent when a firm 
raises its share of educated workers by one percent. 
 
In contrast, the share of female as well as foreign workers has a significant and 
negative impact on firm-specific fixed-effects. A coefficient of -0.002 for both factors 
implies that a one-percent increase in a firm’s share of female workers (or share of 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
78 Average Pay = 0.0421 + 6.98 =7.0221 (antilog = RM 1,121.14).  
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foreign workers), holding all other factors constant, would lead to decreases in the 
average firm-specific effects ( )average(j̂ ) from -0.005 to -0.007. As a consequence, the 
average pay will decrease from RM1, 066.35 to RM1, 064.22 for both factors. Based 
on the figures calculated above, we can also say that the average pay would decline by 
0.2 percent when a firm’s share of female workers (or share of foreign workers) 
increases by one percent. 
 
In terms of firm ownership, Table 7.3 indicates that foreign-owned firms tend to be 
statistically significant at the one-percent level and have a positive sign. A coefficient 
of 0.049 implies that the average firm-specific effects ( )average(j̂ ) for foreign-owned 
firms are higher than domestically-owned firms by 0.05. As a result, the average pay 
for foreign-owned firms is higher compared to domestically-owned firms.  
 
Turning to the work shifts, Table 7.3 shows that single and double work shifts 
dummies are statistically significant at the 10-percent level and have a negative sign. 
This implies that the average firm-specific effects ( )average(j̂ ) for firms that operate 
with single and double work shifts are lower than for firms that operate with triple 
work shifts. As a consequence, the average pay for firms with single and double work 
shifts is lower than that for firms with triple work shifts.  
 
As far as geographical variation is concerned, Table 7.3 shows that all regional 
dummies have an important impact on firm-specific fixed-effects. The negative signs 
envisage that the average firm-specific effects ( )average(j̂ ) for firms located in the 
North, South, East Coast, Sabah, and Sarawak are lower than those for firms located 
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in the Central region. In this manner, the average wages paid by firms that operate in 
the Central region are higher than those paid by firms operating in the other regions.   
 
7.6.3 The relation of pay components to firm performance and inputs  
 
Table 7.4 shows the results of relating the pay components (i.e. average firm-specific 
effect and average predicted pay) of each firm to firm performance with equation 7.5 
using OLS. In this context, firm-specific effects are a measure of firm-specific pay 
policies, so these firm-effects represent the base level of pay in each firm. This table 
also shows the relation between the estimated components of pay and a firm’s input 
such as the logs of employment, capital, and capital labour ratio, as well as share of 
skilled workers, female workers, foreign workers, and workers with a university level 
of education. 
 
Table 7-4: Estimated relations between pay structure and firm’s performance and input 
 
                          Independent variables 
Dependent variables 
Average firm-specific 
effects  in pay equation 
Average predicted pay 
in firm 
 Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err 
Log value-added per worker 0.6720*** 0.1326 0.3574*** 0.0832 
Log profit per worker 0.8512*** 0.1181 0.4640*** 0.0799 
Log of employment 0.6726*** 0.1646 0.4134*** 0.0863 
Log of capital 1.4667*** 0.2934 0.8421*** 0.1544 
Log of capital labour-ratio 0.7940*** 0.2053 0.4287*** 0.1316 
Most skilled workers 5.0036 3.1567 6.7657*** 2.0805 
Most female workers -8.3616*** 2.2935 -6.0079*** 1.7262 
Most foreign workers -4.1453* 2.4127 3.0202 1.9143 
Most higher educated workers 6.97357*** 1.5534 6.3085*** 1.1455 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the results in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. Significance at 1 percent 
and 10 percent level is indicated by *** and *, respectively.  
 
From Table 7.4, we observed that firms with a high average base level of pay also 
employ more productive workers and reap higher profits. In terms of the average 
predicted pay, firms employing workers with a high average predicted pay employ 
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more productive workers and also have higher profitability. On the one hand, we found 
firms that are higher in both components of pay (average predicted pay and average 
base-level of pay) tend to be large, capital-intensive, have an abundance of skilled-
workers, and also an abundance of workers with a higher level of education. On the 
other hand, a firm that is lower in both components of pay tends to be one with an 
abundance of female workers.   
 
7.7  Discussion and conclusion 
 
This chapter is an attempt to respond to the shortcomings of the available empirical 
studies by utilising the rich and unique MWFD for the Malaysian manufacturing sector 
in 2006. In the first stage of analysis, we found that observable worker characteristics 
and unobserved firm-effect both play an important role in the Malaysian pay 
determination. The correlation between unobserved firm-specific effects and log pay 
is greater than that between observable worker characteristics and log monthly pay. 
Moreover, firm-specific effects are different across firms, which suggests that 
employers have some market power in the Malaysian economy.  
 
In the second stage, we can conclude that firms which are large, productive, and have 
an abundance of educated workers pay higher average wages to their workers 
compared to the industrial average. On the other hand, firms that have an abundance 
of both female and foreign workers pay lower average wages to their workers 
compared to the industrial average. In addition, foreign firms pay higher average 
wages compared to local firms. And firms that are located in the central region pay 
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higher average wages to their workers compared to firms that are located in the other 
regions of Malaysia. 
 
Consequently, we found that higher paid workers, either because of worker 
characteristics or firm-specific effects, are employed in firms that are more productive 
and profitable. The relation between firm-specific effects and profitability can be either 
positive or negative depending on either the efficiency wage effect or the rent-sharing 
effect that dominates. This result implies that Malaysian pay policies are dominated 
by the efficiency wage effect. To have more thorough and direct interpretations of our 
results, the production function ought to be specified, which would be a task for future 
research.  
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Annex Chapter 7 
 
Table 7-5: Summary Statistics for the Pay Estimation Including Firm Specific Effects, at the 
Employee-Level Dataset 
Variable Mean                SD 
Log real monthly pay 6.98 0.68 
Education 10.95 3.29 
Potential experience (centered)  -0.21 11.24 
Potential experience squared (centered) 126.27 181.39 
Tenure (centered) 0.11 7.23 
Log of distance 2.05 1.05 
University degree level of education 0.09 0.29 
Upper secondary  level of education 0.40 0.49 
Lower secondary level of education 0.24 0.43 
Primary school 0.13 0.33 
Female 0.49 0.50 
Married 0.66 0.48 
Management 0.15 0.36 
Professionals 0.08 0.28 
Skilled production workers 0.36 0.48 
Non-production workers 0.19 0.39 
Training at current firm 0.41 0.49 
Basic computer skills 0.22 0.41 
Moderate computer skills 0.40 0.49 
Complex computer skills 0.06 0.25 
Study abroad 0.03 0.17 
Chinese 0.37 0.48 
Indian 0.09 0.28 
Other ethnics 0.01 0.09 
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 : GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
From the outset, this thesis set out to explore pay determinants in the Malaysian 
economy from three different perspectives (viz. employees’ perspective, employers’ 
perspective, and both employees-employers’ perspectives) using the Malaysian WLD, 
FLD, and MWFD. In this final chapter, the discussion takes the following approach. 
Section 8.2 summarises and synthesises the empirical findings across the empirical 
chapters. Section 8.3 then outlines a number of implications for matters of policy. 
Section 8.4 discusses the thesis’ limitations, offers suggestions for future research, and 
then draws the thesis to a conclusion. 
 
8.2 Empirical findings 
 
The main empirical findings are chapter-specific and were summarized within the 
respective empirical chapters in this way: Chapter 5: The impact of worker 
characteristics on individual worker’s pay in the Malaysian economy; Chapter 6: The 
effects of employers’ characteristics on the average firm-level pay rates; Chapter 7: 
The role of employer-employee specific-effects in determining the individual worker’s 
pay. The analysis in Chapter 5 utilizes WLD, while the analysis in Chapter 6 uses FLD, 
and with the availability of WLD (which can be linked to FLD) it has made the analysis 
in Chapter 7 feasible. This section will summarise and synthesize the empirical 
findings in these three chapters but with a view to addressing this study’s research 
questions. 
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8.2.1 Impact of employees’ characteristics on individual worker’s pay at the 
WLD 
 
The aim of Chapter 5 is to identify the determinants of the individual worker’s pay in 
the Malaysian manufacturing sector. By utilizing the Malaysian WLD, this chapter 
addresses the first research question, namely: what is the key determinant(s) of the 
individual worker’s pay in Malaysian manufacturing? In addition, this chapter also 
examines how the individual worker’s pay is affected by worker characteristics such 
as training, skills, occupation, location, and the extent to which these variables have 
managed to explain pay variation as outlined in the second and third research 
questions.  
 
The pay models are based on the framework of Mincer’s (1974) human capital 
earnings function. The empirical work focused on estimating the impact of employee 
characteristics (comprising six vectors of worker characteristics) on the individual 
worker’s pay (i.e. log of monthly pay in RM) in the Malaysian manufacturing sector 
for the year 2006.79 Chapter 5 sets out the results. Instead of including only the vectors 
of basic human capital (i.e. years of schooling, potential experience and its squared, 
and tenure and its squared), in the basic pay model we incorporated the vector of 
sheepskin effects (i.e. dummies for the highest level of education attained). In the 
augmented pay model 1, we included a vector of demographic factors such as gender, 
marital status, citizenship, and ethnicity. Meanwhile, in the augmented pay model 2, 
we included training and skills (i.e. training with current and previous employer, 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
79 We included these six vectors: (1) basic human capital; (2) sheepskin effects; (3) training and skills; 
(4) demographic; (5) kinds of work; and (6) state of residence, step by step, in model 1 to model 6.   
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computer skills, people skills, off-the-job training, studied abroad), occupations (viz. 
manager, professionals, skilled workers, and non-production workers), distance from 
the workplace, and location. The statistical results seem to have improved as one 
moves from the basic model to the augmented pay model 2.80  
 
In general, all factors in our models were considered to be important determinants of 
pay in the Malaysian manufacturing sector.81 In all of them, the key determinant of the 
worker’s pay is the ‘sheepskin effects’ or worker’s qualification. Workers with higher 
educational qualification receive a significantly higher pay than those with lower 
qualification. This finding supports the prediction of the screening theory which 
argued that workers with diploma(s) will earn more than their counterparts, even those 
with the same years of schooling but who do not possess any diploma (Belman and 
Heywood, 1991; and Card and Krueger, 1992). The inclusion of the ‘sheepskin effects’ 
in our study has made it possible to estimate the true effects, unlike previous studies 
that neglected this factor. Moreover, Jaeger and Page (1996) stress that studies that 
depend solely on the continuous measure of completed schooling tend to be biased. In 
comparison by gender, the pay premium for university degree and college diploma 
tends to be higher for females than males. These results confirm the findings by Latifah 
(1998) that the incremental effects of successive levels of formal education are higher 
for females than for their male counterparts.  
 
The findings also reveal that training and skills positively affect the worker’s pay. 
Workers who have had training also receive a higher pay than those without training. 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
80 R2 increased from 0.28 to 0.55 and the estimated standard error became smaller. 
81 See details in Chapter 5. 
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Interestingly, training from current employer has a bigger impact on pay than training 
from a previous employer. Moreover, workers who have a vocational certificate (proxy 
for off-the-job training) earn a higher pay than those who have not. Among the skills, 
having complex computer skill has a more positive effect on pay compared to medium, 
basic or no computer skills, as well as skills in dealing with people. This finding has 
support in the argument by Krueger (1993) that workers who use a computer in their 
job earn higher wages. In addition, workers who have studied abroad also receive a 
higher pay than workers who have not. This is because studying abroad contributes to 
language skills, knowledge, and attitudes which also influence labour market 
outcomes (Miller, 1995; Palifka, 2003). Not surprisingly, the findings also highlight 
that workers in professional employment and management (and also have higher 
skills) are paid significantly higher salaries than those in other types of jobs.  
 
In the 10th Malaysian Plan 2010-2015, the Government of Malaysia emphasized the 
mainstreaming of vocational education in order to transform Malaysia into a high-
income developed nation by 2020. To achieve this vision, Malaysia needs more skilled 
and semi-skilled workers to also become knowledge workers (k-workers). The 9th 
Malaysian Plan 2006-2010, shows that only 28 percent of the Malaysian population 
can be considered highly skilled workers. To meet these emerging skill requirements 
for k-workers, vocational education needs to be transformed so as to be able to equip 
trainees with the requisite skills. This highlights the importance of human capital 
variables in determining the individual worker’s earning power.  
 
Finally, this study found that distance and location also affected the worker’s pay in a 
positive manner. In this respect, those who live far from their workplace as well as 
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those who reside in developed states (e.g. Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, Johor, and 
Melaka) earn a relatively higher pay. I also think that a lack of job opportunities with 
higher paid income is one possible reason for the pay differential by location in 
Malaysia.  
 
The results from the augmented Mincerian pay model 2 regression (which includes 
training, skills, occupations, distance, and location) suggested that these new variables 
have significant explanatory power in determining the individual worker’s pay 
compared to the augmented Mincerian pay model 1 (which excludes these same 
variables). Nevertheless, this empirical analysis has several limitations. First, by using 
WLD we only consider the supply-side factors from the employee’s perspective in 
determining the individual workers’ pay, but without taking into consideration the 
demand-side factors from the employer’s perspective. For example, we focused 
particularly on the effects of the employees’ characteristics while the effects of the 
employer’s characteristics (which might well explain the worker’s pay) were for all 
intents and purposes neglected. Second, no ability-variable was taken into account. We 
would argue that our sample is rather homogeneous in terms of ability, and the 
estimated true effect is less likely to be upward biased because of the omission of 
ability. 
 
8.2.2 Impact of employers’ characteristics on the average firm-level pay rates 
using FLD 
 
The second empirical study in this thesis examines the determinants of average wage 
rates at the firm-level. In this analysis, we only focus on the employer’s perspectives 
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on pay determination in the Malaysian manufacturing sector. Chapter 6 addresses the 
fourth research question, namely: what are the important determinants of the average 
firm-level pay rates in Malaysia? Here, there is particular focus on the employer’s 
characteristics. Consequently, this chapter also examines the effects of the employer’s 
characteristics on the worker’s pay as outlined in the fifth research question. Employer 
characteristics comprise employer size, employer performance, capital, regional 
variation, openness, and governance. In addition, this chapter also addresses the 6th 
research question, namely: can the Malaysian labour market be characterized as an 
imperfect labour market, i.e. monopsony?  
 
Chapter 6 sets forth the results of our efforts82. Employer characteristics such as 
employer size, firm’s human capital stock, firm’s performance (i.e. productivity and 
profitability), ownership, and regional variation are found to be important factors for 
determining the average monthly pay in Malaysian manufacturing, whereas factors 
such as openness (i.e. exporter), governance (i.e. legal status), and industry 
concentration are found to be insignificant. 
 
Based on the aforementioned results, employer size plays an important role in 
determining the average pay, as suggested by previous studies such as Idson and Oi 
(1999), and Soderbom and Teal (2004). From the results based on dummies of 
employer size, large firms pay their workers about eleven percent more than small 
firms, while medium firms pay their workers around two percent more than small 
firms. Consequently, results based on continuous firm size variable (employment) 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
82 For details, see Table 6.2 in Chapter 6. 
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seem to suggest that a one-percent increase in employer size leads to a two-percent 
increase in average pay, even after controlling for workplace characteristics that affect 
productivity.  
 
Furthermore, the firm’s human capital such as its share of skilled and higher education 
workers positively affects its workers’ average monthly pay. In contrast, its share of 
female and foreign workers negatively affects its workers’ average monthly pay. 
Moreover, the firm’s performance such as profitability and productivity also played an 
important role in determining the worker’s average pay. In addition, foreign-owned 
firms and regional variations have a positive and significant impact on the average 
monthly pay.  
 
To sum up, we found some evidence that the Malaysian pay structure is under 
imperfect competition, where employers have market power (as in setting wages) in 
the Malaysian manufacturing sector. According to Manning (2003a), in an imperfect 
competition, the supply labour curve facing the firm is not infinitely elastic but is 
upward sloping in relation to the average worker’s pay. In this respect, an employer 
may set wages below the marginal revenue product if there is no competition in the 
labour market. The more inelastic the labour supply, the larger will the gap be between 
the achievable wage rate and the marginal revenue product. This may be indicative of 
a monopsonistic market structure where firms with bigger market share also have a 
higher mark-up on pay.  
 
In other words, the proposed model fits the data well, as the F-statistics are highly 
significant at all conventional levels. However, this study only uses a cross-sectional 
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data on employers. Such data is very useful for estimating the Malaysian pay structure 
by matching the relevant employers with their employees’ data. By using this type of 
data, we can match more detailed variables on the demographic characteristics of 
workers with relevant information about the firm in which they currently work. 
Moreover, such matched data will enable us to control for firm effects. 
 
8.2.3 The impact of observable worker characteristics and firm-specific effects 
on the worker’s pay 
 
Based on the datasets on worker-level and firm-level in Chapters 5 and 6, Chapter 7 
of this thesis further analyses the role of employer-employee specific effects in 
determining the worker’s pay in Malaysia using the Malaysian MWFD from one 
common year (i.e. 2006). The MWFD enables us to put together the two sides of the 
labour market, i.e. supply and demand, towards examining pay determination. This 
analysis has focused on examining how the worker’s pay is affected by the employee-
employer specific effects in the Malaysian manufacturing sector – as stated in the 
seventh research question. In addition, this chapter also provides a comparative 
analysis between observable worker characteristics and unobservable employer 
characteristics with a view to ascertaining the dominant one in determining the 
worker’s pay – as outlined in the 9th research question. Furthermore, this chapter also 
addresses the 10th research question, namely: what are the relations between pay 
structure on the one hand and firm’s performance and inputs on the other?  
 
Using this matched data, we are then able to estimate the statistical firm effect, but 
since we only have data for one year, we cannot disentangle part of this effect that is 
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due to unobservable employee or employer heterogeneity. And so, we adapted the two-
stage estimation strategy proposed by Abowd, Kramarz, and Morgalis (2000) in order 
to control for any potential simultaneity bias. 
 
Chapter 7 sets out the results. In the first stage of the analysis, we examine a simple 
linear structure of pay in which the logarithm of monthly pay is explained by the 
measured employee characteristics and firm fixed-effect. At this stage, we found that 
observable worker characteristics and unobservable firm specific fixed-effect both 
play an important role in the determination of pay in Malaysia83. The correlation 
between unobserved firm specific fixed-effect and the log of monthly pay is greater 
than that between observable worker characteristics and the log of monthly pay, as 
shown in Table 7.3 of Chapter 7. 
 
The second stage is to relate the estimated effects of measured worker characteristics 
plus the estimated firm specific fixed-effect on pay to firm performance (i.e. the log of 
value added per worker) and firm size (i.e. the log of total employment). At this stage, 
we also estimate the firm specific fixed-effect on employer and employee 
characteristics, wherein we found that higher paid workers, either because of worker 
characteristics or firm fixed-effects, tend to be employed in firms that are more 
productive and profitable. The relation between firm fixed-effect and profitability can 
either be positive or negative depending on either the efficiency wage effect or the 
dominant rent-sharing effect. This result implies that the Malaysian pay policies are 
                                                                                                                          
                                                 
83 Refer to Table 7.2, Chapter 7. 
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dominated by the efficiency wage effect in accordance with the Productivity-Linked 
Wage System (PLWS).  
 
From an empirical perspective, the studies conducted in the thesis have shown that pay 
rates determination are complex since pay rates are determined by the characteristics 
of both workers and their employers. As long as workers’ and firm’s characteristics 
are uncorrelated, we may still end up with unbiased estimates as to the impact of 
workers’ (or firm’s) characteristics on worker’s pay. This means that both types of 
characteristics have separate yet significant impacts on the worker’s pay. In reality, 
however, employee and employer characteristics are correlated in determining pay 
rates, and this has been captured by the firm-specific fixed-effects. Such firm-specific 
fixed-effects can only be estimated when employees’ data are matched with those of 
their employer. The use of an employer-employee matched dataset should also make 
the analysis more robust if claims made by its proponents are true. The empirical 
literature utilizing a matched dataset is highly concentrated on developed countries 
and relies mainly on population surveys that provide little information on employer or 
firm characteristics. There is thus a greater need for studies that focus more on 
developing countries, which is exactly why this thesis, in having utilized employer-
employee matched datasets from Malaysia (a middle-income economy), can fill such 
a gap. 
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8.3 Policy recommendations 
 
The findings of this thesis offer useful insights in terms of policy implications for 
policy makers in Malaysia and elsewhere. Based on the results of empirical analyses 
presented in the previous chapters, this study has found that both employee and 
employer characteristics play a pivotal role in determining pay in the Malaysian 
manufacturing sector. Therefore, both characteristics should be of concern to 
employees, employers, as well as government. This section presents a few suggestions 
as how to improve the workers’ pay in Malaysia. 
 
8.3.1 Strengthen the quality of the Malaysian labour force 
 
This thesis has emphasized worker characteristics, particularly the level of educational 
attainment, as the key determinants with a positive impact on the worker’s pay. The 
median monthly pay for those with tertiary education is found to be the highest 
compared to other educational qualifications. In 2010, 58 percent of the Malaysian 
labour force had only a secondary-level education, 13.2 percent had primary-level 
education, and 2.6 percent had no formal education at all (DOSM, 2012). This implies 
that in 2010 nearly three-quarters of the Malaysian labour force were low-skilled.  
 
 Thus, improving the quality of the labour force requires the participation of the 
Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE) and the Ministry of Education (MOE). The 
education system needs to be reformed so as to produce students with strong analytical 
and problem-solving capabilities, a good command of English, and effective social 
networking skills. Moreover, embedding soft skills elements in the curriculum at the 
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school level is one possible solution. Including soft skills in the school curriculum will 
also allow students to learn the necessary skills early. Recognition of the need for soft 
skills in the education system, combined with a refinement of the examination-based 
education system, will go a long way to improving the quality of the workforce in 
terms of academic and non-academic skills, both of which are particularly important 
in the modern labour market.  
 
8.3.2 Improve the employability skills among graduates and workers 
 
Apart from education, this thesis has also emphasized that skills and training also have 
a significant and positive impact on the worker’s pay. The Ninth Malaysian Plan 
(9MP) shows that only 28 percent of the Malaysian population can be considered 
highly skilled. In addition, the talent base of the Malaysian workforce has lagged 
behind the standard found in high-income economies. However, under the Economic 
Transformation Programme for becoming a high-income nation, the country needs an 
additional 1.3 million workers from the Technical Vocational Education and Training 
(TVET) sector (e.g. technicians and associate professionals) by the year 2020. For this 
to happen, the government and the private sector will need to create many jobs with 
reasonable pay that increases with work experience in the TVET sector and in many 
occupations. 
 
8.3.3 Fostering industrial training programmes 
 
Based on our findings, employees’ productivity is one of the key factors for improving 
pay in Malaysia. In order to improve the employee’s productivity, various steps should 
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be taken to improve the existing training provided by both employers and government. 
For example, training should be given to employees at all levels and it should also be 
done consistently and on a regular basis throughout the employee’s career. This is 
because, unlike other developed countries such as Japan, there is no constant and long-
term training for Malaysian enterprises. In addition, the public and private sector 
should collaborate more often in organising training programmes that will benefit both 
parties in the end.  
 
8.3.4 Enhance the productivity of small medium enterprises (SMEs) 
 
Our findings also point to employer size as well as firm performance as having a 
significant and positive impact on the worker’s pay. As a matter of fact, compared to 
its regional peers as well as those in more developed countries, Malaysia’s SMEs are 
categorised by: (1) relatively low productivity; (2) lower business formation rates than 
in high-income countries; (3) concentration of output and employment in a relatively 
small number of firms; and (4) a high share of SMEs operating in the informal sector. 
Moreover, of the total business establishment in Malaysia, 99.2 percent are SMEs. 
SMEs contribute around 32 percent of Malaysia’s GDP, 59 percent of its employment, 
and 19 percent of its exports (Southeast Asian Economic Outlook, 2013). 
 
Accordingly, productivity enhancement among SMEs is thus critical for improving the 
workers’ pay. Therefore, policies that encouraging greater innovation and technology, 
enhancing human capital and entrepreneurship development among SMEs, expanding 
market access for products produced by SMEs., should be created and fostered. In 
addition, efforts to improve demand for SME products should be made, while the 
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presence as well as the role of supporting institutions, particularly in rural areas, should 
be promoted. 
 
8.4 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 
The use of worker-level, firm-level as well as matched employer-employee datasets to 
perform a comprehensive study on pay determination is relatively new in the context 
of Malaysia. Despite the best endeavours by the author, there are some inevitable 
limitations to this work. First, even though we were able to estimate statistical firm 
effects in Chapter 7, we could not (yet) identify separately the part of this effect that 
is due to unobservable individual heterogeneity versus unobservable employer 
heterogeneity with our cross sectional clustered data.  
 
Second, we still expect the presence of self-selection even within firms. Unfortunately, 
we do not have longitudinal or panel data that would allow us to control for individual 
unobserved effects. Nevertheless, we expect that by including information on formal 
educational level, occupation, and other details pertaining to the human capital 
variable, we may be able to mitigate this problem. In addition, datasets that include 
sectors other than manufacturing might provide interesting insights, especially if and 
when the results presented here can also be confirmed for the other industries. 
 
This thesis has had to utilise three separate datasets from one common year (2006) to 
examine the pay determination and its structure in the Malaysian economy. 
Developing a new and dedicated dataset on this issue of pay would of course be too 
costly and even unrealistic. However, a number of improvements may be suggested. 
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First, all three datasets are cross sectional with limited work histories so that gauging 
changes over time is tricky if not impossible. A full-blown panel dataset with questions 
on employee or employer characteristics and labour market outcome whilst desirable 
may not be feasible.  The best that one can appeal for is that the current survey be 
repeated so that the researcher has at his or her disposal a repeated cross sectional 
dataset.  
 
The theoretical framework and empirical study in this thesis have here and there hinted 
at these suggestions for further research. Firstly, besides worker and firm 
heterogeneity, a third important dimension of wage formation is job title heterogeneity 
(Torres et al., 2012). By incorporating job title fixed effects into the pay regression, 
we can make better progress in determining the contribution of job title heterogeneity. 
And by properly accounting for job title heterogeneity, one should be able to provide 
refined estimates that are filtered from the effects of job title heterogeneity and firm 
fixed-effects. This should shed additional light on the current debate concerning the 
role of assortative matching, as measured through the association between worker- and 
firm-fixed effects. 
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